

HOMELAND OR TERRITORY?

Four Ways of Understanding Israel's West Side

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Many thanks to:

Eve

Tali

Michael

Adam

Johanna

CONTENTS

	<u>Curriculum Rationale</u>	<i>iv</i>
	<u>Preface</u>	<i>viii</i>
PROLOGUE	<u>PERSPECTIVE AND EMPATHY EXAMINED</u>	1
ONE	<u>THOSE WHO LIVE IN THEM (Scripted)</u>	3
	<u>Lesson 1</u> – An Introduction to the Settler’s Israel	5
	<u>Lesson 2</u> – An Ancient Promise	7
	<u>Lesson 3</u> – A Promising Return	11
	<u>Lesson 4</u> – A Land Made Whole	13
	<u>Lesson 5</u> – Disappointment with Disengagement	15
	<u>Lesson 6</u> – Expressions of Covenant	17
TWO	<u>THOSE WHO CLAIM THEM</u>	19
	<u>Lesson 1</u> – Modern Bonds & Ancient Ties	21
	<u>Lesson 2</u> – Torn Asunder	23
	<u>Lesson 3</u> – Adding Insult to Injury	25
	<u>Lesson 4</u> – Defiance	27
	<u>Lesson 5</u> – When Hope Becomes Forlorn	29
	<u>Lesson 6</u> – A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words	31
THREE	<u>THOSE WHO SUPPORT THEM</u>	33
	<u>Lesson 1</u> – Revising Zionism	35
	<u>Lesson 2</u> – Trial by Fire	37
	<u>Lesson 3</u> – Lessons in Diplomacy	39
	<u>Lesson 4</u> – Defense in Action	41
FOUR	<u>THOSE WHO WOULD TEAR THEM DOWN</u>	43
	<u>Lesson 1</u> – Cautious Optimism	45
	<u>Lesson 2</u> – Pyrrhic Victory	47
	<u>Lesson 3</u> – Desperate Measures I	49
	<u>Lesson 4</u> – Desperate Measures II	
EPILOGUE	<u>PERSPECTIVE AND EMPATHY IN ACTION</u>	51
	<u>ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY</u>	53
	<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u>	54

APPENDICES

PROLOGUE	LEARNING MATERIALS FOR PROLOGUE	59
ONE	LEARNING MATERIALS FOR UNIT ONE	63
	Lesson 1 – An Introduction to the Settler’s Israel	64
	Lesson 2 – An Ancient Promise	69
	Lesson 3 – A Promising Return	77
	Lesson 4 – A Land Made Whole	83
	Lesson 5 – Disappointment with Disengagement	87
	Lesson 6 – Expressions of Covenant	94
TWO	LEARNING MATERIALS FOR UNIT TWO	95
	Lesson 1 – Modern Bonds & Ancient Ties	97
	Lesson 2 – Torn Asunder	101
	Lesson 3 – Adding Insult to Injury	N/A
	Lesson 4 – Defiance	107
	Lesson 5 – When Hope Becomes Forlorn	110
	Lesson 6 – Pictures of Home	112
THREE	LEARNING MATERIALS FOR UNIT THREE	113
	Lesson 1 – Revising Zionism	115
	Lesson 2 – Trial by Fire	125
	Lesson 3 – Lessons in Diplomacy	147
	Lesson 4 – Defense in Action	172
FOUR	LEARNING MATERIALS FOR UNIT FOUR	173
	Lesson 1 – Cautious Optimism	N/A
	Lesson 2 – Pyrrhic Victory	175
	Lesson 3 – Desperate Measures I	N/A
	Lesson 4 – Desperate Measures II	N/A

HOMELAND OR TERRITORY?

A Rationale

“Homeland or Territory?” contains a syllabus designed specifically for Jewish high school students, although one may adapt the course material to suit other audiences. There are no prerequisites, but a familiarity with Israeli history would prove beneficial.

“Homeland or Territory?” intends to help students define or develop their relationship with Israel using perspective and empathy to analyze one of the critical issues in Israel that appear to consistently trouble liberal American Jews.

“Homeland or Territory?” by design, can function in a variety of settings. The included syllabus assembles students for 22 lessons in a lounge setting, such as a café.

"Never let the facts get in the way of a good story." –Frank Dobie.

"Any fool can criticize, condemn, and complain, but it takes character and self-control to be understanding and forgiving." -Dale Carnegie.

Countless studies, most recently those of Jewish researchers Steven Cohen and Ari Kelman conclude that young American Jews express substantially increasing indifference or even antipathy towards Israel.¹ Such findings appear exceptionally applicable to young liberal Jews, who often express suspicion towards the historical Zionist myths and modern Israeli policies that once received a warm welcome among American Jews.² Unfortunately, as preeminent Israel educator Lisa Grant notes, “the teaching of Israel in American Jewish education has been much more often about the myth and miracle than it has been about the work of creating a relationship of mutuality based upon deep knowing and rich understanding.”³

The confounding task of fashioning a “relationship of mutuality based upon deep knowing and rich understanding” remains the primary obstacle facing Israel education today. In his ethnography of Israel education at Camp Ramah, leading scholar of Israel education Alex Sinclair suggests that effective Israel education must achieve two distinct goals, resolution and connection. Sinclair represents the two goals as intersecting axes, as shown in Figure 1.⁴ Resolution, the vertical axis, represents the comprehensiveness of the student’s knowledge, while connection, the horizontal axis, represents the level of identification that an individual feels towards Israel. Israel education, according to Sinclair, must aim for the top-right quadrant, producing students who, “feel deeply committed to Israel and who see it as an integral part




Figure 1. Sinclair’s axes of resolution and connection.

¹ Steven Cohen and Ari Kelman, “Beyond Distancing: Young Adult American Jews and their Alienation from Israel,” *Jewish Identity Project of Reboot* (2007), 2, <http://bjpa.org/Publications/details.cfm?PublicationID=326> (accessed November 20, 2011).

² Peter Beinart, “The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment,” *The New York Review of Books* (2010), <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/failure-american-jewish-establishment>, accessed December 13, 2011).

³ Lisa Grant, “Pluralistic Approaches to Israel Education,” *Journal of Jewish Education* 77 (2011): 2.

⁴ Alex Sinclair, “A New Heuristic Device for the Analysis of Israel Education: Observations from a Jewish Summer Camp,” *Journal of Jewish Education* 75 (2009): 82.

of their identity, and who also have a hi-res view of Israel, replete with its details, complexities, frustrations, and realities, both wondrous and worrisome.”⁵

In order to determine how to establish connection, we must determine how students understand the knowledge that they learn. In their acclaimed work on curricular design, *Understanding by Design*, Grant Wiggins and Jay McTighe discuss six facets of understanding.⁶ Although each facet contributes to the fashion in which students understand knowledge, two directly address our relationships with others – perspective, the willingness to embrace solutions from multiple vantage points, and empathy, the ability to adopt alternate viewpoints as our own. Understandings that require perspective and empathy must always create connection, as one cannot truly empathize without connecting. Therefore, when exercised in concert, perspective and empathy represent the tools necessary to achieve connection, to confidently move forward along the horizontal and vertical axes of Sinclair’s heuristic.

This course intends to help students develop, in Grant’s words, a “relationship of mutuality based upon deep knowing and rich understanding” with Israel by teaching the following enduring understandings:

1. A comprehensive assessment of settlements requires both perspective and empathy.
2. A thoughtful American Jewish relationship with Israel cannot ignore the facets of Israeli society that challenge American Jewish values.

Students will examine settlements from the following perspectives:

1. Those who Live in Them: Specifically, the National Religious Settler.
2. Those who Claim Them: Specifically, the Palestinian.
3. Those who Support Them: Specifically, the Israelis who advocate continued settlement in order to secure Jewish safety.
4. Those who would Dismantle Them: Specifically, the Israelis who advocate destroying settlements as part of the peace process.

This course is intended for Jewish high school and college students. The growing global and national obsession with the Middle East (and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in particular) finds expression in the high school and university settings, amidst the marketplace of ideas about Israel that compels Jewish students either to develop or evaluate their relationship with Israel. Jewish college students, especially, often receive scrutiny from peers, professors, and activists who expect them to fluently articulate or even defend their relationship with the Jewish state.

⁵ Sinclair, 83.

⁶ Grant Wiggins and Jay McTighe, *Understanding by Design* (Alexandria, Virginia: Pearson, 2005), 84. The six facts of understanding according to Wiggins and McTighe are: explanation, interpretation, application, perspective, empathy, and self-knowledge.

As Jewish students begin to reevaluate their beliefs and existing relationship to Israel, they may discover that their relationship with Israel lacks a viable understanding of the viewpoints and motivations at stake in Israel, what Sinclair refers to as resolution. This course intends to supply or reinforce that understanding. *This course does not promote Israel advocacy.* Rather, the course intends to provide students with the skills necessary to fashion an independent relationship with Israel using perspective and empathy.

Just as the high school and college settings ask students to evaluate their beliefs and relationships, it also asks students to evaluate how and where they spend their casual time. This course employs a collegial, social setting for several reasons. First, the setting may encourage participation among students that would scoff at spending their free time in a classroom environment. Second, the setting may inspire students to believe that they can enjoy free time spent in conversation regarding serious subject matter. Third, the setting attempts to brand the subject matter as more than an academic concern by likening the students' relationship with Israel to social relationships.

Instructors who seek to help their students develop a strong identification with Israel should consider this curriculum as a means for helping Jewish American students construct a healthy relationship with Israel. By giving students the opportunity to draw their own conclusions from empathizing with multiple perspectives, instructors will empower students with the tools necessary to honestly and intelligently develop their own relationship with Israel throughout their lifetimes, even in the face of criticism from professors, peers, and even media biases.

"Friendship is a living thing that lasts only as long as it is nourished with kindness, empathy, and understanding." -Anonymous.

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HOMELAND OR TERRITORY?

Preface

Dear Teacher,

Thank you for considering this curriculum guide for your students. We hope that it will provide your students with the information and skills necessary to accept the multiplicity of legitimate views regarding settlements and, ultimately, arrive at their own perspective on the issue. In addition, we hope that it will help you teach your students the value of perspective and empathy when assessing problems of all sorts. With this in mind, we would like to take note of the following:

Overall Philosophy. This curriculum intends to help students cultivate four distinct perspectives and try on those perspectives as their own. The curriculum aims to teach students that these perspectives all represent legitimate means of viewing the circumstances at hand in the arena of settlements. Therefore, students will spend little time employing critical evaluation skills. We expect students to do so on their own. Rather, we seek to inform student evaluations by familiarizing them with new perspectives and asking them to think like people who champion that perspective. In order to more fully inhabit the perspective at hand, we suggest employing the vocabulary used by each perspective and during that perspective's unit. We have included some important vocabulary words during the introduction to each unit.

Classroom Technology. Although we designed this course with the intent of taking advantage of existing communications technology, we have left the choice up to the teacher whether to employ paper or computers for classroom activities, except in certain, prescribed situations. We recommend that, aside from books required for purchase, this course can remain nearly paperless. However, this is now *your* course, and we expect that you will choose the right approach for your learners.

Required Materials. We have provided copies of most of the materials used within the course. However, the course uses a significant amount of material from two books and one film, making it necessary to purchase these for use during the class. They are as follows:

Avni, Ronit, and Julia Bacha, dir. *Encounter Point*. Just Vision Films, 2006, film.

Buber, Martin. *A Land of Two Peoples*, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

Matar, Dina. *What It Means to Be Palestinian*. New York, New York: IB Taurus, 2011.

These materials provide integral course content and can be purchased with little cost.

Assessment Methodology. As you will see, the course primarily employs two forms of assessment: reflection and project based learning. First, each lesson contains a section entitled 'Reflection.' These reflections offer students time to write individual journals, memoirs, or, in some cases, poetry, in order to practice empathy for the perspective that they learned during the lesson. However, these opportunities will soon prove ineffectual if the teacher does not carefully review these reflective activities and offer feedback. In many ways, these are starting points for

conversations. So, if you feel that your students demonstrate the maturity necessary to share their feelings with others, please feel free to arrange the reflections in a way that allows students to share their individual thoughts with one another. We recommend creating a closed online community for the class where students can post their reflective responses and comment upon each other's work, such as [Ning](#) or [VoiceThread](#).

Second, the first three units each contain a project-based assessment to be completed at the end of the unit. These assessments require the students to create editorials in Unit One, graphic advertisements in Unit Two, and video advertisements in Unit Three –which depict and champion the perspective studied during that unit. These three projects serve as drafts for the final curriculum evaluation, where students will divide into groups that champion one of the four perspectives that they studied – using an editorial, a photo advertisement, and a video advertisement. As a class, the students may then present their work to their school or congregational community, teaching the community about the multiplicity of relevant opinions on this topic of contemporary interest.

We have chosen not to require an assessment for the fourth unit in order to allow time for students to work on the cumulative assessment. Since many liberal American Jews express sympathies towards those who would tear the settlements down (Unit Four), we felt that requiring a unit assessment seemed unnecessary. However, if you feel that your class leans toward Revisionist ideals (Unit Three), feel free to swap the order of Units Three and Four.

Guest Speakers. In order to facilitate empathy and in order to provide genuine assessment of student work by members of the field, this course employs liberal use of guest speakers. There exist many resources throughout the United States and Europe with access to free speakers who can represent the viewpoints covered within this curriculum. If you find difficulty scheduling a speaker, feel free to contact the author for assistance. However, we suggest relying upon local community resources in order to obtain speakers to facilitate the assessments. Most Jewish communities have access to individuals with experience in creating editorials, photo advertisements, and video advertisements, and would likely welcome the opportunity to teach students their craft.

Memorable Moments. As a course designed to change the way students think, “Homeland or Territory?” contains many memorable moments, each designed to help students view the world from the perspective of another. We wanted to highlight particular activities that we feel may represent memorable moments for your class.

1. Unit I, Lesson 4: Decision-Making. Students create a mock settlement.
2. Unit I, Lesson 5: Guest Speaker.
3. Unit II, Lesson 3: Text Study with Role-Plays. Students act as Palestinians wounded by the 1967 War.
4. Unit II, Lesson 5: Guest Speaker.
5. Unit III, Lesson 5: Guest Speaker.

Lesson Objectives and Bloom's Taxonomy. Following each lesson objective, instructors will find a number in parentheses. This number indicates the level on Bloom's taxonomy corresponding to the lesson objective. The levels of Bloom's taxonomy are as follows:

1. Knowledge. The ability to recognize or recall information.
2. Comprehension. The ability to organize or arrange information within one's mind and portray that information in an individualized fashion.
3. Application. The ability to apply information in new situations.
4. Analysis. The ability to use information in order to develop conclusions.
5. Synthesis. The ability to generate new ideas, to make predictions, or to solve problems using information.
6. Evaluation. The ability to use information in order to judge the merits of an idea, theory, or viewpoint.

Video Narratives. At the time of this publication, many of the video narratives are pending production. In the summer of 2012, the author will conduct interviews in order to obtain video narratives for the course. He may obtain additional narratives, which may alter the course slightly or simply provide additional resources for the teacher.

Point of Contact. The point of contact for this curriculum is the author, available at jknobel@huc.edu. Good luck in your endeavor. I hope that this guide helps your students develop an authentic, meaningful relationship with Israel, based upon fact and understanding. I also hope that this guide enables you to open the eyes of your students to a new world of knowledge and understanding, one that enables them to travel into the world with their eyes open to the many wonderful ways of understanding not only Israel, but the world in which we live.

Respectfully,
Joshua D. Knobel
Student, HUC-JIR

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PROLOGUE

Perspective and Empathy Examined

This lesson introduces students to the territories and to the methodology of the course, namely, understanding settlements by cultivating knowledge of multiple perspectives and developing empathy for each perspective. In this introductory lesson, students will “try on” perspective and empathy using situations from their everyday lives prior to employing the techniques throughout the course.

Objectives

- Students will be able to determine why so many perspectives on settlements exist (4).
- Students will be able to provide examples of perspective and empathy (2).
- Students will be able to examine problems using a multi-perspective approach (4).

Set Induction

- Ask students, on a piece of paper, to write down a short definition of ‘Israeli settlements.’ Afterwards, students should crumple the paper and place it in the middle of the room.
- When all students have completed their definitions, each student will grab a piece of paper (not their own), and students will read the papers in a circle.
- Taking note of the differences in definitions, ask students why they feel that the definitions differ so much.

Concept Attainment – Perspective and Empathy

- Prepare examples that depict different types of understanding. The 1st examples should include scenarios where subjects demonstrate perspective. The 2nd examples should include scenarios where students demonstrate empathy. The 3rd examples include scenarios where subjects demonstrate understanding via different methods. For some examples, see “Definitions of Perspective and Empathy,” in the appendix.
- Provide the students with examples, and ask them, in pairs, to determine the qualities that define the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd examples and distinguish the categories from one another.
- After students have arrived at an idea of what unifies the individual categories and separates them from one another, ask students to design new examples that meet their criteria of the 1st and 2nd.
- Review the students’ suggestions.
- Provide definitions of empathy and perspective from ‘Definitions of Perspective and Empathy,’ located in the appendix.
- Ask the students to review the new examples that they designed earlier and modify them, if necessary, to incorporate what they learned from the definitions.

Welcome and Administrative Information

- This time has been allotted for welcoming and meeting students, learning a bit about them, and disseminating administrative data such as a syllabus, course expectations, etc.

Survey

- Students will individually fill out a survey provided by the teacher.

Resources

- Survey of Israeli Settlements.
- Definitions of Perspective and Empathy, with examples.

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ONE

Those Who Live in Them

This unit introduces students to the viewpoints of Israelis who live within the settlements. Although students will receive a brief introduction to different types of settlers in Lesson 1, the unit will focus upon National Religious settlers. Students will learn how National Religious settlers see and refer to the Land of Israel by exploring the narrative of Israel through the National Religious lens.

That narrative begins midway through Lesson 1 with the Biblical depiction of Israel's borders. The narrative continues in Lesson 2 with an analysis of Israel's import as the lynchpin of the covenant between the People of Israel and the God of Israel and continues with a brief exploration of the articulation of the relationship between People and Land during Exile.

Subsequently, in Lesson 3, students study changes in the relationship that result from the return from Exile. In Lesson 4, they focus upon the reunification of the Land in 1967, and, in Lesson 5, the dismantlement of settlements in the hopes of peace. Students conclude their studies of the National Religious viewpoint by preparing a draft editorial summarizing the view, as introduced in Lesson 6.

Enduring Understandings

- A comprehensive assessment of Israeli settlements requires an open-minded, faithful exploration of the narrative of the Land from the viewpoint of the people who live within the settlements.

Knowledge (According to this Narrative)

- According to the Bible, the Land of Israel represents a lynchpin of the covenant between the God of Israel and the People of Israel.
- Jewish tradition during the classical and medieval periods expresses faith in the Biblical covenant with the Land of Israel through prayer, commentary, philosophy, and the arts.
- Zionism and the successful capture of Judea and Samaria in 1967 represent steps along the path towards fulfilling God's promise to Israel, the return to Zion promised within the Bible.
- Abdication of settlements in return for peace represents a backwards step in the Jewish people's journey to fulfill the requirements necessary for Redemption.

Vocabulary

- Judea and Samaria: Terms used by many Israelis since 1967 in order to refer to the territory captured from Jordan during the Six-Day War. The Jordanians referred to the same territory as the West Bank, as the land rests on the west bank of the Jordan River.

Skills

- Students will be able to justify National Religious attitudes towards the Land of Israel using ancient and contemporary sources.
- Students will be able to express the hopes, concerns, and disappointments of contemporary National Religious settlers.

Evidence of Learning

- Students will record journal entries and/or poetry, written from the National Religious point of view, in response to exile, the creation of the state, the conclusion of the 1967 war, and the destruction of a nearby settlement.
- In groups, students will write an editorial, designed to appear within the Temple bulletin or school publication, representing the National Religious point of view and requesting ideological support from Temple or school members for their cause.

Lesson 1

An Introduction to the Settler's Israel

Objectives

- Students will be able to recognize and illustrate the existence of multiple settlement citizens and communities that lay outside the National Religious narrative (1).
- Students will be able to describe the Land of Israel using National Religious vocabulary (2) and select important cities and sights based upon National Religious principles (3).
- Students will be able to create maps of Israel using Biblical source texts as a guide (5).

Set Induction

- Break students into pairs and ask them to jot down everything they know or think they know about settlements and settlers.
- Ask the pairs to share their findings with the class and highlight similarities and differences between the characteristics provided by the pairs.

Videos and Discussion – What Do Settlers Look Like?

- Students watch the three selected video narratives from Israelis living in Samaria. The first depicts a settler from Ariel who lives in Ariel for financial purposes. The second portrays an elderly settler from Gush Etzion who first moved there for security purposes, and the third, a Religious Zionist from Hebron. Prior to each video narrative, show a map revealing the location of the village. The map should contain the borders of the West Bank/Samaria, but no words demarking the area.
- Students will discuss the narratives presented to them, focusing upon the motivations behind living in Samaria (or the West Bank, depending upon the narrative) revealed by each settler. Guiding questions may include:
 - “Which area did these people choose to live in?” *Cities, the West Bank, Judea and Samaria, Israel, etc.* Introduce the multiplicity of names for the area containing the settlements.
 - What reasons did these individuals reveal for settling in this area? *Financial reasons, commute, more space, devotion to Israel, devotion to Holy Land.*
 - Do some of these reasons surprise you? Why or why not? *I didn't expect people to live there just for a commute, I thought settlers all wanted all the land, I had no expectations...*
- Formally introduce the Religious Zionist settler narrative and inform students that the remainder of their study will focus on this one narrative, to the exclusion of others.

Text Study and Map Drawing – A Land unlike Any Other

- Students break into groups and receive Biblical quotes and corresponding maps that define the dimensions of the land of Israel. Using the same blank map provided during the set induction, students create a map of Israel using the texts as a guide. Students also select the five most important cities, as suggested by their experience with the Bible.
- If the students lack a sense of Biblical geography, the teacher may wish to show the students how to conduct an electronic concordance search of the Bible in order to determine how often the name of a particular city appears (Jerusalem would serve as a good example). In order to assist the endeavor, provide a list of cities, both modern and Biblical, for the students to search (although the teacher must take care to ensure that the spelling matches the text used for the concordance search, if the list is in English). If

time is lacking, the teacher may provide a concordance search, although such a decision eliminates a potential area for student discovery.

- After they finish, ask students to post their maps on the wall (or upload them to the group's web working area) and survey their classmates' maps in order compare.
- Students will query one another and their instructor in order to define a 'class map,' with agreed-upon dimensions for Biblical Israel and five important cities. Students must explain their final choices as a class. Upload this map to the class web site.

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect upon the differences between the Biblical map selected by the class, a map of Israel that includes the West Bank, and a map of Israel bereft of Samaria [with important Biblical cities denoted].
- Students will respond to the following:
 - "These maps of Israel today seem a bit different from the map that we created in class. What do you think these differences might mean to someone who takes the Bible literally?"
 - "If you believed that Israel should contain all the land demarcated by our map from class, what do you think giving up the entire region of Samaria would mean to you? What is lost?"

Resources

- Videos:
 - Settler, Ariel.
 - Settler, Gush Etzion.
 - Settler, Hebron.
- Maps:
 - Israel (Genesis 15).
 - Israel (Numbers 34/Ezekiel 47).
 - Israel (Borderless Map).
- The Bible:
 - Genesis 15:18-21.
 - Exodus 23:20-31.
 - Numbers 34:1-15.
 - Deuteronomy 1:6-8.
 - Ezekiel 47:13-20.

Lesson 2 An Ancient Promise

Objectives

- Students will be able to fashion an articulation of the relationship between the God of Israel, the People of Israel, and the Land of Israel using the Bible (5).
- Students will be able to hypothesize and describe the meaning of the Land of Israel to the People of Israel in the ancient and medieval Diaspora, using Jewish prayers, Biblical commentary, philosophy, and artistic works as evidence for their claims (5).

Set Induction

- In advance, ask students to bring to class a cherished gift from a loved one that symbolizes the love that exists between them. Ask students to consider why and how the gift symbolizes love. *My parents gave me this locket because they loved me, this picture shows how they feel about me, they knew that I loved sports, so they bought me this jacket, etc.*
- Ask students to consider what they would feel like if they lost this gift, yet continued to see it and hear about it constantly, either in pictures, in videos, or even in conversations. *I wouldn't care, It would mean something, I would be angry, sorrowful, etc.*

Etch-a-Sketch Notes – The Bible on Israel

- Demonstrate Etch-a-Sketch notes for the students using one of the gifts brought into class (the teacher can also bring a gift of her/his own, which eliminates any risk of violating the trust inherent in discussing such a personal subject in front of the class). *Etch-a-Sketch notes require a student to examine a text or artifact, draw a picture representing the meaning of the object of study, and then write brief notes.* For the demonstration, prepare the sketch and notes in a manner that addresses the meaning of the gift and the motivation for it.
- A pair of students will take a Biblical quote regarding the role of the Land of Israel within the covenant between God and the People. The pair will create an Etch-a-Sketch note for the quote, addressing the meaning of the Land and the motivations regarding God and the People of Israel regarding the Land.
- After they finish, ask students to post their notes on the wall (or upload them to the group's web working area) and survey their classmates' notes in order to compare.
- Ask the students to develop a consensus expression regarding the Land of Israel and its meaning for the God of Israel and the People of Israel, using the quotes and Etch-a-Sketch notes as guides. In order to guide the conversation, you may wish to ask the following:
 - “Now that you've seen these quotes and your classmates' opinions, what do you think the Land of Israel means to the People of Israel and the God of Israel?” *It is a symbol of God's love, It is a part of the covenant, it is our duty to inherit it, it is just land, etc.*
 - “Now, let's put these answers together to agree on a clear definition of what this Land means, not just to us, but to God, according to the Bible.”

Jigsaw with Window Notes – Expressions of Longing

- Demonstrate Window Notes for the students using a Biblical quote from the previous exercise. *Window Notes require students to take four separate categories of notes after examining and inspecting an object. Teachers may facilitate the process by preparing*

note sheets with columns representing the types of notes desired. The Window Notes used for this exercise will include:

- Facts (as suggested by the material).
- Feelings demonstrated by the author towards Israel.
- Feelings inspired within the reader.
- Questions raised by the material.
- Students break into three expert groups: literature, prayer, and commentary.
- Students proceed to separate learning stations, where they will find a brief introduction to their field, a brief introduction to their authors or prayers, and works from each field.
- Students review the works in their expert groups and create Window Notes for the works they study.
- Remix the groups so that one student from each group (literature, prayer, and commentary) sits in each new group.
- Students share their notes with one another.
- Assemble students for brief discussion, focusing upon the feelings demonstrated within the material and the feelings inspired by the material. Guiding questions may include:
 - “Why do you think the writer feels the way you state he did?” *The writer may miss Israel, the writer may feel homeless, life wasn’t good for the Jews of that period in that place, the Jews didn’t have their own home, since the Land represented a covenant between God and the people, the Jews might feel that since they no longer have the Land, God no longer loves them.*
 - “How does it make you feel?”
 - “What is the writer’s relationship to the Land of Israel? How can you tell?” *The author longs for the Land of Israel, as shown by the imagery, the writer feels that Israel is a crown jewel, the writer feels unworthy of the land of Israel.*

Reflection

- Students will select any one of the following: a prayer, a poem, a short story, or a Biblical commentary that articulates the relationship between pre-Zionist Diaspora Jews and Israel.
- Students will respond to the following:
 - “From the text you selected, what does the Land of Israel mean?”
 - “Does the Land of Israel have any role in the way the author of your text approaches God? If so, how?”
 - “Based upon a careful reading of the text, can you suggest a metaphor for Israel?”

Resources

- The Bible:
 - Genesis 13:14-17, 17:7-8.
 - Deuteronomy 30:1-5.
 - 2 Samuel 7:10-16.
 - Jeremiah 31:31-40.
- The Prayer Book:
 - *Ahavah Rabah.*
 - Selection from *Birkat HaMazon.*
- Medieval Jewish Literature:
 - Judah HaLevi, *The Kuzari: An Argument for the Faith of Israel* (New York, New York: Schocken Books, 1964), 293-295.

- Selected Poems of Judah HaLevi.
 - “A Longing to Return to the Land of Israel.”
 - “Mount Avarim.”
 - “My Lord, Your Dwelling Places Are Lovely.”
- Rashi: Commentary on Genesis 1:1.

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Lesson 3

A Promising Return

Objectives

- Students will be able to express the relationship between the God of Israel, the People of Israel, and the Land of Israel according to the National Religious ideologies expressed by Rav Kook (2).
- Students will be able to determine how Biblical and medieval conceptions of the Land of Israel find expression in the National Religious ideologies expressed by Rav Kook (4).
- Students will be able to fashion personal expressions of the impact that Israeli statehood represents for National Religious settlers (5).

Set Induction

- Ask students to individually write down characteristics of the words ‘national’ and ‘religious.’
- Ask students to share their results and write them on the board, making note of overlap.

Do You Hear What I Hear? – A New Hope

- Read aloud an excerpt from Rav Kook twice. The teacher may simplify language as necessary for the audience (remember, it’s already a translation).
- Next, break students into pairs, and ask them to retell the passage to the other student, who acts as a retelling coach. Each student retells the excerpt.
- Students scramble pairs and answer, either in writing or on computer, three questions provided by the teacher.
 - “What does Israel represent for the Jews, according to Rav Kook?”
 - “What does it mean when Rav Kook refers to, ‘the fire of Israel?’”
 - “What do you think is Rav Kook’s message to the Jews of the early 1900’s?”
- Distribute a copy of the excerpt, asking students to cite evidence from the excerpt in order to support their answers to the questions above.
- Convene students for a brief discussion. Ask the questions provided and ask students to provide their answers, with proof.

Compare and Contrast – Themes of the Land

- Students array in groups and receive an un-cited collection of ideological statements regarding the Land of Israel from the Bible, medieval Jewish texts, and Rav Kook.
- In their groups, students decide how to group the ideological statements within a Venn diagram consisting of Biblical and medieval ideology covered during Lesson 2 and Rav Kook’s ideology learned earlier during Lesson 3.
- Student groups present their Venn diagrams to the class at large.
- Provide the students with the quotes attributions and provide them with time to reconsider the list.

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect upon the lesson through role play that responds to the following:
 - “Imagine that you and your brother/sister are National Religious Zionists who just recently moved to Israel from Eastern Europe in 1925 in the hopes of finding a new home in the Promised Land. You write your parents a letter, informing them how you are doing.”

- “Explain to your parents what Israel means to you. Does it satisfy your longing? Does it bring you closer to God? Does it give you hope? Does it feel like home? If so, why? If not, why not?”

Resources

- Abraham Isaac Kook, “The Land of Israel,” *The Zionist Idea*, ed. Arthur Hertzberg (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: JPS, 1997), 419-421.
- Ideological Statements Sheet.

Lesson 4 A Land Made Whole

Objectives

- Students will be able to express how the 1967 war impacts contemporary National Religious ideology and its articulation of the relationship between the God of Israel, the People of Israel, and the Land of Israel, and the State of Israel (2).
- Students will be able to fashion personal expressions of the impact that the 1967 war represents for National Religious settlers (5).

Set Induction

- In advance, ask students to bring back to class their gift from Lesson 1 (a cherished gift from a loved one that symbolizes the love that exists between them).
- Ask students to consider what they would feel like if, having lost this gift (as discussed in Lesson 1), they found the gift once again. *Pride, joy, contentment, satisfaction, no feeling.*

Peer Reading – Fulfilling the Promise

- Students break into pairs. One student in each pair receives two short lists with accompanying questions, one for the first student and one for the second. Students help one another answer these questions. The texts for this exercise are as follows:
 - “Opinion Paper (1978),” Gush Emunim, from *Israel in the Middle East*, Rabinovich and Remhorz.
 - Student 1 Questions:
 - What circumstances led to the publishing of this document?
 - The author distinguishes between “imaginary peace” and “true peace.” What do you think true peace looks like to the author?
 - Student 2 Questions:
 - Why do the authors reject the proposed peace plan?
 - What do you think is the authors’ alternative to the peace plan?
 - What is the importance of Shiloh and why does it matter to the authors?
 - “The Holy Land and the Value of Life,” Shlomo Goren.
 - Student 1 Questions:
 - What is the primary dilemma that Goren attempts to address?
 - What contrary opinions does Goren evaluate in order to address this dilemma?
 - According to Goren, do Palestinians have the right to live in the Land of Israel? Why or why not?
 - Student 2 Questions:
 - What authorities does Goren consult in order to render his decision?
 - Under what circumstances, according to Goren, can the state risk the lives of individual Soldiers?
- Students assemble to discuss their answers to the questions.

Decision Making – The Import of History

- Students watch a brief testimonial from a National Religious settler who lived in Israel during the Six Day War and pioneered a settlement shortly thereafter, which addresses the following inspirations in settling: religious significance, security, resources, communal commitment, transportation access, and existing Arab presence.
- Students break into groups and review four listed candidates for a potential settlement. Students subjectively rate the areas according to religious significance, security, resources, communal commitment, transportation access, and existing Arab presence. They then select a locale for settlement.
- Student teams prepare a brief of the choice and brief their classmates. In their brief, students should include: A name for their settlement, a Jewish hero or story that represents the new town, and an oath to be sworn by anyone wishing to join them at their new settlement.

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect upon the lesson by answering the following:
 - “Much of our study has tiptoed around the idea of the messiah and the redemption of the Jews, as expressed by Rabinovich and Remhorz. The recovery of Samaria in 1967 represented a large step towards redemption for the Religious Nationalists. Imagine that you were a Religious Nationalist shortly after Israel recaptured Hebron and the Old City of Jerusalem. How do you feel? What should we expect next in terms of Redemption? What are our responsibilities?”

Resources

- Hamas Rabinovich and Yehuda Remhorz, *Israel in the Middle East* (Brandeis: Hanover, 2008), 305-307.
- Shlomo Goren, “The Holy Land and the Value of Life,” *Jerusalem Post*.
- Video: Settlement Testimonial.

Lesson 5 Disappointment with Disengagement

Objectives

- Students will be able to express how withdrawal from settlements impacts contemporary National Religious ideology and its articulation of the relationship between the God of Israel, the People of Israel, and the Land of Israel, and the State of Israel (2).
- Students will be able to fashion original expressions of the emotional impact generated by withdrawal from settlements for National Religious settlers (5).

Set Induction

- In advance, ask students to bring back to class their gift from Lesson 1 (a cherished gift from a loved one that symbolizes the love that exists between them).
- Ask students to consider what they would feel like if having lost this gift and found it again in someone else's hands, an authority figure (other than their loved one) told them that they now had to share the gift with that someone else. For instance, if the gift was from a grandparent, suggest that the student found the gift with a sibling, and the pair's parents then instructed the student to share the gift with that sibling. *Feelings of resentment, amicability, or a lack of emotion may all ensue.*

Reading and Lecture – Redrawing the Map

- Distribute copies (paper or electronic) of Netty Gross' "Religious Zionism's Identity Crisis" and Danny Daryan's September 2007 interview in the *Jerusalem Report*. Provide students time to read the chapter and write down any pertinent questions from the two texts.
- Briefly discuss the Egyptian peace treaty and the withdrawal from Gaza. Afterwards, ask the students to consider settlements within [Gush Katif](#), the settlement area within the Gaza Strip. "What do you think happened to those cities?" *They remain, they have been abandoned, they have been bulldozed, the Palestinians took them over, etc.*
- Provide brief lecture (verbal or audiovisual), explaining the dismantlement of settlements and its impact upon the National Religious movement.

Guest Speaker Q & A – Echoes from the Aftermath

- Formally introduce the guest speaker, a National Religious settler forced to abdicate a settlement.
- Remind students to prepare thoughtful questions and to take care to listen to the emotional impact of the abdication.
- If speaker is not available (locally or via video-teleconference), proceed to task rotation. Otherwise, proceed to individual reflection.

Activity: Task Rotation:

- Students will rotate through the following –
 - Students will listen to the song, Ein Li Eretz Acheret, and read a brief synopsis of the song's history (It began as a song of the left, but became a song of the right following disengagement). Armed with a copy of the lyrics, students will explain how the song expresses the discontent of the settlers, using at least two lyrical quotations as evidence.
 - Write a song, a poem, or a short story that expresses what a National religious settler might feel being forced from his/her home.
 - See Reflection.

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect upon photos of abandoned settlements. Students will comment on the following:
 - “These cities were once homes to families and communities. Can you imagine someone telling you that you had to leave your neighborhood in order to make peace with another country? How do you think you would feel?”
 - “In addition, these cities were more than just homes to the people who lived here. They symbolized God’s love for the people who lived in them. What do you think it feels like to relinquish that gift, to give up something that you knew was meant for you, and you alone?”

Resources

- Eetta Prince-Gibson, “Interview with Danny Dayan,” *The Jerusalem Report* (September 3, 2007), 48.
- Netty Gross, “Religious Zionism’s Identity Crisis,” *The Jerusalem Report* (September 5, 2005), 17-20.
- Photos: Abandoned Settlements, taken by Saul Schwarz.

Lesson 6

Expressions of Covenant

Objectives

- Students will produce an original, persuasive expression of the hopes, concerns, and disappointments of contemporary National Religious settlers (5).

Set Induction

- Hand students an extremely brief editorial from that day's newspaper.
- Ask students, in groups, to analyze the editorial. What is it trying to say? How does it convey its message? What does it do well? Where does it fail? Is this a good medium for conveying this message? What might work better? Why might someone wish to write an editorial? What is the tone of the editorial? What words are used to express the tone? Does the editorial convey emotion? How so?

Introduction to the Assessment

- Hand out two copies of brief editorials that articulate positions on Israel (but not a position on settlements). *Feel free to consult the guest speaker for assistance.*
- Introduce the primary assessment for the unit, a draft editorial, designed to appear within Temple or school bulletin, representing the National Religious point of view and requesting ideological support from school or Temple members for their cause.
- Provide students with a copy of the assignment and assignment rubric.

Assessment Coaching

- Introduce students to the guest speaker, a member of the community well-versed in preparing editorials.
- Allow time for the guest speaker to present the fundamentals of good editorial design and prepare students to craft their editorials.

Resources

- Assignment Rubric

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TWO

Those Who Claim Them

This unit introduces students to the viewpoints of Palestinians (which includes many Arab-Israelis who self-identify as Palestinians) who claim the land currently devoted to Israeli settlements as essential components of a future Palestinian state. Students will learn how Palestinians see and refer to the Land of Israel by exploring the narrative of the land through the Palestinian lens.

That narrative begins in Lesson 1 with a brief exploration of Islam's relationship with Palestine during the Middle Ages. Subsequently, in Lesson 2, students study Palestinian narratives addressing the *nakbah*. Students continue by studying changes in the relationship between Palestinians and the Land that result from the *Naksa*, in Lesson 3, the *intifadas*, in Lesson 4, and the failed peace process, in Lesson 5.

Students conclude their study of the Palestinian perspective by preparing a poster advertisement expressing the Palestinian point of view, as introduced in Lesson 6.

Enduring Understandings

- A comprehensive assessment of Israeli settlements requires an open-minded, faithful exploration of the narrative of the Land from the viewpoint of the people who claim the land used for settlements as part of Palestine.

Knowledge (According to this Narrative)

- Islam possesses a religious and historical relationship with the land of Palestine, specifically the city of Jerusalem.
- The Land of Palestine, including the areas temporarily left during the *nakbah*, represents the home of many Palestinians, who enjoyed a special relationship with their land.
- The *naksa* further separated Palestinians from their homes and insulted the pride and nationality of the Palestinian people.
- The *intifada* represented an inevitable expression of Palestinian national will, pride, and commitment that no occupation or exile can ever hope to extinguish.
- The failed peace process and the security barrier signify Israel's commitment to divest the Palestinians of their national home and national pride.

Vocabulary

- *Al-Nakbah*: 'The catastrophe' refers to Israeli Independence. Its use appears remarkably similar to the Jews' use of *Shoah*, or 'the calamity' to refer to the Holocaust.
- *Al-Naksa*: 'The setback' refers to the 1967 Israeli takeover of the West Bank.
- *Intifada*: 'Shaking off,' refers to the civil insurrections of 1987-91 and the early 2000's, expressions of Palestinian nationalism and a refusal to yield to Zionist aggression.

Skills

- Students will be able to justify Palestinian attitudes towards the land usurped by the Zionists using ancient and contemporary sources.
- Students will be able to express the hopes, concerns, and disappointments of contemporary Palestinians with regard to the land.

Evidence of Learning

- Students will record journal entries, written from the Palestinian point of view, in response to Middle Age conceptions of Palestine, the *nakbah*, the *naksa*, the *intifadas*, and the failed peace process.
- In groups, students will craft a graphic advertisement, complete with a 5-page paper describing the scholarly choices behind the making of the advertisement, designed to appear within a Temple bulletin or school publication, representing the Palestinian point of view and requesting ideological support from Temple or school members for their cause.

Lesson 1 Modern Bonds & Ancient Ties

Objectives

- Students will be able to recognize and illustrate the existence of multiple Palestinian narratives (1).
- Students will be able to determine the common features among multiple Palestinian narratives (3).
- Students will be able to portray the special relationship between Islam and Jerusalem (2).
- Students will be able to suggest how the relationship between Islam and Jerusalem affects contemporary Palestinian views of Palestine (4).

Set Induction

- Break students into pairs and ask them to jot down everything they know or think they know about the origins of Palestine and Palestinians.
- Ask the pairs to share their findings with the class and highlight similarities and differences between the characteristics provided by the pairs.

Videos and Discussion – What Do Palestinians Look Like?

- Students watch three selected video narratives from Palestinians living in the West Bank. The first depicts an elderly Palestinian who abandoned his home west of the Green Line and cannot return. The second portrays a settler who owns farms separated by the security barrier. The last depicts a Palestinian who lost his brother to an Israeli raid but encourages Palestinians living in settlements to make peace with their Israeli neighbors. Prior to each video narrative, show a map revealing the location of the village. The map should contain the borders of the West Bank/Samaria, but no words demarking the area.
- Students will discuss the narratives presented to them, focusing upon the motivations behind each video. Guiding questions may include:
 - Which area does each of these people call home?
 - Do they live in the same home now? Why or why not?
 - Do they intend to return to their ‘homes?’ Why or why not?
 - Do some of these answers surprise you? Why or why not?

Jigsaw with Window Notes – Ancient Ties to Palestine

- Students divide into three groups and each group receives a text.
 - “Umar permits the Jews to Return to Jerusalem,” *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, ed. Norman Stillman.
 - “The Charge of Appointment for a Nagid in Mamluk Egypt,” *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, ed. Norman Stillman.
 - “The Meaning of Isra’ and Mi’raj in Islam,” Huda.
- Each group reads their essay and takes window notes. *Window Notes require students to take separate categories of notes after examining and inspecting an object. Teachers may facilitate the process by preparing note sheets with columns representing the types of notes desired.* The Window Notes used for this exercise will address:
 - Facts about Jerusalem conveyed in the text.
 - Relationship between Islam and Jerusalem suggested by the text.
- Remix the groups so that one student from each group sits in each new group.
- Students share their notes with one another.
- Assemble students in order to conduct a class-wide assessment of their answers.

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect upon Islam’s ancient ties to Palestine and to Jerusalem.
- Students will respond to the following:
 - “Having read about Islam’s relationship with Jerusalem, how important do you think Palestine, and, specifically, Jerusalem, would be to someone who interpreted the Isra’ and Mi’raj literally?”
 - “If you were Muslim and believed that Jerusalem represents a pivotal component of Islamic tradition, would you be satisfied with Israeli control over Jerusalem? Why or why not? What about international control? Please explain.”

Resources

- Video Narratives:
 - Palestinian, Israel.
 - Palestinian, Barrier.
 - Palestinian, Brother.
- “Umar permits the Jews to Return to Jerusalem,” *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, ed. Norman Stillman (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979), 154-155.
- “The Charge of Appointment for a Nagid in Mamluk Egypt,” *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, ed. Norman Stillman (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979), 269-270.
- Huda, “The Meaning of Isra’ and Mi’raj in Islam” (About.com), <http://islam.about.com/od/otherdays/a/isra-miraj.htm> (accessed 1 April 2012).

Lesson 2 Torn Asunder

Objectives

- Students will be able to fashion an articulation of the relationship between the People of Palestine and Palestine prior to the *nakbah* using Palestinian source texts (5).
- Students will be able to identify that Palestinians left their homes during the *nakbah* with the intent to return (1).
- Students will be able to articulate how the *nakbah* impacted the Palestinians' relationship with Palestine (3).

Set Induction

- Ask students to take two minutes to jot down a description of their lunch table with their friends at school. Instruct them to talk about who sits there, what types of conversations take place, what types of food they regularly see, etc.
- Then, ask students to imagine that a new group of students to the school took their lunch table, and their table was forced to split up among the other lunch tables. Ask them to briefly consider, in student discussion, what that lunch, and subsequent lunches would feel like.

Drafting a Letter to the United Nations – The Arab Case for Palestine.

- Ask students to split into three groups. Distribute a copy of the “The Arab Case for Palestine.” Ask students to read the document and prepare letters of their own to the United Nations Delegation asking for support in restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine. Each group will choose a particular focus area for their letter:
 - The historical relationship between the Palestinian people and the land.
 - The violence and upheaval caused by the Zionists.
 - The favoritism exhibited by Britain towards the Jews.
- After students complete their letters, ask students to go around and view the letters of their classmates.
- Finally, conclude with a discussion of the three topics and their role in Palestinian connection to the land of Palestine.

Text Study with Student Presentations – Hasty Departures

- Students break into three groups and each group receives a Palestinian narrative discussing the *nakbah*.
 - Sa'id Barghouti, “A Homeland Has No Borders,”
 - Um Thabet, “I called my daughter Sourriyya’,”
 - Shafik al-Hout, “It Is a Question of Belonging,”
- Provide students with a blank map (either paper or on a slide) of Israel and the surrounding Arab territories.
- Students read their stories and determine how to present the narratives to their fellow students. Instruct students to ensure that they cover:
 - The author's home.
 - The reason that the author departs and his/her feelings towards departure.
 - The expected duration of the author's journey.
 - The author's ultimate destination.
 - The author's potential feelings towards home.
- In addition, students locate the author's home and current location on the map.

- Students present their “stories” to the class.

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect upon the distinction between home and current residence as portrayed by the narratives that they read during class.
- Students will respond to the following:
 - “Take a look at the map you made when summarizing your narrative today. Imagine that you made that journey, that you are now living so far from home.”
 - “Now, imagine that your children, or your brother or your sister, has just asked you why you never call *your current residence* home. In a letter or dialogue, explain to them where home is and what it is like.”

Resources

- “The Arab Office: The Arab Case for Palestine,” *The Israel-Arab Reader*, ed. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 57-62.
- Sa’id Barghouti, “A Homeland Has No Borders,” *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, ed. Dina Matar (New York, New York: IB Taurus, 2011), 31-34.
- Um Thabet, “I called my daughter Sourriyya’,” *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, ed. Dina Matar (New York, New York: IB Taurus, 2011), 37-40.
- Shafik al-Hout, “It Is a Question of Belonging,” *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, ed. Dina Matar (New York, New York: IB Taurus, 2011), 44-48.

Lesson 3 Adding Insult to Injury

Objectives

- Students will be able to articulate how the *naksa* impacted the Palestinians' relationship with Palestine (3).
- Students will be able to fashion an articulation of the change in the relationship between the People of Palestine and Palestine that resulted from the *naksa* (5).

Set Induction

- Ask students to recall their lunch table discussion from the previous lesson or summarize the activity for students who missed the previous lesson.
- Then, ask students to imagine, having already yielded their lunch tables to the newcomers and made new homes at new lunch tables, new students from the same neighborhood arrive and take up half of the new lunch table. In addition, they make fun of the group's food and conversations, sometimes hog the condiments, and generally treat the original members of the table with disdain.
- Ask students to discuss their reactions to this new state of affairs.

Text Study with Role-Plays – Pushed to the Edge

- Students break into three groups and each group receives a Palestinian narrative discussing the *naksa*:
 - Mohammed Naguib Mahmoud, "Men Cry, Too." Students read the text as a group and design a one-page soliloquy that expresses Mahmoud's feelings.
 - Samia Nasser Khoury, "The Honeymoon Did Not Last."
 - Hani Ahmad Issawi, "I Did Not Waste My Life in Prison."
- Provide the students with sufficient time to prepare a role-play, using one of the scenes described by the authors in order to demonstrate the effects of the *naksa*.
- Students perform their role-plays.
- Students engage in class discussion regarding the motivations for expressing Palestinian nationalism.
 - Why did these people choose to express their nationalism in this way?
 - What did these expressions represent?

Viewing for Meaning – The Import of History

- Introduce the activity by informing students that will watch a brief video and asking them to take note of the following:
 - Words about emotions, such as pride, fear, or despair, that the author mentions.
 - Physical settings for the author's stories.
 - Memorable actions on the part of Israelis that stick out in the mind of the author.
 - Memorable actions on the part of Palestinians that stick out in the mind of the author.
- Students watch a brief testimonial from a Palestinian who served time in prison after violating restrictions imposed by the Israeli military governance in the West Bank following the *naksa*.
- After the viewing, students return to their texts from the previous activity and look for similarities between the texts and the video in the categories observed.
- Students assemble and discuss the similarities in their narratives. Help the students determine why there are so many similarities among these narratives.

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect upon the *naksa*. Students will comment on the following:
 - “Imagine that you were the Palestinian from the short play that your group performed today.”
 - “Explain to an audience what it felt like to live your experiences. What does the *naksa* mean to you? How did it change your life? How did it change the way in which you view the world?”

Resources

- Mohammed Naguib Mahmoud, “Men Cry, Too,” *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, ed. Dina Matar (New York, New York: IB Taurus, 2011), 100-103.
- Samia Nasser Khoury, “The Honeymoon Did Not Last,” *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, ed. Dina Matar (New York, New York: IB Taurus, 2011), 106-110.
- Hani Ahmad Issawi, “I Did Not Waste My Life in Prison,” *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, ed. Dina Matar (New York, New York: IB Taurus, 2011), 110-113.
- Video: Palestinian *naksa* narrative.

Lesson 4 Defiance

Objectives

- Students will be able to summarize the *intifadas* and their import in Palestinian nationalism (2).
- Students will be able to express how the *intifadas* revealed Palestinian commitment to peoplehood and to home (3).
- Students will be able to fashion expressions of Palestinian nationalism (5).

Set Induction

- Ask students to recall their lunch table discussion from the previous lesson or summarize the activity for students who missed the previous lesson.
- Suggest the following:
 - “One of your fellow students, tired of the poor treatment she receives from the newcomers to your table, begins screaming at them in the middle of lunch and tells them to leave. They casually brush her off with an insult but seem startled by her reaction.”
 - “Do you applaud her actions? Do you condemn them? Do you find the results satisfying? How or how not?”
- Conduct a class discussion using the suggested scenario.

Reading and Questions – The Intifada

- Distribute copies (paper or electronic) of Dina Matar’s *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, Chapter 5 (154-163). Provide students time to read the chapter and write down any pertinent questions.
- Lead a brief Question and Answer session discussing the *intifada*’s significance to Palestinian nationalism.

Decision Making – Taking a Stand

- Students break into three groups and each group receives three Palestinian narratives discussing Palestinian nationalism associated with the *intifadas*.
 - Khaled Ziadeh, “History No Longer Forgot the Palestinians.”
 - Manal Hazzan Abu-Sinni, “It Made Us Feel Different.”
 - Mahmoud Darwish, “The Palestinians’ Appeal on the 50th Anniversary of the Nakbah,”
- Provide the students with sufficient time to prepare a soliloquy expressing how their group would respond to Zionist occupation and the first *intifada* and why. Potential solutions, as suggested by the texts, may include.
 - Armed resistance.
 - Organization of peaceful demonstrations.
 - Literary resistance.
- Students assemble and read their proposed courses of action and justifications.
- Students engage in class discussion regarding the motivations for expressing Palestinian nationalism.
 - Why did these people choose to express their nationalism in this way?
 - What did these expressions represent?
 - What seems the most effective?

- Does the continued presence of the Israelis mean that these strategies were a failure? Why or why not?

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect upon the *intifada*. Students will comment on the following:
 - “Imagine that you were a Palestinian child or a young adult during the first *intifada*. You just attended a rally, where demonstrators protested a checkpoint that ordinarily delayed you and your family three hours each day during transit.”
 - “Describe the scene in a letter or memoir to your family. What happened? What did it look like? Sound like? What did it feel like to see Palestinians take up their own cause against armed Soldiers?”

Resources

- Dina Matar, *What It Means to Be Palestinian* (New York, New York: IB Taurus, 2011), 154-163.
- Khaled Ziadeh, “History No Longer Forgot the Palestinians,” *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, ed. Dina Matar (New York, New York: IB Taurus, 2011), 169-172.
- Manal Hazzan Abu-Sinni, “It Made Us Feel Different,” *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, ed. Dina Matar (New York, New York: IB Taurus, 2011), 172-175.
- Mahmoud Darwish, “The Palestinians’ Appeal on the 50th Anniversary of the Nakbah,” read live Monday, June 14, 1998, at 12:15 at the end of the Nakba march.

Lesson 5 When Hope Becomes Forlorn

Objectives

- Students will be able to express how the failed peace process and the security barrier affect the relationship between the Palestinians and Palestine (2).
- Students will be able to assess and choose statements of Palestinian nationality appropriate to contemporary times (4).
- Students will be able to fashion original expressions of the emotional impact generated by the failed peace process and the security wall (5).

Set Induction

- Ask students to recall their lunch table discussion from the previous lesson or summarize the activity for students who missed the previous lesson.
- Suggest the following:
 - “The school administration, having noticed the problems caused in the lunchroom, has intervened, promising to separate you from the newcomers who currently sit at your lunch table and antagonize you throughout lunch.”
 - “However, they fail to reach an agreement, and the newcomers put up stacks of books each lunch, squeezing you and your friends into one another and placing the condiments out of reach.”
- Conduct a class discussion using the suggested scenario.

Text Survey – What is Modern Palestinian Identity?

- Place the three quotes from Matar’s Epilogue to *What It Means to be Palestinian* at different tables within the room.
- Ask students to survey the quotes and write down questions as they arise. For example, Um Khaled talks about ‘the wall.’ Students may not know that this wall refers to the security barrier recently erected between the West Bank and Israel.
- Answer student questions as a class.
- Ask students to circulate once again and pick a quote that they see as the best representation of Palestinian identity. Students will group together in order to discuss why they picked the quote.
- Students represent the quote to their classmates.

Guest Speaker Q & A – Echoes from the Aftermath

- Formally introduce the guest speaker, a Palestinian from the West Bank who once lived east of the Green Line.
- Remind students to prepare thoughtful questions and to take care to listen to the emotional impact of the abdication.
- If speaker is not available (locally or via video-teleconference), proceed to task rotation. Otherwise, proceed to individual reflection.

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect upon photos of the security wall. Students will comment on the following:
 - “This wall, erected after the failed peace talks and the second intifada, splits your farm in two. Each day that you want to travel to the other side in order to sow, plant, or harvest, you must travel five miles on foot to the security checkpoint, wait at least two hours at the security checkpoint, and another five miles to your

field. In addition, you must repeat the trip before nightfall or face imprisonment for violating curfew.”

- “You once worked this farm without problem. This was your home. You grew up here, planted here. Your friend died here, throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers while still a youth. What does it feel like, to look at this fence which cuts your home into two?”

Resources

- Dina Matar, *What It Means to Be Palestinian* (New York, New York: IB Taurus, 2011), 183-185.
- Photos: Security Wall.

Lesson 6

A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words

Objectives

- Students will produce an original, persuasive expression of the hopes, concerns, and disappointments of contemporary Palestinians (5).

Set Induction

- Hand students a photo advertisement from that day's newspaper.
- Ask students, in groups, to analyze the advertisement. What is it trying to say? How does it convey its message? What does it do well? Where does it fail? Is this a good medium for conveying this message? What might work better? When might someone wish to use a photo advertisement?

Introduction to the Assessment

- Hand out two photo advertisements for Israel organizations, such as AIPAC or J-Street.
- Introduce the primary assessment for the unit, a draft graphic advertisement, designed to appear within a Temple or school bulletin, representing the National Religious point of view and requesting ideological support from school or Temple members for their cause. A 5-page paper describing the scholarly choices behind the making of the advertisement will accompany each submission.
- Provide students with a copy of the assignment and assignment rubric.

Assessment Coaching

- Introduce students to the guest speaker, a member of the community well-versed in preparing photo advertisements.
- Allow time for the guest speaker to present the fundamentals of good design and prepare students to craft their photo advertisements.

Resources

- Assignment Rubric

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THREE

Those Who Support Them

This unit introduces students to the viewpoints of Israelis who support the continued existence and development of settlements but do not live in them. Students will learn how the supporters of settlements see and refer to the Land of Israel by exploring the narrative of Israel through the lens of security.

That narrative begins in Lesson 1 with the first articulations of Revisionist Zionism by Ze'ev Jabotinsky. The narrative continues in Lesson 2 with an analysis of Israel's border conflicts in the Golan and the West Bank, as well as the rebranding of Revisionism that followed the Six Day War. In Lesson 3, students will assess the aborted peace talks of 2000 and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Students will complete a project to assess their learning during Lesson 4.

Enduring Understandings

- A comprehensive assessment of Israeli settlements requires an open-minded, faithful exploration of the narrative of the Land from the viewpoint of the people who support the continued existence and development of settlements.

Knowledge (According to this Narrative)

- Settlements represent essential steps towards securing the Land and creating a lasting peace with the Arabs.
- The Arabs proved their unwillingness to countenance the existence of Israel by consistently attacking Israel and its resources via the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank.
- The retaking of the Golan, the Gaza, and Samaria in 1967 served as an essential step towards safeguarding the Jews of Israel by denying Israel's enemies access to strategically significant land.
- Terrorism, the intifadas, the aborted peace talks in 2000, and the success of Hamas in the abandoned Gaza Strip all prove that the Palestinians would rather destroy Israel than make peace with Israel.

Skills

- Students will be able to justify Revisionist attitudes towards the Land of Israel using ancient and contemporary sources.
- Students will be able to express the hopes, concerns, and disappointments of the Revisionists and their ideological successors.

Evidence of Learning

- Students will record journal entries, written from the Revisionist point of view, in response to Arab hostilities toward Zionism, hostile Arab actions toward Israel, the conclusion of the 1967 war, the intifadas, the peace talks, and the withdrawal from Gaza.
- In groups, students will create a 30-second video advertisement, complete with a 10-minute video or 5-page paper describing the scholarly choices behind the making of the advertisement, which represents the Revisionist point of view and requests ideological support for their cause.

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Lesson 1 Revising Zionism

Objectives:

- Students will be able to describe why, according to Jabotinsky, the Arabs of Palestine would unfailingly resist Jewish settlement (2).
- Students will be able to explain three reasons why, despite Arab hostility to Jewish settlement, the pursuit of a Jewish state remained a steadfastly moral choice (2).
- Students will be able to deduce the relationship between the Land of Israel and the People of Israel, according to Jabotinsky (4).

Set Induction

- Show students included video clip of people fighting over a parking space.
- Ask the students to consider the motivations of each participant in the argument. Why might these people fight over a parking space?
- Ask students to consider:
 - “What if there were no other parking spaces, not just in the parking lot, but period?”
 - “Would that change your perception of the participants? How?”

Compare and Contrast – The Arab Quotient

- Students array in groups and receive a collection of ideological statements regarding the Arabs and the Land of Israel from Theodore Herzl, David ben Gurion, and Ze’ev Jabotinsky.
 - *Altneuland*, Theodore Herzl.
 - Excerpts, David Ben Gurion.
 - “Evidence Submitted to the Palestine Royal Commission,” Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Begin on 564, with the first full paragraph, which begins “Finally...”
- In their groups, students come up with any number of words to describe each author’s understanding of the Land of Israel and the Arabs living within that land. Students create two-part (Israel and Arabs) three-part (three authors) Venn Diagrams and locate these words within the diagrams.
- Student groups present their Venn diagrams to the class at large.

Do You Hear What I Hear? – An Iron Wall

- Read aloud “An Iron Wall,” by Ze’ev Jabotinsky twice. The teacher may simplify language as necessary for the audience (remember, it’s already a translation).
- Next, break students into pairs, and ask them to retell the passage to the other student, who acts as a retelling coach. Each student retells the excerpt.
- Students scramble pairs and answer four questions provided by the teacher.
 - Why, according to Jabotinsky, will the Arabs of Palestine resist Jewish immigration?
 - What does it mean when Jabotinsky refers to, “An Iron Wall?” What might an “Iron Wall” look like?
 - What do you think the Land of Israel means to Jabotinsky?
- Distribute a copy of the excerpt, asking students to cite evidence from the excerpt in order to support their answers to the questions above.

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect on the following:

- “Jabotinsky suggests that the Israelis must create an Iron Wall in order to create a state of their own. What role do you think settlements would play in creating such an Iron Wall? Create your own plan for how to create an effective Iron Wall.”

Resources

- Video: Parking Space Wars, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SunrQam8aU>
- Theodore Herzl, *Altneuland* (Haifa, Israel: Haifa Publishing Company, 1961), 23-24.
- David ben Gurion, Excerpts.
- Ze'ev Jabotinsky, “Evidence Submitted to the Palestine Royal Commission,” in *The Zionist Idea*, ed. Arthur Hertzberg (Philadelphia: JPS, 1997), 564-570.
- Ze'ev Jabotinsky, “An Iron Wall (We and the Arabs),” *Zionism: Background Papers for an Evaluation, vol. 4 – Zionism and the Arab Movement: Our Reflections with Our Neighbors* (Jerusalem, Israel: n.d.), 319-322.

Lesson 2 Trial by Fire

Objectives:

- Students will be able to evaluate Jabotinsky's claims regarding Arab resistance to Jewish settlement and the need for an Iron Wall in light of Arab-Israeli relations from 1948 to 1967 (6).
- Students will be able to evaluate the changes in defensive posture offered by the changes in Israeli borders following the Six-Day War (6).

Set Induction

- Show students included video clip of schoolyard bully fight.
- Debate the ethics of retaliation.

Group Study – A Nation under Fire

- Students break into six separate groups.
- Each group receives a selected reading which briefly describes a component of Israeli relations with the Arab world before the Six-Day War.
 - *A History of Israel*, 443-445. Israel-Jordan border skirmishes (1949-55).
 - *A History of Israel*, 445-450. Israel-Syria/Egypt DMZ conflicts (1949-55).
 - *A History of Israel*, 450-453. Boycotts and Blockades (1950-55).
 - *A History of Israel*, 617-622. Headwater Diversion Plan (1964-67).
 - *The Israel-Arab Reader*, pp. 89-91. Nasser on Zionism and Israel (1960-63).
 - *The Israel-Arab Reader*, pp. 93-96. Constitution of the PLO (1963).
- Students review the works in their groups and answer the following:
 - Identify the motives of parties mentioned within the reading.
 - Think back to Jabotinsky. Would the behavior of the Arab nations in this reading surprise him? Why or why not?
- Assemble students and have them brief one another about their readings and the answers to the questions. Conclude with a discussion. Guiding questions may include:
 - If you were an Israeli at this time, how do you think you would feel?
 - What should the priority of the Israeli government be in these situations?
 - Imagine that one of these scenarios involved Mexico and the United States instead of Israel and its neighbors. How would that make you feel?

Map Analysis – A Land Secured

- In four groups, students will study the maps depicted in “Creating Secure Borders.” Using the readings from the earlier group study, students will theorize the potential impact of returning one territory (the Sinai, the Gaza, the Golan, or the West Bank) to Egypt, Syria, or Jordan.
- Once complete, students will present their security assessment to the remainder of the class.

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect upon photos of Soldiers entering Jerusalem's Old City during the Six-Day War.
- Students will respond to the following:
 - “Imagine that you were an IDF soldier involved in the border wars between Israel and Jordan, that you lost friends in border skirmishes in the past, and, now, you are among these soldiers entering the Old City of Jerusalem during the Six-Day

War, the first time that Jews were allowed in the city since 1948. How would it feel to be here?"

- "What do you think the Land, especially the Old City, would mean to you?"

Resources

- Video Clip: Bully Retaliation, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8p-pt1H4AJw&feature=related>
- Howard M. Sachar, *A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 443-445, 445-450, 450-453, 617-622.
- Gamal Abdel Nasser, "On Zionism and Israel," *The Israel-Arab Reader*, ed. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (New York: Penguin, 2008), 89-91.
- "Palestinian Liberation Organization: Draft Constitution," *The Israel-Arab Reader*, ed. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (New York: Penguin, 2008), 93-96.
- "Creating Secure Borders," *Secure and Recognized Boundaries: Israel's Right to Live within Defensible Borders* (Jerusalem: Carta, 1971), 34-35.

Lesson 3

Lessons in Diplomacy

Objectives:

- Students will be able to express the disappointment wrought by the failed Israeli-PLO peace talks (2).
- Students will be able to assess how the failed peace process reinforced Jabotinsky's notion of the "Iron Wall." (4).
- Students will be able to assess the changes wrought in the relationship between the Land of Israel and the People of Israel through the withdrawal from Gaza (4).

Set Induction

- Show students a video or an article depicting disappointment over a failed negotiation that has significance to the students, such as professional sports labor negotiations or school board negotiations.
- Ask students to consider the mindset of the disgruntled response. Why would people seem so disappointed? Do they seem angry? Sad? Both?

Jigsaw with Window Notes – A Handshake Ignored

- *Window Notes require students to take four separate categories of notes after examining and inspecting an object. Teachers may facilitate the process by preparing note sheets with columns representing the types of notes desired.* The Window Notes used for this exercise will include: facts (as suggested by the material), feelings demonstrated by the author towards peace, feelings inspired within the reader, and the apparent relationship the author sees between the People of Israel and the Land of Israel.
- Students break into three expert groups: literature, prayer, and commentary.
- Students proceed to separate learning stations, where they will find texts assessing the failed peace talks by Bill Clinton, Ehud Barak, and Dennis Ross.
- Students review the works in their expert groups and create Window Notes for the works they study.
- Remix the groups so that one student from each group (literature, prayer, and commentary) sits in each new group.
- Students share their notes with one another.

Guest Speaker Q & A – Disenchantment with Engagement

- Formally introduce the guest speaker. Appropriate speakers on the topic may vary from former IDF Soldiers to Knesset members to negotiators, but the speaker should be one who possesses a discernible sense of disenchantment with the peace process:
- Remind students to prepare thoughtful questions and to take care to listen to the emotional impact of the abdication.

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect on the Gaza Disengagement Plan, as presented by Ariel Sharon to the Knesset in 2008. Students will answer the following:
 - Why does Sharon recommend withdrawing from the Gaza Strip?
 - What does this withdrawal signify in terms of Jabotinsky's "Iron Wall?"

Resources

- Bill Clinton, "Summarizing his Experience with the Peace Process," *The Israel-Arab Reader*, ed. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (New York: Penguin, 2008), 573-580.

- Benny Morris, “Camp David and After: An Exchange (An Interview with Ehud Barak),” *The New York Review of Books*, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2002/jun/13/camp-david-and-after-an-exchange-1-an-interview-wi/> (accessed 1 April 2012).
- Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace* (New York: Farrar, Stratus, and Giroux, 2004), 753-758.
- Ariel Sharon, “Disengagement Plan (The Withdrawal from Gaza),” in *The Israel-Arab Reader* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 591-593.

Lesson 4

Defense in Action

Objectives

- Students will produce an original, persuasive expression of the hopes, concerns, and disappointments of contemporary Revisionists (5).

Set Induction

- Show students a 30 second political advertisement.
- Ask students, in groups, to analyze the advertisement. What is it trying to say? How does it convey its message? What does it do well? Where does it fail? Is this a good medium for conveying this message? What might work better? When might someone wish to use a video advertisement?

Introduction to the Assessment

- Review two 30-second photo advertisements for Israel.
- Introduce the primary assessment for the unit, a 30-second video advertisement, designed for Jewish audiences, representing the Revisionist point of view and requesting ideological support from school or Temple members for their cause. A 5-page paper or 10-minute video describing the scholarly choices behind the making of the advertisement will accompany each submission.
- Provide students with a copy of the assignment and assignment rubric.

Assessment Coaching

- Introduce students to the guest speaker, a member of the community well-versed in preparing video advertisements.
- Allow time for the guest speaker to present the fundamentals of good design and prepare students to craft their video advertisements.

Resources

- Assignment Rubric

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FOUR

Those Who Would Tear Them Down

This unit introduces students to the viewpoints of Israelis who support withdrawal from the settlements in return for a negotiated peace settlement with a future Palestinian state. Students will learn how the critics of settlements see and refer to the Land of Israel by exploring the narrative of the land through the potential for peace.

That narrative begins in Lesson 1 with the first articulations of warning regarding Zionism by Martin Buber. It continues in Lesson 2 with an examination of the Six-Day War and the challenges presented to Israel by the occupation of the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. In Lesson 3, students will see the impact of the aborted peace talks, the intifadas, and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip upon the relationship between the Land and those willing to give up settlements for peace.

Enduring Understandings

- A comprehensive assessment of Israeli settlements requires an open-minded, faithful exploration of the narrative of the Land from the viewpoint of the people who would willingly abandon the settlements in return for peace.

Knowledge (According to this Narrative)

- Although the Jews possess a legitimate claim to the Land of Israel, the Arabs of Palestine also possess a legitimate claim to the very same land.
- Israel holds a responsibility to honor the legitimate Arab claim to Palestine.
- The Six-Day War created a dilemma for Israel by giving them possession of territories containing an Arab majority with legitimate claims to those territories.
- Terrorism, the intifadas, and the success of Hamas in the abandoned Gaza Strip prove the ineffectiveness of Israel's policy towards the territories.
- Israel can only achieve peace by recognizing the Arabs' legitimate claims in the West Bank and furnishing them with their own state.

Skills

- Students will be able to justify attitudes that propose giving up land for peace using ancient and contemporary sources.
- Students will be able to express the hopes, concerns, and disappointments of contemporary Israelis with regard to the land and peace.

Evidence of Learning

- Students will record journal entries, written from the 'Land for Peace' point of view, in response to Zionism, the conclusion of the 1967 war, and terrorism.

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Lesson 1 Cautious Optimism

Objectives:

- Students will be able to describe why, according to Buber, the Israelis possessed a responsibility to the Arab inhabitants of Palestine (2).
- Students will be able to express the relationship between the Land of Israel and the People of Israel, as suggested by Buber (3).
- Students will be able to suggest appropriate measures for realizing the relationship suggested by Buber during the period of settlement (5).

Jigsaw with Window Notes – The Evolving Arab Question

- Students divide into four groups and each group receives an essay from Martin Buber regarding Arabs, Jews, and the Land of Israel.
 - “A Proposed Resolution on the Arab Question (September 1921).”
 - “Soul-Searching (April 1926).”
 - “Let Us Make an End to Falsities! (October 1948).”
 - “A Protest against Expropriation of Arab Lands (March 1953).”
- Each group reads their essay and takes window notes. *Window Notes require students to take four separate categories of notes after examining and inspecting an object. Teachers may facilitate the process by preparing note sheets with columns representing the types of notes desired.* The Window Notes used for this exercise will address:
 - The author’s feelings towards Arabs in the Land of Israel.
 - The author’s feelings towards Jews in the Land of Israel.
 - The author’s feelings towards the relationship between Jews, the Arabs, and the Land of Israel.
 - Proposed Solutions for addressing competing claims on the Land.
- Remix the groups so that one student from each group (literature, prayer, and commentary) sits in each new group.
- Students share their notes with one another.
- In their new groups, students combine their Window notes to create a picture of Buber’s thoughts on the questions from the 1920’s through the 1950’s.
- Students then respond to the following questions:
 - “Why do the Jews, according to Buber, possess a responsibility to the Arabs living in Palestine?”
 - “How, according to Buber, should Israelis exercise that responsibility?”
 - “What, according to Buber, is the relationship between the Jews, the Arabs, and the Land of Israel?”
- Assemble students in order to conduct a class-wide assessment of their answers.

Reflection

- Students each receive a copy of the guidelines for “Brith Shalom,” an organization founded in 1925 to create a peaceful resolution to violence between Jews and Arabs in the Palestinian mandate.
- Students will respond to the following:
 - “Imagine that you are a resident of Jaffa in 1925. Your brother, a member of the nascent *Hagganah*, has taken arms to defend his neighborhood in Jaffa against Arab riots. You, however, just paid for your membership in *Brith Shalom* and

you are preparing to attend the inaugural meeting. Your brother, who feels that *Brith Shalom* is a waste of time, seems angry and wants to know why you would go to such a meeting.”

- “Explain to your brother why you feel that the *Brith Shalom* is important, what you hope to achieve through your participation, and how you hope to achieve it.”

Resources

- Martin Buber, “A Proposed Resolution on the Arab Question (September 1921),” *A Land of Two Peoples*, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 58-62.
- Martin Buber, “Brith Shalom (1925),” *A Land of Two Peoples*, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 72-75.
- Martin Buber, “Soul-Searching (April 1926),” *A Land of Two Peoples*, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 76-78.
- Martin Buber, “Let Us Make an End to Falsities! (October 1948),” *A Land of Two Peoples*, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 226-228.
- Martin Buber, “A Protest against Expropriation of Arab Lands (March 1953),” *A Land of Two Peoples*, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 261-263.

Lesson 2 Pyrrhic Victory

Objectives:

- Students will be able to explain how the occupation of the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank following the Six-Day War posed dangers to Israel (3).
- Students will be able to evaluate the dangers posed by the occupation of the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank using Buber's proposed relationship between the People and the Land of Israel (6).

Peer Reading – The Spoils of Victory?

- Students break into pairs. One student in each pair receives two short lists with accompanying questions, one for the first student and one for the second. The students help one another answer the questions. The texts for this exercise are as follows:
 - Selections from “The Meaning of Homeland (1967),” Amos Oz.
 - Student 1 Questions:
 - Oz compares Zionism to a drowning man grabbing a plank at sea. What does this comparison mean?
 - What factors, according to Oz, make Israel the only place for the Jewish state?
 - Student 2 Questions:
 - According to Oz, why are the Jews in Israel? Why are the Arabs in Palestine?
 - What dilemma is Oz addressing? What is his solution?
 - Describe Oz's Zionism.
 - “The Territories (1968),” Yeshayahu Leibowitz.
 - Student 1 Questions:
 - What problems face Israel if it occupies the territories?
 - How can Israel avoid these problems, according to Leibowitz?
 - Student 2 Questions:
 - How do you understand Leibowitz's contention that calling the Land “holy” is a form of idolatry?
 - What Biblical images does Leibowitz use to support his claim? Why are they important?
- Students assemble to discuss their answers to the questions.

Role Play and Discussion – Strategic Decisions

- Select two students to act out the dialogue between an Israeli reporter and Moshe Dayan recorded in *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories* 7, no. 4.
- In the meantime, divide the remaining students into three groups and ask them to prepare short, one-paragraph biographical sketches of Moshe Dayan, Yigal Allon, and Rabbi Moshe Levinger using whatever resources they can find on the internet.
- Students conduct role-play, and groups read their biographical sketches of Dayan, Allon, and Levinger.
- After students complete their role-play, engage the students in discussion regarding the conversation. Potential questions include:
 - “Why do you think Dayan appears so upset with the settlement of Hebron?”

- “Knowing Dayan’s role as a war hero and Defense Minister, does his opinion surprise you? Why or why not?”
- What are Dayan’s primary considerations regarding the territories?”

Reflection

- Students will individually reflect upon the following:
 - “Imagine that you are a member of an Israeli pro-peace organization in 1967. You are proud of your country for defending itself but wonder about the wisdom of capturing the West Bank. Write a letter to your family describing the dangers of staying in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.”

Resources

- Amos Oz, “The Meaning of Homeland (1967),” *The Amos Oz Reader* (Orlando, Florida: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), 235-253.
- Yeshayahu Leibowitz and Eliezer Goldman, *Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), 223-228.
- Moshe Dayan, “Moshe Dayan on Settlement in Hebron – ‘A Real Disaster,’” *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories* 7, no. 4 (Jul-Aug 1997): 4-5.

Lesson 3 & 4 Desperate Measures

Objectives:

- Students will be able to express the disappointment wrought by the failed Israeli-PLO peace talks and continued terrorism (2).
- Students will be able to explain how Israeli presence and growth within the occupied territories continually frustrate attempts to create peace (3).
- Students will be able to justify abandoning settlements (6).

Video, Window Notes, and Discussion – No Peace in Our Time?

- Students watch selections from the video, *Encounter Point*. The documentary depicts different families that have been affected by the violence in Israel between Israelis and Palestinians. In this film, [Just Vision](#), a non-profit organization, follows these families for 16 months. It begins this journey by documenting the ongoing troubles between the Israelis and Palestinians. The team conducted 475 preliminary interviews and did two years of research before embarking on this 16 month journey. The crew traveled throughout Israel, from Tel Mond, Tulkarem, Hebron, and Haifa. These parents and loved ones have been attempting to end the violence by joining, or beginning their own peace organizations and awareness campaigns.
- *Because the running time of the film is 85 minutes, secure additional time for the class or use two class sessions to conduct the viewing and discussion.*
- Following the viewing, students divide into four groups and discuss a character from the film, creating Window Notes to represent their thoughts. *Window Notes require students to take four separate categories of notes after examining and inspecting an object. Teachers may facilitate the process by preparing note sheets with columns representing the types of notes desired.* The Window Notes used for this exercise will address:
 - The character’s experiences and how they shaped their views.
 - The ways in which the character’s views conflict with the traditions of their society.
 - The character’s espoused hopes for the Land.
 - The character’s proposed solutions for addressing competing claims on the Land.
- Students reassemble to discuss their findings.

Reflection

- Students individually respond to the following:
 - “Imagine that you are Robi Damelin, visiting a home in Hebron in an attempt to explain why the citizens of Hebron ought to willingly leave their homes in return for peace. Knowing that these people have lived here for more than a generation, that they have fought for their homes, and that they believe in their homes, what might you say to them? How would you convince them of the need to leave?”

Resources

- Ronit Avni and Julia Bacha, dir, *Encounter Point* (Just Vision Films, 2006), film.

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EPILOGUE

Perspective and Empathy in Action

This cumulative activity allows students to employ perspective and empathy by trying on one of the perspectives that they studied during the course.

Objectives

- Students will be able to create original, persuasive, and coherent expressions of the hopes, concerns, and disappointments of the viewpoints that they studied during the course (5).

Assignment

- Use the survey results from the beginning of the course, or re-conduct the survey, in order to assign the students into four groups. Each group will advocate one of the four viewpoints studied during the course. Students will advocate a position that they ignored or condemned during the survey. For example, if one student expressed in her survey that she felt that Israelis should remain in the settlements because the settlements represent a part of the Biblical Israel, do not assign her to National Religious Settler group. Instead, try to assign her to the Palestinian or Land-for-Peace group. This ensures that students receive an additional opportunity to embrace new perspectives.
- After dividing students into groups, ask them to use their previous work and feedback as guides to create an editorial, a photo advertisement, and a 30-second video advertisement that expresses the concerns of their assigned group. Essentially, they will repeat the assignments that they conducted before, but, this time, all of the assignments will support one individual perspective.
- Some groups will have a step ahead; as the National Religious Settler group will already possess several draft editorials, the Palestinian group will already possess several draft photo advertisements, and the Revisionist group will already possess several draft videos.

Student Presentation

- Students should have an opportunity to present their work to the greater community in order to inform the community about the different perspectives.
- We recommend a school or synagogue program that exposes adults and children of an appropriate age to the material. Specifically, we recommend inviting the guest speakers who taught the students about editorials and advertisements to attend and grade the work.
- Otherwise, teachers may use the existing rubrics in order to assess the final work.

Survey

- At the conclusion of the course, students will complete the same survey that they completed on the first day of the course.

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Buber, Martin. *A Land of Two Peoples*, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

As one of the earliest Israeli critics of Zionism's blatant disregard for the relationship between the Palestinians and the Land, Buber vividly articulates the birth of the viewpoint now championed by many – the Arabs possess an equal right to the very Land that settlements rest upon and Israelis possess a responsibility to find a way to share the Land amicably.

HaLevi, Judah. *The Kuzari: An Argument for the Faith of Israel*. New York, New York: Schocken Books, 1964.

Both HaLevi's prose and poetry reveal a longing for Israel that characterizes Jewish conceptions of the evolving relationship between the Land of Israel, the God of Israel, and the People of Israel during the medieval era. Students study these texts (as well as Biblical passages and prayers) in order to understand how they translate into the mindset of the modern National Religious Settler.

Hertzberg, Arthur. *The Zionist Idea*. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: the Jewish Publication Society, 1997.

Hertzberg's collection of Zionist essays contains the works of Rav Abraham Isaac Kook and Ze'ev Jabotinsky, both used in this curriculum. The former articulates the original philosophy of the National Religious Settler movement, while the latter is the author of the Revisionist philosophy.

Laqueur, Walter, and Barry Rubin. *The Israel-Arab Reader*. New York, New York: Penguin Books, 2008.

The Israel-Arab Reader contains a bevy of primary sources regarding the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Documents from this text support philosophies found in Units Two and Three.

Matar, Dina. *What It Means to Be Palestinian*. New York, New York: IB Taurus, 2011.

Through carefully constructed narrative, Dina Matar weaves together a collection of interviews and essays into a master story of the Palestinian struggle, from the *nakbah* to the first *intifada*. Her primary sources prove invaluable to an understanding of the Palestinian perspective.

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- “Umar permits the Jews to Return to Jerusalem.” *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, ed. Norman Stillman, 154-155. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979.
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APPENDIX TO THE PROLOGUE
Learning Materials for Prologue

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PROLOGUE

Definitions of Perspective and Empathy, with Examples

Perspective

In the critical thinking sense of the term, students with perspective expose questionable and unexamined assumptions, conclusions, and implications. When students have or can gain perspective, they can gain a critical distance from the habitual or knee-jerk beliefs, feelings, theories, and appeals that characterize less careful and circumspect thinkers.⁷

- ✓ Robert recognizes in TV advertising the fallacy of using popular figures to promote products.
- ✓ Jill explains the Israeli and Palestinian arguments for and against new settlements on the Gaza Strip.
- ✗ Ted refuses to consider that there is another way to model the phenomena mathematically. She just “knows” that there is only one way – hers.
- ✗ Amy knows that the news reports about a U.S. Soldier killing innocent civilians in Afghanistan must be somehow biased, because American Soldiers simply don’t kill innocents.

Empathy

Empathy is the ability to get inside another person’s feelings and worldview...Empathy is a form of insight because it involves the ability to get beyond odd, alien, seemingly weird opinions or people to find what is meaningful to them.⁸

- ✓ A young teenager empathizes with the restrictive lifestyle of his bedridden grandmother.
- ✓ Jennifer imagines what it must feel like to be Romeo and Juliet, so desperately in love that they sacrificed themselves rather than live apart.
- ✗ Tim, an excellent football player, becomes a coach and berates his young players because he cannot relate to their struggles to learn a game that came so easily to him.
- ✗ Cindy doesn’t understand why Bill decided to join the Army. The Army is full of nothing but violence and misogyny.

⁷ Grant Wiggins and Jay McTighe, *Understanding by Design* (Columbus, Ohio: Pearson, 2005), 96-97.

⁸ Wiggins and McTighe, 98-99.

PROLOGUE

Survey on Israeli Settlements

Name:
Age:
Gender:


For each question below, circle the number to the right that best fits your opinion on the importance of the issue. Use the scale above to match your opinion.

Question	I Agree with this Statement:				
	Don't Know	Not at all	Not very	Some-what	Extremely
I feel that Jews have an obligation to live in the ancient Jewish homeland of Israel.	0	1	2	3	4
I feel that the State of Israel should include all of the Land of Israel as described by the Bible.	0	1	2	3	4
I feel that Palestinians have a special relationship with Palestine, including the area now called Israel.	0	1	2	3	4
I feel that the West Bank rightfully belongs to the Palestinians and that Israel does not belong there.	0	1	2	3	4
I feel that Palestinians who left during the Israeli War for Independence should be able to return to the homes they left in 1948.	0	1	2	3	4
I feel that Israel must keep the West Bank and the Golan Heights in order to maintain safe and secure borders with its neighbors.	0	1	2	3	4
I feel that Israel stands alone in the Middle East, beset on all sides by hostile neighbors who want to destroy Israel and the Jews.	0	1	2	3	4
I feel that Israel should return most, if not all, of the West Bank to the Palestinians, in return for peace.	0	1	2	3	4
I feel that the Palestinians have as much of a right to the Land of Israel as the Jews.	0	1	2	3	4

APPENDIX ONE
Learning Materials for Unit One


Lesson 1

Map of Israel (Genesis 15)



Lesson 1

Map of Israel (Numbers 34/Ezekiel 47)



Lesson 1
Map of Israel (Blank)



Lesson 1

The Bible

Genesis 15:18-21:

“In that day God made a covenant with Abram, saying, ‘To your seed I have given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates, the land of the Kenite, and the Kenizzite, and the Kadmonite, and the Hittite, and the Perizzite, and the Rephaim, and the Amorite, and the Canaanite, and the Girgashite, and the Jebusite.’”

Exodus 23:20-31

“[God to the Israelites] Behold, I am sending a messenger before you to keep you in the way, and to bring you in unto the place which I have prepared; be watchful because of his presence, and hearken to his voice, do not rebel against him, for God will not suffer your transgression, for My name is in his heart; for, if you diligently hearken to his voice, and do all that which I speak, then I will be the enemy of your enemies, and will distress those distressing you. For My messenger will go before you, and bring you unto the Amorite, and the Hittite, and the Perizzite, and the Canaanite, the Hivite, and the Jebusite, and I will cut them off. Do not bow to their gods, nor serve them, nor do according to their doings, but utterly destroy them, and thoroughly break their standing pillars. And serve your God, and God shall bless your bread and your water, and I turn aside sickness from your heart; there shall be no miscarrying or barrenness in your land; the number of your days I will fulfill: My terror will I send before you, and put to death all the people that you come against, and I will give the neck of all your enemies unto you. And I will send the hornet before you, and it will cast out the Hivite, the Canaanite, and the Hittite, from before you; I will cast them not out from before you in one year, lest the land be a desolation, and the beast of the field will be multiplied against you; rather, little by little I will cast them out from before you, until you may be fruitful, and inherited the land. And I have set your borders from the Red Sea, even unto the sea of the Philistines, and from the wilderness unto the River: for I give into your hand the inhabitants of the land, and thou hast cast them out from before you...”

Numbers 34:1-15

“And the Lord spoke unto Moses, saying: ‘Command the children of Israel, and say unto them: When you come into the land of Canaan, this shall be the land that shall fall unto you for an inheritance, even the land of Canaan according to the borders thereof. Thus your south side shall be from the wilderness of Zin close by the side of Edom, and your south border shall begin at the end of the Salt Sea eastward; and your border shall turn about southward of the ascent of Akrabbim, and pass along to Zin; and the goings out thereof shall be southward of Kadesh-barnea; and it shall go forth to Hazar-addar, and pass along to Azmon; and the border shall turn about from Azmon unto the Brook of Egypt, and the goings out thereof shall be at the Sea. And for the western border, ye shall have the Great Sea for a border; this shall be your west border. And this shall be your north border: from the Great Sea ye shall mark out your line unto mount Hor; from mount Hor ye shall mark out a line unto the entrance to Hamath; and the goings out of the border shall be at Zedad; and the border shall go forth to Ziphron, and the goings out thereof shall be at Hazar-enan; this shall be your north border. And ye shall mark out your line

for the east border from Hazar-enan to Shepham; and the border shall go down from Shepham to Riblah, on the east side of Ain; and the border shall go down, and shall strike upon the slope of the sea of Chinnereth eastward; and the border shall go down to the Jordan, and the goings out thereof shall be at the Salt Sea; this shall be your land according to the borders thereof round about.'

And Moses commanded the children of Israel, saying: 'This is the land wherein ye shall receive inheritance by lot, which the Lord hath commanded to give unto the nine tribes, and to the half-tribe; for the tribe of the children of Reuben according to their fathers' houses, and the tribe of the children of Gad according to their fathers' houses, have received, and the half-tribe of Manasseh have received, their inheritance; he two tribes and the half-tribe have received their inheritance beyond the Jordan at Jericho eastward, toward the sun-rising.'"

Deuteronomy 1:6-8

"[Moses to Israel] The Lord our God spoke unto us in Horeb, saying: 'You have dwelt long enough in this mountain; turn you, and take your journey, and go to the hill-country of the Amorites and unto all the places nigh thereunto, in the Arabah, in the hill-country, and in the Lowland, and in the South, and by the sea-shore; the land of the Canaanites, and Lebanon, as far as the great river, the river Euphrates. Behold, I have set the land before you: go in and possess the land which the Lord swore unto your fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give unto them and to their seed after them.'"

Ezekiel 47:13-20

"[Ezekiel to Israel] Thus said the Lord God: 'This shall be the border, whereby ye shall divide the land for inheritance according to the twelve tribes of Israel, Joseph receiving two portions. And you shall inherit it, one as well as another, concerning which I lifted up My hand to give it unto your fathers; and this land shall fall unto you for inheritance. And this shall be the border of the land: on the north side, from the Great Sea, by the way of Hethlon, unto the entrance of Zedad; Hamath, Berothah, Sibram, which is between the border of Damascus and the border of Hamath; Hazer-hatticon, which is by the border of Hauran. And the border from the sea shall be Hazar-enon at the border of Damascus, and on the north northward is the border of Hamath. This is the north side. And the east side, between Hauran and Damascus and Gilead, and the land of Israel, by the Jordan, from the border unto the east sea shall ye measure. This is the east side. And the south side southward shall be from Tamar as far as the waters of Meriboth-kadesh, to the Brook, unto the Great Sea. This is the south side southward. And the west side shall be the Great Sea, from the border as far as over against the entrance of Hamath. This is the west side.

Lesson 2

The Bible

Genesis 13:14-17

“And God said unto Abram, after Lot was separated from him: ‘Lift up now your eyes, and look from the place where thou are, northward and southward and eastward and westward. All the land which you see, I am giving it to you, and to your seed forever. And I will make your seed as the dust of the earth; so that if a man can number the dust of the earth, then shall your seed also be numbered. Get up and walk through the land in the length of it and in the breadth of it; for I am giving it to you.’”

Genesis 17:7-8

“[God to Abraham] And I will establish My covenant between Me and you and your seed after you throughout their generations for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto you and to your seed after you. And I will give to you, and to your seed after you, the land of your sojournings, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God.”

Deuteronomy 30:1-5

“[Moses to Israel] And it shall come to pass, when all these things have come upon you, the blessing and the curse, which I have set before you, and thou shall be spread among all the nations, where God has driven you, then you shall return to God, and hearken to God’s voice according to all that I command thee this day, you and your children, with all your heart, and with all your soul. Then, God will end your captivity, and have compassion upon you, and will return and gather you from among all the peoples, where God scattered you. If some of you are even in the uttermost parts of heaven, God will gather you from there and fetch you. And God will bring you into the land that your fathers possessed, and you shall possess it; and God will make great things happen for you, and multiply you above your fathers.”

2 Samuel 7:10-16

“[God to David] And I will appoint a place for My people Israel, and will plant them, that they may dwell in their own place, and be disquieted no more; neither shall the children of wickedness afflict them anymore, as at the first, even from the day that I commanded judges to be over My people Israel; and I will cause thee to rest from all your enemies. Moreover, God will make you a house. When your days are fulfilled, and you shall sleep with your ancestors, I will set up your seed after you, and I will establish your seed’s kingdom. He shall build a house for My name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom forever. I will be to him for a father, and he shall be to Me for a son; if he commit iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the stripes of the children of men; but My mercy shall not depart from him, as I took it from Saul, whom I put away before thee. And your house and your kingdom shall be made sure for ever before you; your throne shall be established forever.”

Jeremiah 31:31-40

“‘Behold, the days come,’ says God, ‘that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah; not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt; for, as much as they broke My covenant, although I was a lord over them,’ says God.

‘But this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days,’ says God, ‘I will put My law in their guts, and in their heart will I write it; and I will be their God, and they shall be My people; and they shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying: 'Know God'; for they shall all know Me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them,’ says God, ‘for I will forgive their iniquity, and their sin will I remember no more.’ Thus says God, ‘Who gives the sun for a light by day, and the ordinances of the moon and of the stars for a light by night? Who stirs the sea, that the waves thereof roar? The Lord of Hosts is His name. If these ordinances depart from before Me, says God, then the seed of Israel also shall cease from being a nation before Me forever.’ Thus says God, ‘If heaven above can be measured, and the foundations of the earth searched out beneath, then will I also cast off all the seed of Israel for all that they have done,’ says God.

‘Behold, the days come,’ says God, ‘that the city shall be built to God from the tower of Hananel unto the gate of the corner. And the measuring line shall yet go out straight forward unto the hill Gareb, and shall turn unto Goah. And the whole valley of the dead bodies, and of the ashes, and all the fields unto the brook Kidron, unto the corner of the horse gate toward the east, shall be holy unto God; it shall not be plucked up, nor thrown down any more forever.’

Lesson 2 The Prayer Book

Weekday Morning

AHAVAH rabbah ahavtanu, Adonai Eloheinu, chemlah g'dolah viteirah chamalta aleinu. Baavur avoteinu v'imoteinu shebat'chu v'cha vat'lamdeim chukei chayim, kein t'choneinu ut'lamdeinu. Ham'racheim, racheim aleinu, v'tein b'libeinu l'havin ul'haskil, lishmo-a, lilmod ul'lameid, lishmor v'laasot ul'kayeim et kol divrei talmud Toratecha b'ahavah.

אָהַבָּה רַבָּה אֲהַבְתָּנוּ, יְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ, חֶמְלָה גְדוֹלָה וַיִּתְּרָה חֶמְלַתְּ עָלֵינוּ. בְּעִבּוּר אֲבוֹתֵינוּ וְאִמּוֹתֵינוּ שִׁבְטוּחוֹ בְּךָ וַתְּלַמְּדֵם חֻקֵי חַיִּים, כֵּן תִּחְנַנֵּנוּ וַתְּלַמְּדֵנוּ. הַמְּרַחֵם, רַחֵם עָלֵינוּ, וַתֵּן בְּלִבֵּנוּ לְהִבִּין וּלְהַשְׂכִּיל, לְשִׂמְעָה, לְלַמֵּד וּלְלַמֵּד, לְשִׂמּוֹר וּלְעֲשׂוֹת וּלְקַיֵּם אֶת-כָּל-דְּבָרֵי תִלְמוּד תּוֹרַתְךָ בְּאַהֲבָה.

בְּרַכּוֹ
יִצְרָה
אֲהַבָּה רַבָּה
שִׂמְעָה
וְאַהֲבָה
לְמַעַן תִּזְכְּרוּ
וְיִאֱמָרוּ יְיָ
אֲמַת וְנַצִּיב
מִיִּבְרָחָה

HOW DEEPLY You have loved us Adonai, our God, gracing us with surpassing compassion! On account of our forebears whose trust led You to teach them the laws of life, be gracious to us, teaching us as well. O Merciful One, have mercy on us by making us able to understand and discern, to heed, learn, and teach, and, lovingly, to observe, perform, and fulfill all that is in Your Torah.

V'ha-eir eineinu b'Toratecha, v'dabeik libeinu b'mitzvotecha, v'yacheid l'vaveinu l'ahavah ul'yirah et sh'mecha, v'lo neivosh v'lo nikaleim, v'lo nikasheil l'olam va-ed. Ki v'sheim kodsh'cha hagadol v'hanora batachnu, nagilah v'nism'chah bishuatecha. Vahavi-einu l'shalom mei-arba kanfot haaretz, v'tolicheinu kom'miyut l'artzeinu. Ki El po-eil y'shuot atah, uvanu vacharta v'keiravtanu l'shimcha hagadol selah be-emet, l'hodot l'cha ul'yachedcha b'ahavah. Baruch atah, Adonai, habocheir b'amo Yisrael b'ahavah.

וְהָאֵר עֵינֵינוּ בְּתוֹרַתְךָ, וְדַבֵּק לִבֵּנוּ בְּמִצְוֹתֶיךָ, וַיַּחַד לִבֵּנוּ לְאַהֲבָה וּלְיִרְאָה אֶת-שְׁמֶךָ, וְלֹא יִבוֹשׁ וְלֹא יִקָּלֵם, וְלֹא יִקָּשֵׁל לְעוֹלָם וָעֶד. כִּי בְשֵׁם קֹדֶשְׁךָ הַגְּדוֹל וְהַנּוֹרָא בְּטַחְנוּ, נִגִּילָה וְנִשְׂמַחָה בִּישׁוּעַתְךָ. וְהִבִּיאֵנוּ לְשָׁלוֹם מֵאַרְבַּע כַּנְפוֹת הָאָרֶץ, וְתוֹלִיכֵנוּ קוֹמְמִיּוֹת לְאַרְצֵנוּ. כִּי אֵל פּוֹעֵל יִשׁוּעוֹת אֲתָה, וּבָנוּ בְּחַרְתָּ וְקִרְבַּתָּנוּ לְשִׂמְךָ הַגְּדוֹל סֵלָה בְּאַמַּת, לְהוֹדוֹת לְךָ וּלְיַחַדְךָ בְּאַהֲבָה. בְּרוּךְ אַתָּה, יְיָ, הַבוֹחֵר בְּעַמּוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּאַהֲבָה.

Enlighten our eyes with Your Torah, focus our minds on Your mitzvot, unite our hearts in love and reverence for Your Name. Then we will never feel shame, never deserve rebuke, and never stumble. Having trusted in Your great and awesome holiness, we shall celebrate Your salvation with joy. Gather us in peace from the four corners of the earth and lead us upright to our land. For You, O God, work wonders. You chose us. Truly, you drew us near to Your Great Name, that we might acknowledge You, declaring You One in love. Praised be You, Adonai, who chooses Your people Israel in love.

בְּרוּךְ אַתָּה, יְיָ, הַבוֹחֵר בְּעַמּוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּאַהֲבָה.
Baruch atah, Adonai, habocheir b'amo Yisrael b'ahavah.

Lesson 2
The Prayer Book

וּבְנֵה יְרוּשָׁלַיִם עִיר הַקֹּדֶשׁ בְּמַהֲרָה בְּיָמֵינוּ.
בְּרוּךְ אַתָּה יְיָ, בּוֹנֵה בְּרַחֲמָיו יְרוּשָׁלַיִם. אָמֵן.

*Uv'neih Y'rushalayim ir hakodesh bimheirah v'yameinu.
Baruch atah Adonai, boneh v'rachamav Y'rushalayim. Amen.*

Let Jerusalem, the holy city, be renewed in our time.
We praise You, *Adonai*; in compassion You rebuild
Jerusalem. Amen.

degree. It is God alone who controls everything corporeal. The reason why philosophers adopted many gods is to be found in their investigations of the movements of the spheres, of which they counted more than forty. They found for every movement a separate cause, from which they concluded that these movements were independent rather than necessary or natural. Each movement, therefore, originated with a soul. Every soul has intellect, and this intellect is an angel severed from material substance. They called these intellects, or angels, or secondary causes and other names. The nethermost degree, nearest to us, is the Active Intelligence, of which they taught that it guided the nether world. The next is the Hylic Intellect, then comes the soul, nature, the natural and animal forces, and the faculties of each [human] organ. All these, however, are subtleties, and pleasant for investigation.¹⁵ He who is deceived by them is in any case a heretic. Leave also alone the argument of the Karaites, taken from David's last will to his son: 'And thou, Solomon, my son, know thou the God of thy father, and serve Him' (1 Chron. xxviii. 9). They conclude from this verse that a complete knowledge of God must precede His worship. As a matter of fact, David reminded his son to imitate his father and ancestors in their belief in the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, whose solicitude was with them, and who fulfilled His promises in multiplying their descendants, gave them Palestine, and caused His Shekinah to dwell among them. It is also written: 'Gods which ye did not know,' but this does not allude to the real truth, but those objects from which neither good nor evil can issue, and deserve neither confidence nor fear.—

22. The Rabbi was then concerned to leave the land of the Khazari and to betake himself to Jerusalem. The king was loth to let him go, and spoke to him in this sense as follows: What can be sought in Palestine nowadays, since the divine reflex is absent from it, whilst, with a pure mind and desire, one can approach God in any place. Why wilt thou run into danger on land and water and among various peoples?

23. The Rabbi answered: The visible Shekinah has, indeed, disappeared, because it does not reveal itself except to a prophet or a favoured community, and in a distinguished place. This is what we look for in the passage: 'Let our eyes behold when Thou returnest to Zion.' As regards the invisible and spiritual Shekinah, it is with every born Israelite of virtuous life, pure heart, and upright mind before the Lord of Israel. Palestine is especially distinguished by the Lord of Israel, and no function can be perfect except there. Many of the Israelitish laws do not concern those who do not live there; heart and soul are only perfectly pure and immaculate in the place which is believed to be specially selected by God. If this is true in a figurative sense, how much more true in reality, as we have shown.¹⁶ Thus the longing for it is awakened with disinterested motives, especially for him who wishes to live there, and to atone for past transgressions, since there is no opportunity of bringing the sacrifices ordained by God for intentional and unintentional sins. He is supported by the saying of the Sages: 'Exile atones for sins,'¹⁷ especially if his exile brings him into the place of God's choice. The danger he runs on land and sea does not come under the category of: 'You shall not tempt the Lord' (Deut. vi. 16); but the verse refers to risks

Lesson 2

Judah HaLevi, the Kuzari

which one takes when travelling with merchandise in the hope of gain. He who incurs even greater danger on account of his ardent desire to obtain forgiveness is free from reproach if he has closed the balance of his life, expressed his gratitude for his past life, and is satisfied to spend the rest of his days in seeking the favour of his Lord. He braves danger, and if he escapes he praises God gratefully. But should he perish through his sins, he has obtained the divine favour, and may be confident that he has atoned for most of his sins by his death. In my opinion this is better than to seek the dangers of war in order to gain fame and spoil by courage and bravery. This kind of danger is even inferior to that of those who march into war for hire.

24. Al Khazari : I thought that thou didst love freedom,¹⁹ but now I see thee finding new religious duties which thou wilt be obliged to fulfil in Palestine, which are, however, in abeyance here.

25. The Rabbi : I only seek freedom from the service of those numerous people whose favour I do not care for, and shall never obtain, though I worked for it all my life. Even if I could obtain it, it would not profit me—I mean serving men and courting their favour. I would rather seek the service of the One whose favour is obtained with the smallest effort, yet it profits in this world and the next. This is the favour of God, His service spells freedom, and humility before Him is true honour.

26. Al Khazari : If thou believest in all that thou sayest, God knows thy mind. The mind is free before God, who knows the hearts and discloses what is hidden.

27. The Rabbi : This is true when action is impossible. Man is free in his endeavours and work. But he deserves blame who does not look for visible reward for

visible work. For this reason it is written : 'Ye shall blow an alarm with the trumpets, and ye shall be remembered before the Lord your God (Num. x. 9) . . . They shall be to you for a memorial (ver. 10) . . . A memorial of blowing of trumpets' (Lev. xxiii. 24). God need not be reminded, but actions must be perfect to claim reward. Likewise must the ideas of the prayers be pronounced in the most perfect way to be considered as prayer and supplication. Now if thou bringest intention and action to perfection thou mayest expect reward. This is popularly expressed by *reminding*, and 'the Tōrah speaks in the manner of human beings.'²⁰ If the action is minus the intention, or the intention minus the action, the expectation [for reward] is lost, except in impossible things. It is, however, rather useful to show the good intention if the deed is impossible, as we express this in our prayer : 'On account of our sins have we been driven out of our land.' This sacred place serves to remind men and to stimulate them to love God, being a reward and promise, as it is written : 'Thou shalt arise and have mercy upon Zion, for the time to favour her, yea, the set time is come. For thy servants take pleasure in her stones and embrace the dust thereof' (Ps. cii. 14 sq.). This means that Jerusalem can only be rebuilt when Israel yearns for it to such an extent that they embrace her stones and dust.²¹

28. Al Khazari : If this be so, it would be a sin to hinder thee. It is, on the contrary, a merit to assist thee. May God grant thee His help, and be thy protector and friend. May He favour thee in His mercy.²²

Completed is the book with the help of God and His assistance. Praise without end be to the Giver of Help.

Lesson 2

Judah HaLevi, Selected Poems

A Longing to Return to the Land of Israel

My heart is in the east, and I in the uttermost west.
How can I find savor in food? How shall it be sweet to me?
How shall I render my vows and my bonds, while yet
Zion lieth beneath the fetter of Edom, and I in Arab chains?
A light thing would it seem to me
to leave all the good things of Spain -
Seeing how precious in mine eyes
to behold the dust of the desolate sanctuary.

Mount Avarim

Shalom, Mount Avarim. Blessed be your slopes.
Somewhere on you the greatest of men was gathered,
Sacred bones now buried deep in your side.
If you do not know him, ask the Red Sea,
Ask the green bush, ask Sinai, and they will tell you:
“He was not a man of words, but he did God’s work.”
I have vowed to visit you soon, God willing.

My Lord, Your Dwelling Places Are Lovely

O My Lord, Your dwelling places are lovely
Your Presence is manifest, not in mystery.
My dream brought me to the Temple of God
And I praised its delightful servants,
And the burnt offering, its meal and libation
Which rose up in great pillars of smoke.
I delighted in the song of the Levites,
In their secrets of the sacrificial service.
Then I woke, and still I was with you, O Lord,
And I gave thanks - for to You it is pleasant to give thanks.

Lesson 2

Rashi on Genesis 1:1

Genesis 1:1

“In the beginning of God's creation of the heavens and the earth...”

Rashi on “In the beginning...”

Said Rabbi Isaac: It was not necessary to begin the Torah except from “This month is to you,” (Exod. 12:2) which is the first commandment that the Israelites were commanded, (for the main purpose of the Torah is its commandments, and although several commandments are found in Genesis, e.g., circumcision and the prohibition of eating the thigh sinew, they could have been included together with the other commandments). Therefore, why did God commence [the Torah] with “In the beginning?” Because of [the verse] “The strength of His works He related to His people, to give them the inheritance of the nations” (Ps. 111:6). For if the nations of the world should say to Israel, “You are robbers, for you conquered by force the lands of the seven nations [of Canaan],” they will reply, “The entire earth belongs to the Holy One, blessed be He; He created it (this we learn from the story of the Creation) and gave it to whomever He deemed proper. When He wished, He gave it to them, and when He wished, He took it away from them and gave it to us.

Lesson 3

Abraham Isaac Kook, "The Land of Israel"

THE LAND OF ISRAEL (1910-1930)

ERETZ ISRAEL is not something apart from the soul of the Jewish people; it is no mere national possession, serving as a means of unifying our people and buttressing its material, or even its spiritual, survival. Eretz Israel is part of the very essence of our nationhood; it is bound organically to its very life and inner being. Human reason, even at its most sublime, cannot begin to understand the unique holiness of Eretz Israel; it cannot stir the depths of love for the land that are dormant within our people. What Eretz Israel means to the Jew can be felt only through the Spirit of the Lord which is in our people as a whole, through the spiritual cast of the Jewish soul, which radiates its characteristic influence to every healthy emotion. This higher light shines forth to the degree that the spirit of divine holiness fills the hearts of the saints and scholars of Israel with heavenly life and bliss.

To regard Eretz Israel as merely a tool for establishing our national unity—or even for sustaining our religion in the Diaspora by preserving its proper character and its faith, piety, and observances—is a sterile notion; it is unworthy of the holiness of Eretz Israel. A valid

strengthening of Judaism in the Diaspora can come only from a deepened attachment to Eretz Israel. The hope for the return to the Holy Land is the continuing source of the distinctive nature of Judaism. The hope for the Redemption is the force that sustains Judaism in the Diaspora; the Judaism of Eretz Israel is the very Redemption.

JEWISH ORIGINAL CREATIVITY, whether in the realm of ideas or in the arena of daily life and action, is impossible except in Eretz Israel. On the other hand, whatever the Jewish people creates in Eretz Israel assimilates the universal into characteristic and unique Jewish form, to the great benefit of the Jewish people and of the world. The very sins which are the cause of our exile also pollute the pristine wellspring of our being, so that the water is impure at the source. Once the unique wellspring of Israel's individuality has become corrupt, its primal originality can express itself only in that area of loftiest universal creativity which belongs to the Jew—and only in the Diaspora, while the Homeland itself grows waste and desolate, atoning for its degradation by its ruin. While the life and thought of Israel is finding universal outlets and is being scattered abroad in all the world, the pristine well of the Jewish spirit stops running, the polluted streams emanating from the source are drying up, and the well is cleansing itself, until its original purity returns. When that process is completed, the exile will become a disgust to us and will be discarded. Universal Light, in all its power, will again radiate from the unique source of our being; the splendor of the Messiah who is to gather in the exiles will begin to be manifest; and the bitter lament of Rachel weeping for her children will find sweet and glorious consolation. The creativity of the Jew, in all its glory and uniqueness, will reassert itself, suffused with the all-encompassing riches of the spirit of the greatest giant of humankind, Abraham, whom the Almighty called to be a blessing to man.

A JEW CANNOT BE as devoted and true to his own ideas, sentiments, and imagination in the Diaspora as he can in Eretz Israel. Revelations of the Holy, of whatever degree, are relatively pure in Eretz Israel; outside it, they are mixed with dross and much impurity. However, the greater is one's yearning for and attachment to Eretz Israel, the purer his thoughts become, for they then live in the air of Eretz Israel, which sustains everyone who longs to behold the Land.

IN THE HOLY LAND man's imagination is lucid and clear, clean and pure, capable of receiving the revelation of Divine Truth and of expressing in life the sublime meaning of the ideal of the sovereignty of holiness; there the mind is prepared to understand the light of prophecy and to be illumined by the radiance of the Holy Spirit. In gentile lands the imagination is dim, clouded with darkness and shadowed with unholiness, and it cannot serve as the vessel for the outpouring of the Divine Light, as it raises itself beyond the lowness and narrowness of the universe. Because reason and imagination are interwoven and interact with each other, even reason cannot shine in its truest glory outside the Holy Land.

DEEP IN THE HEART of every Jew, in its purest and holiest recesses, there blazes the fire of Israel. There can be no mistaking its demands for an organic and indivisible bond between life and all of God's commandments; for the pouring of the spirit of the Lord, the spirit of Israel which completely permeates the soul of the Jew, into all the vessels which were created for this particular purpose; and for expressing the word of Israel fully and precisely in the realms of action and idea.

In the hearts of our saints, this fire is constantly blazing up with tongues of holy flame. Like the fire on the altar of the Temple, it is burning unceasingly, with a steady flame, in the collective heart of our people. Hidden away in the deepest recesses of their souls, it exists even among the backsliders and sinners of Israel. Within the Jewish people as a whole, this is the living source of its desire for freedom, of its longing for a life worthy of the name for man and community, of its hope for redemption—of the striving toward a full, uncontradictory, and unbounded Jewish life.

This is the meaning of the Jew's undying love for Eretz Israel—the Land of Holiness, the Land of God—in which all of the Divine commandments are realized in their perfect form. This urge to unfold to the world the nature of God, to raise one's head in His Name in order to proclaim His greatness in its real dimension, affects all souls, for all desire to become as one with Him and to partake of the bliss of His life. This yearning for a true life, for one that is fashioned by all the commandments of the Torah and illumined by all its uplifting splendor, is the source of the courage which moves the Jew to affirm, before all the world, his loyalty to the heritage of his people, to the preservation of its identity and values, and to the upholding of its faith and vision.

An outsider may wonder: How can seeming unbelievers be moved by this life force, not merely to nearness to the universal God but even toward authentic Jewish life—to expressing the divine commandments concretely in image and idea, in song and deed. But this is no mystery to anyone whose heart is deeply at one with the soul of the Jewish people and who knows its marvelous nature. The source of this Power is in the Power of God, in the everlasting glory of life.

Lesson 3

Ideological Statements Sheet

“The world and all that it contains is waiting for the Light of Israel, for the Exalted Light radiating from God Whose Name Should Be Praised.”⁹

“How can we sing a song of God on foreign soil?”¹⁰

“The Light of Israel is not a utopian dream, or some abstract morality, or merely a pious wish and a noble vision. It does not wash its hands of the material world and all its values, abandoning the flesh and society and government to wallow in their own impurity, forsaking the forces of nature which fell in the Fall of Man to remain in their low estate. The Light of Israel is, rather, a raising of all life.”¹¹

“If I forget you, Jerusalem, let my right hand wither, let my tongue stick to the roof of my mouth, if I cease to think of you, if I fail to keep Jerusalem in my mind even at my happiest hour.”¹²

“Apart from the nourishment it receives from the life-giving dew of the holiness of the Land of Israel, Jewry in the Diaspora has no real foundation and lives only by the power of a vision and by the memory of our glory...”¹³

“In days to come, the People of Israel shall strike root. Israel shall sprout and blossom, and the face of the entire world will be covered with fruit.”¹⁴

“The Land of Israel is especially distinguished by the God of Israel, and no function can be perfect except there.”¹⁵

“My heart is in the east, and I in the uttermost west. How can I find savor in food? How shall it be sweet to me?”¹⁶

⁹ Abraham Isaac Kook, “The Rebirth of Israel,” *The Zionist Idea*, ed. Arthur Hertzberg (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: The Jewish Publication Society, 1997), 424.

¹⁰ Psalm 137:4.

¹¹ Kook, 424.

¹² Psalm 137:5-6.

¹³ Abraham Isaac Kook, “Lights for Rebirth,” *The Zionist Idea*, ed. Arthur Hertzberg (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: The Jewish Publication Society, 1997), 429.

¹⁴ Isaiah 27:6.

¹⁵ Judah HaLevi, *The Kuzari: An Argument for the Faith of Israel* (New York, New York: Schocken Books, 1964), 293.

¹⁶ Judah HaLevi, “A Longing to Return to the Land of Israel.”

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supported the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt on the basis of the Camp David Accords [doc. 103]. The NRP's opposition to the removal of the settlements in the Rafiah Salient was based on security considerations and on the national-religious significance attached to Jewish settlement once already established and inhabited. One should remember that the settlements were established for security reasons and on the basis of a strategic-security concept and not as a result of religious significance attached to the area itself. In this respect, the NRP always rejected the Greater Israel movement's claim that an active Israeli military presence in Sinai is vital for Israeli security.

The NRP's approach to the Golan Heights is also based on security criterion. One need not be a military strategist to realize the vital significance of the Golan Heights for the defense of Israel. One need only to stand on the top of the heights, and to see the entire Galilee in the palm of his hand, to realize that a strong military and civilian presence on the Golan Heights is absolutely essential for the defense of the entire North and for the very security of Israel. Thus the NRP is part of the national consensus which holds that Israel will never go down from the Golan Heights. Yet, since the basis for Israel's adamant stand on the Golan Heights is security, the NRP supports the government's position that while Israel remains on the Golan she is willing to negotiate with Syria—in the context of a permanent peace treaty—on the final borders of the Golan, which need not be identical to the present lines.

Judea, Samaria, and Gaza present an entirely different picture. The NRP's attachment to these areas is founded both on security grounds and on their national-religious significance as an integral part of Eretz Israel, the Land of Israel. The NRP has always refrained from determining the relative importance of each of these two factors, stressing the vital importance and centrality of each one in its own right and the fact that each complements and reinforces the other—both jointly leading to the same conclu-

sion and both forming the joint basis for the NRP's position. Thus, the NRP firmly rejects the territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria, claiming that such a compromise does not meet either the requirements of Israel's security or of the maintenance of her national right.

The NRP's position is that while the Allon Plan [see map 4] might be an answer to the external threat to Israel's security, it leaves the question of internal security and terrorism wide open. The presence of Israeli forces on the Jordan River, as envisaged by the Allon plan, might deter Arab aggression from the East, although the need for such a force to be maintained and reinforced through narrow corridors in hostile territory could seriously impair its effectiveness and its deterrent capability. But the creation of a sovereign Arab entity—be it Jordanian or Palestinian—inhabited by close to a million Arabs, raised and educated on hatred and on a dream of revenge, adjacent to Israel's population centers, would mean a hotbed of terrorism and terrorism that would be uncontrollable and make life in Israel unbearable and unlivable. The only answer to such a possible nightmare in the future is a strong Israeli presence in these areas, with Israel enjoying the prime responsibility for internal security for the entire area west of the Jordan River.

Similarly the NRP believes that once Israel returned to parts of its historic homeland—as a result of an aggressive war waged against it by Jordan—it cannot permit itself to sever these areas from any relationship or contact with the Jewish people. The NRP's position is that there must be some relationship and some contact between the Jewish people and Israel and between these areas.

Nevertheless, the NRP supports a compromise solution for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, a compromise that falls far short of meeting the just national aspirations of the Jewish people. For this reason, the NRP has not demanded the annexation of Judea and Samaria. On the contrary, it has opposed legislation calling for the annexation of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza or

parts of these areas, as for instance, has been proposed by Gush Emunim [see doc. 8]. The NRP supports the Autonomy Plan of the present government and is actively involved in the autonomy negotiations. In fact, the NRP is not demanding Israeli sovereignty in Judea and Samaria but is willing to support a *func-*

ional compromise, by which authority, government, and effective sovereignty would be shared by the Palestinian Arabs and Israel. This is the essence of the Autonomy Plan, and the NRP sees in this plan, or in a similar approach, the only viable compromise with which both sides can live.

NOTES

1. Ben Kobbah (d. 18 c.e.) was the leader of the Jewish revolt against the Romans, 132-135 c.e. The great rabbinic leader of the period, Akiba, considered Ben-Kobbah to be the Messiah. The revolt was put down, and both leaders were killed.
2. The First Zionist Congress endorsed Political Zionism as espoused by Theodor Herzl. According to Herzl, the Jewish Question could be solved only by large-scale migration and settlement of Palestine, which could be attained only through the political assistance and consent of the Sinai immediately south of the Gaza Strip.

3. The Rafiah Salient is the area in the northern part of the Sinai immediately south of the Gaza Strip.

Handwritten note: Haim Resinovich & Yehuda Runkovitz, Israel in the Middle East (Bardai, Haaretz 2008) 11.301-307

Gush Emunim

Opinion Paper

January 1978

The central issue in Israel's domestic politics following the Yom Kippur War has been the debate over the fate of the territories captured in 1967, particularly the West Bank and Gaza. In the late 1970s the signing of a peace treaty with Egypt (doc. 104) and the return of the Sinai served to exacerbate the debate on the Palestinian issue inside Israel.

One side of this issue was argued by Gush Emunim (Bic of the Faithful), a group of ultra-right-wing religious nationalists who believe that Jews have a holy obligation to retain sovereignty over western Palestine. The group was led in its early phases by Rabbi Moshe Levinger and Haiman Frenkel. Before the formation of a symphetic government in 1977, Gush Emunim established settlements on the West Bank illegally, forcing the Labor government to compromise and allow the settlement to remain or to use military force to remove the illegal settlers. The Labor governments usually compromised. The Likud governments have been more openly supportive of such settlements. The following opinion paper was published in Gush Emunim's newsletter.

Source: Chofei Gush Emunim [Friends of Gush Emunim], January 1978, pp. 1-4.

The hope for peace has captured the people of Israel of all ages. The people of Israel—its blessing is peace, the end of its prayers is for peace, and even upon leaving for battle it calls out to its enemies for peace.

But just because of our strong desire for peace, we need great strengths of wisdom and courage not to mistake a deceitful peace for a real peace, a weak peace for a peace of honor and strength, a peace of crisis and retreat for a peace of renewal and creation.

We must painfully conclude that the peace plan proposed by the government of Israel has no truth, no honor and strength, no redemptive power. The basis of this plan is a deceitful peace; its spirit, one of breakdown and weakness; and its results, crisis and retreat.

This "peace plan" is based on three main points of distortion:

1. Readiness for complete withdrawal down to the last centimeter, to the borders before the Six-Day War. This withdrawal would signify acknowledgment of the Arab claim that the "obliteration of the traces of Israeli aggression" is a condition for peace. This claim is false and deceitful, and willingness to accept it as a basis for a peace plan, and to retreat indiscriminately now from all of Sinai and the Golan Heights, is an unethical step lacking the propriety in which the prime minister prides himself.
2. Readiness to remove all the Jewish settlements from the Rafiah Salient and Sharm el-Sheikh from Israeli sovereignty and to transfer them to Egyptian sovereignty. This readiness reflects an approach lacking in national responsibility and represents not only a mortal blow to the ability of these settlements to exist but also a basic undermining of the ideological foundation of Zionist fulfillment, which determined from its beginnings that settlement of the land is the basis for sovereignty. A blow to the practical and ideological roots of settlement undermines the motivation to settle, and therefore

whoever thinks that it is possible to rally upon the people of Israel to become pioneers and go out to settle the land in great numbers on the basis of this plan is mistaken and deceiving.

3. The idea of administrative autonomy for the Arabs of Judaea and Samaria and the Gaza District. The autonomy as it is proposed is not limited to the regional municipal framework but represents a basis for Arab national institutions to be elected in general, democratic elections. One would be completely blind not to realize that this autonomy will lead directly to the establishment of a Palestinian state that will enjoy—despite Israel's opposition—recognition by the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world. There is not one Arab leader, not even the "most moderate of the moderates," who will not see autonomy as the basis for a Palestinian state and who will not do everything to bring this about. This proposal does not bring a solution to the Palestinian question any closer. On the contrary, it exacerbates the question and will force the question that much sooner. Therefore, it not only does not contribute to peace and tranquility but actually brings closer the time at which the War of Palestinian Liberation is likely to set off a war in the entire Middle East.

In conclusion, we reject this plan from the start and call for a public struggle for its abolition. This is not a personal struggle against the prime minister. It is a deep moral struggle against the spirit of deceit, the weakness inherent in the very basis of the plan; it is a struggle for the spirit of the great renaissance.

Our sages have said, "A bit of light pushes much of the darkness aside," and we will proceed likewise. We will raise the light of revival, we will arouse the power of Israel through great public courtesies of honor and strength; we will rejoice in the land with settlements and waves of immigration; we will, through education and information, open our eyes to see what is this peace we are

yearning for, and what the difference is between true peace and a deceitful peace. Rav [Abraham Isaac] Kook, of Blessed Memory, said, "The truth is not shy or cowardly." We shall follow in his footsteps and not be deterred from stating loudly the truth of renaissance, even if it is not the kind of peace that can be attained from one day to the next, one that is all lies and illusion.

We believe that the people will yet awaken from the illusion of this imaginary peace and will strengthen itself in its onward struggle.

We pray that this awakening will not be accompanied by the sufferings of despair and as a result the hope for true peace, of strength, brotherhood, honor, and light will not be lost.

We pray that this awakening will not be accompanied by the sufferings of despair and as a result the hope for true peace, of strength, brotherhood, honor, and light will not be lost.

God will grant His people strength

God will bless His people with peace!

Come, let us go up and settle the land!

Shiloh

Shiloh, at which the members of Gush Emunim intend to lay the cornerstone for a new city today, has been the target for settlers since the middle of 1974.²

Shiloh has great significance and holds a special place in the history of the Jewish people. According to tradition, Shiloh is one of the holy places for the people in which the Divine Presence abided. Here the land was divided up among the tribes, and the Tabernacle and Ark of the Covenant arrived here. It is said that the graves of Eli the Kohan and his two sons are here.³

The site, at which archaeological excavations have long been held, is near the Arab village of Turmus-Aya in Samaria, about two miles east of the Ramallah-Nablus road, about fourteen miles north of Ramallah. At the mound itself, remnants have been found of buildings, walls, burial caves, and more—remnants of an Israelite city that existed before Jebusite Jerusalem was conquered and reached the height of its development in the tenth century. When the renowned Jewish traveller Ishraqi Hafanhi visited it in 1322, he saw ruins, among them a mosque. Its remains can be found in the area today.

Next to the mound is the Valley of Shiloh, which is intended to serve the city the settlers plan to establish. In Arabic the valley is called Marg-eid (lit., Valley of the Holy Day), in which, it seems, large public gatherings were held in the days of its glory. Among the vineyards of the valley, the tribe of Benjamin laid in ambush for the daughters of Shiloh, in order to kidnap them and take them for wives, as told in the Bible.

NOTES

1. The Autonomy Plan is a proposal for "administrative autonomy" for the West Bank and Gaza first developed by the Begin government in late 1977 and presented as a twenty-six-point plan to Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in December of that year (doc. 100). The plan agreed to at Camp David used the term "full autonomy," and autonomy talks began in May 1979 but made no real progress.
2. Shiloh is a Gush Emunim settlement established in January 1978 and officially classified as an archaeological site despite Gush Emunim's public statement that it intended a permanent settlement. By March 1979 Shiloh was officially included in the list of settlements under the jurisdiction of the Settlement Section of the Jewish Agency.
3. Eli the Kohan (priest) was priest at Shiloh in central Samaria, one of the major religious centers of the Israelites before the Temple was built. Eli trained Samuel. See 1 Sam. 1-3.

1972, but the government forcibly removed them. In June 1979 Elon Moreh was established with the government's support. In October 1979, however, the Supreme Court ruled that civilian settlements on land privately owned by Arab residents was illegal, rejecting the government's argument that the land was appropriated for security reasons and stating that no such justification existed in this instance. The court ordered that the settlement be evacuated by November 18, 1979. Both the settlers and the government ignored this deadline at first, but the settlement was finally evacuated in 1980.

3. Eli the Kohan (priest) was priest at Shiloh in central Samaria, one of the major religious centers of the Israelites before the Temple was built. Eli trained Samuel. See 1 Sam. 1-3.

Lesson 4

Shlomo Goren, "The Holy Land and the Value of Life"

The Holy Land and the value of life

Rabbi Shlomo Goren



J' Lem 6
OCT. 6, 1

SINCE THE Six Day War, a cardinal question has been occupying our mind: the view of the Tora, the Prophets and Jewish law as to the duty to defend Israel's sovereignty in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.

Even though these areas have not yet been annexed to the State of Israel and are still under military occupation, it is our duty to clarify whether Jewish law requires us to defend forcibly the sanctified soil of Israel. In principle there is no difference between Judea, Samaria and Gaza, on the one hand, and Jaffa, Ramla, Lod, and Ashkelon, on the other.

The temporary difference of 19 years between the conquest of the latter cities and the liberation of Hebron, Bethel, Jericho, Anatot, Nablus, and Jenin cannot accord these cities a different *halachic* status with regard to our duty toward these parts of Israel. On the contrary: Judea and Samaria were always the heartland of Eretz Yisrael. It is there that we find the cradle of the Davidic monarchy and of the Israelite Kingdom.

It is logical to assume that in order to maintain Jewish sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza we will have to exert force against the Arabs living there, and possibly against some of the Israeli Arabs who, covertly or overtly, will join in the Arab struggle against us. And there is no doubt that some of the Arab states, even if they do not enter into an overt war against us, will offer a great deal of resistance - and there is no war without casualties.

This gives rise to the question of whether there is *halachic* justification for making concessions on territory of Eretz Yisrael, in order to avoid bloodshed and achieve a formal peace (to the extent that one can trust that the peace will be permanent). The command, "You shall live by them" (Lev. 18:5) - to which the Talmud adds: "and you shall not die by them" - is the basis for the accepted *halacha* that a question of *pi'ku'ah nefesh* (danger to human life) suspends the performance of all the commandments and prohibitions.

Non-Jews and the possession of land in Israel

tion except for the prohibitions on idolatry, sexual immorality and bloodshed.

The question then arises: does this rule also suspend the commandment of *lo'chanem* ("you shall show them no mercy") (Deut. 7:2), which forbids granting non-Jews possession of land in Israel? If so, it means that whenever one's life is endangered, he is exempt from the prohibition of *lo'chanem*. Or is this commandment not suspended by *pi'ku'ah nefesh*, as Maimonides appears to imply:

"When Israel has the upper hand over them [the non-Jews], we are forbidden to permit idolaters in our midst, even if they live there but temporarily... until they take upon themselves the seven Noahide commandments" (*Yad, Hil. Avodat Kokhavim* 10:6).

One may conclude from this language that when we have sovereignty over Eretz Yisrael and have the military power we are forbidden to permit non-Jews who are idolaters to live in Eretz Yisrael. Obviously, in order to achieve this goal we will have to exert force against them, because Maimonides refers to the use of physical force when he states that his law applies "when Israel has the upper hand." And who will guarantee that the Arabs will not apply counterforce in order not to be expelled from the land, thus endangering the lives of our soldiers?

Maimonides nevertheless does not make the duty of implementation contingent on its being possible without endangering the lives of our forces. So if the Tora nevertheless commands us to use force, it might appear that it suspends "You shall live by them."

ONE MIGHT argue that the prohibition against "giving them lodging in Eretz Yisrael" does not apply to the Arabs, who are not idolatrous and whose monotheistic belief is unquestionable. This claim has no substance; for several reasons:

a. According to Maimonides, in order to be permitted to live in Eretz Yisrael they must take upon themselves the seven Noahide laws; accepting the unity of God is insufficient.

b. Even if they observed these laws, today we could not grant them the privilege of living in Eretz Yisrael. As Maimonides states, a non-Jew can be accepted as a *ger tashav* only when the jubilee year laws are in effect. Today, when there is no jubilee year, there cannot be a *ger tashav* (*Isurei Bie'h* 14:6).

c. Maimonides (*M'la'chim* 8:11) rules that a *ger tashav* who observe the Noahide laws is considered one of the *hasidei umot ha'olam* (a righteous gentile) and has a place in the World to Come. That is only true though, if he keeps the laws because God commanded them in the Tora and informed us through Moses that the Sons of Noah had previously been commanded to observe them. But not if he observes the laws because of his own logic. This proviso, noted by Maimonides, excludes the Moslems from gaining the special status.

d. The *Ra'avad* differs with Maimonides and holds that even in our times we may grant the status of *ger tashav*. But even he makes this contingent on the candidate's undertaking to keep the Noahide laws and on his accepting the right of the Jewish people to its land, in accordance with the Tora. The Arabs of the territories, however, have been fighting against us and against this right.

There is also the following clear ruling of Maimonides (*Hil. Mela'chim* 7:15), which indicates that even an elective war suspends the consideration of the security of life:

"Once he enters into a military confrontation, he is to trust in the Hope of Israel.... And he should know that it is for the unifying of The Name [of God] that he is waging war. He must put his life at risk and must not fear or think of his wife or his children... Moreover... if he ... did not wage war with all his heart and all his soul, it is as if he shed the blood of all, as is written, 'Lest he make his brethren's heart faint as his heart' (Deut. 20:8)."

These words of Maimonides prove that in war one is forbidden to reckon the danger involved to the life of the individual, because the life of the nation depends on victory. This refers to an elective war - in which men in various categories are sent home from the front before the battle - and it applies *a fortiori* to an obligatory war.

(CONTINUED ON REVERSE)

NAHMANIDES, IN HIS comments on Maimonides' *Sifre He-Mitzvot*, takes a clear position on this question. He holds that to take possession of the land of Israel is one of the 613 commandments, and that that law applies in every generation in which we have the might to conquer the land, as it states, "Behold, the Lord your God has set the land before you; go up and possess it (Deut. 1:21). Based on this, Nahmanides in Commandment 4 which he adds to those listed by Maimonides, writes:

"We were commanded to inherit the land that God gave to our fathers.... And we are not to leave it in the hands of others.... This is what He said to them: 'You shall dispossess the inhabitants of the land, and dwell therein, for I have given you the land to possess it. And you shall inherit the land...' (Num. 33:53f.). Nahmanides adds: "This is what the Sages refer to as an obligatory war.

Now, there is obviously no such thing as a war that does not pose a danger to the combatants, as we see in the chapter in which the officers send home certain categories of men "lest he die in the battle, and another man dedicate it [his new house]." It follows that the commandment to wage battle, even in the case of an elective war, suspends the rule of individual security, for the chapter

'In an obligatory war there is no limitation on the percentage of casualties'

cited deals with an elective war. This we see in *Sifre d'Bei Rav*, Deut. sect. 99: "Where does this apply? In an elective war, but in an obligatory war all go out, even the bridegroom from his room and the bride from her bridal canopy."

Two basic principles emerge from all this:

a. Participation in war always poses a direct danger to human life, to the point that the Tora is concerned enough to warn: "lest he die in the battle and another man take her."

b. Even an elective war suspends the rules of individual security, because the commandment to defeat the enemy is more important than the life of the individual. Once an elective war has been embarked upon, the *Hazon Ish* ruled, it is the Tora's commandment to emerge victorious, based on the verse, "You shall besiege the city that makes war with you, until it is subdued" (Deut. 20:20). On this Shammai the elder (*Sifre, Shofetim*, sect. 33) and the Jerusalem Talmud, *Shabbat* 1:5, comment: "'until it is subdued' - even on the Sabbath." This refers to an elective war, as *Sifre* concludes.

We have found incontrovertible proof for this in Tractate *Shevu'ot* 35b: Samuel said: "A regime that kills one of [every] six is not pun-

ished, as it states, 'the thousand is thine, O Solomon' - that is for the Kingdom of Heaven - "and 200 each to those who keep the fruit" (Song of Songs 8:12) - that is for the kingdom of the earth." On this, *Tosafot* comments: "that kills one of six" refers to an elective war." Which shows that security of life does not suspend even an elective war, because the government is permitted to take the nation into an elective war and is not punished even if a sixth of the population falls.

And in an obligatory war there is no limitation on the percentage of casualties. The only proviso there is that there be a high probability of victory; one may not risk even a single life for a lost cause, even in an obligatory war. But if the military evaluation is that the probability of victory is high, then the percentage of those that are liable to fall in an obligatory war cannot prevent the nation from going to war.

We thus see that, unlike other Tora commandments, the rule that individual security suspends the laws of the Tora does not apply to war.

Even a shaky peace treaty is preferable to defeat on the battlefield

The great halachic principle that individual security suspends the performance of the commandments does not apply to war, even an elective one. And certainly today, when all our wars are obligatory, there is no violation of the rule, "You shall live by them."

Based on all these sources, there are no grounds for discussing the retention or return of parts of Israel in terms of the question of danger. All *poskim* have ruled that it is incumbent on all generations to defend Jewish sovereignty over the sanctified territory of Eretz Yisrael, and that this commandment overrides the danger to individuals - all this conditional on the unequivocal military opinion that we have the ability to carry out these commandments.

If we find that from the purely military aspect we are not in a position to vanquish our enemies, then even a shaky peace treaty is preferable to a defeat on the battlefield.

This was the case in the Great Revolt when the Roman forces besieged Jerusalem. R. Yohanan ben Zakkai favoured peace with the Romans when Jerusalem was left without provisions or arms. It was just the opposite with the Hasmonians, who waged a struggle against the Greek Empire for over 80 years and did not give up hope of the victory which they eventually achieved.

What is left for us to do is to clarify whether our efforts today to defend Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip from the activities of the *intifada* and other hostile forces, whose aim is to force us to retreat from these regions, is an obligatory or an elective war. And indeed, we find clearly in the Talmud, *Sota* 44b, in the name of Rava, that the war of Joshua to conquer Eretz Yisrael is considered by all to have been *milhemet hova* - a "duty war" - which is even higher than an obligatory war (*milhemet mitzva*).

IF WE WERE embarking today on an attempt to conquer Eretz Yisrael, we would be faced with a dispute between Maimonides and Nahmanides as to the definition of such a war. But since the entire country was liberated by us in the War of Liberation and in the Six Day War, the problem now relates to defending our sovereignty over all Eretz Yisrael, since even those parts under IDF occupation are, according to Maimonides, part of our sovereignty. As R. Hisda says in the JT: "R. Judah would consider an elective war to be where "we come upon them," whereas a *milhemet hova* is one "where they come upon us." So too do we find in BT, *Sota* 44b, in the name of Rava.

On the other hand, Me'iri, in Beit Ha-B'hirah (his commentary on *Sota*), holds that the argument between the Sages and R. Judah refers to a case where we fear that the enemy is going to wage war against us, or we know that they are about to launch an offensive. But if they have already attacked us, all agree that it is an obligatory war.

The same applies in our case today, where the Arabs have launched a rebellion against us, with injuries and fatalities to Jewish soldiers and civilians. Their aim is to uproot us not only from parts of Eretz Yisrael; their ultimate goal is to destroy the entire state of Israel.

Our struggle against the *intifada* is in the category of an obligatory war which, according to the *poskim*, is a super *milhemet mitzva* calling for *mesirut nefesh* - the utmost devotion.

Lesson 5

Etta Prince-Gibson, "Interview with Danny Dayan"

The Back Page

'A state that abandons its own land will soon abandon its other core values'

Since losing its campaign against the disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, the movement for Jewish settlement in Gaza and the West Bank has faced a severe public, political and ideological crisis. Aware of the general public's alienation from extremist settlers and support for evacuation of illegal outposts and a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians, leaders of the settlement movement have determined that they must re-engage with Israeli society in advance of any future withdrawal plans.

As part of the move to change their image, on July 13, the date on which the settlers commemorated two years since the disengagement from Gaza, the Yesha [a Hebrew acronym for "Judea, Samaria and Gaza"] Council, a self-appointed body of heads of settlements and prominent figures, elected Danny Dayan, only the second non-religious person to head the council as their chairman, since it was established in 1979.

Dayan, 51, lives in the mixed religious-secular settlement of Ma'ale Shomron. Born in Argentina to a staunchly Revisionist family, he came to Israel at age 16. After completing his army service and receiving a BSc in computer sciences, he founded a software company, which he sold two years ago, and has since devoted his time to business initiatives and teaching. He was active in the now-defunct, far-right Tehiya party in the late 1980s. Concerned about the rifts between the settlers and the general public and about increasing extremism and alienation in his own ranks, Dayan is optimistic about the future of the settlement movement in Judea and Samaria.

The Jerusalem Report: Why do you think that you, a non-religious Jew, were elected as chairman of the Yesha Council?


Danny Dayan: Some people may have voted for me because I do not wear a kippa; some may have voted for me despite the fact that I do not wear a kippa. But I believe I was elected because I can deal with the challenges facing Israeli society today. The religious-secular divide is not the most significant threat to Israeli society today. The most crucial divide is the one between those who believe in the Zionist values — aliya, settlement, and the Jewish people's right to the Land of Israel — and those who don't.

What are your goals for the Yesha Council?

In addition to attending to the needs of 300,000 settlers in Judea and Samaria, we have two major goals: To renew the dialogue with Israeli society, so that a minority of extremists will no longer set the tone for our entire community; and to prevent diplomatic and political arrangements that threaten the State of Israel, and especially the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria.

Do you believe the general Israeli public supports your positions?

Recent polls show that a majority of the public is against unilaterally dismantling settlements. The public realizes that the expulsion from Gush Katif was a strategic mistake that led to the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip and the public knows that the same thing will happen in



Judea and Samaria, if the IDF and the settlements are removed.

Would you consider evacuation of settlements in the West Bank if Israel's security could be guaranteed?

Of course not. There is a strong connection between the land and other social values. A state that abandons its own land will abandon its other core values. Because people in Tel Aviv no longer believe in the value of the land,

they no longer care if Qassams fall on Sderot or if the state is neglecting the Holocaust survivors.

Do you distinguish between isolated or illegal settlements and those located in centralized blocs close to the Green Line?

No. Since the Land of Israel stretches at least from Jordan to the sea, no settlements should ever be evacuated. As to illegal settlements there are none. Most of the so-called illegal settlements were set up legally but face bureaucratic hurdles that the government could, if it wished, solve quickly and easily.

Recently, 12 soldiers, most of them from religious settlements, refused to obey orders to evacuate two families who had illegally settled in Hebron. What is your position on this?

The families in Hebron were not there illegally. The refusal to obey orders stemmed from a failure of leadership on the part of the commanders, who should have known better than to send soldiers who were themselves expelled from their homes in the Gaza Strip to expel other Jews from their homes. As we see, refusal to obey orders becomes especially acute when the army is used for political goals.

If a soldier believes that he cannot, in good conscience, obey an order, then he should report to his commanding officer and be willing to bear the consequences. But no one — not rabbis, politicians, educators, or anyone else — has the right to call on anyone else, or on any group, to refuse orders.

Do you fear growing religious extremism in the settlements?

I am very worried that, as a result of the expulsion from Gush Katif and other actions by the government, such as the evacuation of [the outpost of] Amona [in January 2006], some of our youth are finding it difficult to distinguish between the government of Israel and the State of Israel. Some people may call this religious extremism. I believe it is a failure of leadership and values.

Are you optimistic about the future of the settlement movement?

Only a year and a half ago, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was elected on a platform calling for "realignment," including almost total withdrawal from the West Bank and the evacuation of settlements. Now no one even thinks about this. The settlements are growing, and every day, hundreds of thousands of Jews in the West Bank get up, go to work and to school and live productive, fulfilling lives. So, of course, I'm optimistic.

Etta Prince-Gibson

Lesson 5

Etta Prince-Gibson, "Interview with Danny Dayan"



COVER STORY: THE DAY AFTER

WESTERN WALL PROTEST
Spiritual leaders question the secular state's authority to give up parts of the divinely granted homeland.

Religious Zionism's Identity Crisis

Netty C. Gross

The disengagement from Gaza and the northern West Bank has undermined the relationship of many in the religious Zionist camp with the state they have viewed as the vehicle for the Jewish people's redemption. As their shock and sense of betrayal deepen, the community faces gripping questions of where to turn and what to believe.

IT'S A STIFLING FRIDAY IN EARLY AUGUST ON Moshav Hemed, a religious Zionist village of some 190 families south of Tel Aviv, and the streets are deserted. Hemed was established in 1950 as an agricultural community by Holocaust survivors and soldiers who had fought in Israel's War of Independence. At the end of its first decade, Hemed boasted 31 oxen, 159 cows and calves, 78 goats and 50,000 egg-laying hens.

Now, however, the farming days are long over, Hemed's residents commute to jobs in Tel Aviv and some agricultural land has been trans-

THE JERUSALEM REPORT SEPTEMBER 5, 2005

17

4/103

formed into office and warehouse space. But there's a lingering air of the old-fashioned religious and political pragmatism that was once associated with Orthodox Zionist thinkers. Many older women don't cover their hair and despite spoken admiration for the soon-to-be-remodeled settlement of the Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank, there's only a moderate display of orange protest ribbons dangling from cars. By Friday afternoon, preparations for Shabbat dinner, most locals are napping.

Yitzhak Meir, the 80-year-old village historian and architect, is waiting for me in his simply furnished living room; his wife Bere, who came to Israel on the Exodus, serves homemade apple cake. Five years ago, Meir, an energetic man with a thick German accent, spearheaded opening a market, including the market's history and architecture. Meir's family fled to Berlin to escape Nazi Germany at age 14 but lost 17 family members in the Holocaust. In 1946, he helped found the religious kibbutz of Ein Haetzayz near the Jordan River; he worked in the chicken coop and eventually became national inspector of poultry farms at the Agriculture Ministry. He moved to Hemed in 1952.

In 1967, like many religious Zionists, Meir perceived Israel's conquest in the Six-Day War as a divine gift. Wartime postcards he wrote to Bere from his reserve unit describe his emotions upon hearing that the Western Wall had been captured, beginning with the traditional words of praise from Psalms, "This is the day the Lord has made." In the mid-1970s, he supported Gush Emunim, the Bloc of the Faithful, established by disciples of Rabbi Tevye Yehudah HaCohen Kook, who saw settlement in the newly conquered lands as a step toward messianic redemption. After Israel withdrew from Sinai in 1982, disbanding its settlement there, Meir refused for the first time to vote for the National Religious Party (NRP), which stayed in the government despite the pullout.

The family's youngest child, Mirshah, joined Gush Emunim's mass attempt to settle at Sebastia near Nablus in 1975, a confrontation with the government that opened the movement's way to settlement throughout the West Bank. Mirshah eventually moved to the Gaza Strip settlement of Ein Haetzayz, becoming a natural anti-political activist. Her husband, another Gush Emunim member, moved to Nablus, another settlement. The Meirs' two older children remained within the

Green Line, a son in Hemed and a daughter in the religious Zionist Moshav Tikvahim, in the western Negev.

Yitzhak and Bere Meir have other, tragic, ties to the territories. In 1980, a nephew, Palestinian gunman with five other young men in Hemed. In August 2002, their eldest grandchild, Avital, 27 and pregnant with her third child, and her husband, Avi Wolansky, 29, were driving in their buses in the West Bank settlement of Ein Hemed territory, shot and killed.

Yitzhak Meir, who has three grandsons in elite combat units, sees no difference between the piousness of his nephew Hemed and those who built Ein Hemed and those who built Ein Hemed. He says, "The Lord of Israel is acquired through suffering," he says. For him, the disengagement is terrifying, he believes it will spiritually shatter the religious Zionist camp, which he thinks is being "punished" by secular forces for having become too powerful. "We devoted our lives to the state. There should have been elections or a referendum" on disengagement, he says. "The prime minister tricked us."

Meir isn't alone. The withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank is an upheaval for the religious Zionist community, whose members were in the vanguard of the opposition to the move. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's decision to evacuate settlements dissolved the alliance between the secular hawk like him, driven by security concerns, and the Orthodox settler movement. After Sharon's announcement 18 months ago, displays of religious fury with the same acuity: Pro-settler rabbis called on Orthodox soldiers to disobey orders connected with the withdrawal. Spiritual leaders delivered sermons questioning the government's authority to give up parts of the clearly granted homeland. From the orthodox chief rabbi Menachem Elia, who declared that the disengagement "definitely would not happen in the Western Wall; tens of thousands prayed for it."

But the prayers weren't answered, and now that the evacuation is under way and the Whole Land of Israel idea has been repudiated by the state — which religious Zionists have seen as sacred and as a divine vehicle for fulfillment of Biblical prophecy — the

crisis has only deepened. "Decades spent building up an ideology, and now you're left like worms, there is no being packed to the cancer. There's no Rabbi Rafi Hatan Krauthammer, a psychologist and head of Tzohar, a group of several hundred Orthodox rabbis that has sought to present a softer image of Orthodoxy to the secular public but whose members largely identify with the settlement movement.




UNANSWERED PRAYERS: Emunim's or Orthodox withdrawal from Gaza and northern West Bank is an upheaval for the religious Zionist community, whose members were in the vanguard of the opposition to the move.

Hebrew University philosopher Meir Halberstam, "a self-proclaimed ultra-Orthodox Jew, is self-proclaimed, and the shock is profound."

With that, care must be taken not to confuse the protesters lying down on roads or the rabbis urging soldiers to violate orders with all religious Zionists. Only a small minority of Israel's approximately 800,000 religious Zionists support illegal or violent actions, says Bar-Ilan University political scientist and pollster Asher Cohen, but 80 percent of self-defined religious Zionists oppose disengagement, putting them sharply at odds with secular Israel and the government. The politically dovish minority accepts or supports leaving Gaza.

SO WHERE IS RELIGIOUS ZIONISM headed after the pullout, and in the light of the political, theological and educational issues that it raises? Will it fine itself, fragment or be reabsorbed? Will the disillusioned faithful now shift toward ultra-Orthodoxy and its negative view of the Zionist idea, or be attracted to radical religious nationalists who promise "Jewish leadership" in place of democracy? Or will the religious Zionist mainstream return to its pre-settlement moderation, unleash its idealism in other areas and shift leftward toward the views of dovish religious groups such as Meimad and Ot V'Shalom?

Practically speaking, will young religious Zionist couples eschew settlement in the territories and opt to live within the Green Line for fear of future withdrawals? If the Jewish people isn't



Interested in the settlements, why should we keep banging our heads against the wall? It's not worth the effort," says one graduate of West Bank yeshiva, explaining why he, his wife and baby will soon relocate from Otzlet, in the West Bank, to Puhah Tikvah, Feuzimim, an opponent of the pullout who has ever sharper critic of what he calls "the hurried, brutal manner in which it is being carried out," predicts a deep theological and political re-evaluation of religious Zionism. There will be, he predicts, a defection to ultra-Orthodoxy or at least to a "new insularity" — turning away from the state and mil-

ity and civil service. The community, he says, will reopen the old, religious Zionist vs. ultra-Orthodox argument and question whether the "secular Zionists" state could ever have been the "value-free" or "value-neutral" approach. He predicts many will conclude, as he does, that the theology does not allow for a human, let alone secular, teacher in the classroom. "We are already heard resigned talk among some referring to Israel as the galut, the exile," he says.

Bar-Ilan Jewish philosophy professor Dov Schwartz, an expert on religious Zionism, is less grim. The movement, perhaps temporarily battered, will not be substantially undermined by the disengagement, he argues. "The redemption theme, historically, has had its ups and downs and so has religious Zionism. These are evolutionary processes and the disengagement period is just another intermezzo." Religious Zionism's commitment to national unity, he says, "is as strong as its commitment to the land," which makes self-segregation unlikely. For classic religious Zionists, he goes on, "and that's many Orthodox people in Israel today, the state itself is sacred," so adopting ultra-Orthodoxy's alienation is out of the question.

Halberstam sketches out four separate paths that a fractured community may take: A minority of religious Zionists, he predicts, will perceive the clash over the disengagement as a "culture war between Jews and Halutzim, meaning Jews or Russian immigrants," sense that living in Israel is some form of "internal exile," and move toward ultra-Orthodoxy. Next, he says, will be a small extremist apocalyptic group determined to "force the redemption" by any means — even deliberately provoking a confrontation with the Muslim world. A third group is likely to start a type of New Age religion, though the ultra-Orthodox, as a response to the failed philosophy of redemption through settling the land.

But the fourth and largest sector, Halberstam says, will "not break the bond with mainstream Israel." This critical mass of religious Zionists, he also believes, will put Jewish unity before any other consideration. Halberstam's evidence is that the heads of the overwhelming majority of the Hazerah yeshivot, which combine military service with religious studies, did not support the call of some influential rabbis to ultra-Orthodoxy or at least to a "new insularity" — turning away from the state and mil-

ONE IMMEDIATE CONCERN among educators and rabbis is for religious Zionist youth, many of whom have spent the summer participating in protest rallies, listening to over-the-air rhetoric, sometimes being urged to break the law by entering the Gaza Strip to confront soldiers.

Shimon Flicker, director of the Shalom House, a product Center for the Study of Torah and Leadership, which provides study tools for teaching democratic values in Orthodox schools, says that 45 schools demanded for programs, with 45 schools already having signed on for next summer. And yet, he says, some educators wonder whether religious schools will open at all, because of the fear that "kids will just be under too much emotional stress."

Flicker says educators are also worried that a mood of "sanctity and rejection of authority" is spreading from the radical "Hilltop Youth" of illegal settlement outposts in the West Bank to the mainstream — for example, "to the good kids from Erez," a West Bank community regarded as the epitome of radical, bourgeois settlement.

Moderating the message to young people won't be easy. State religious schools, says Flicker, are often staffed by teachers who are identified with Merkaz HaEzra, the yeshiva from which Gush Emunim sprang, or with the wider Whole Land ideology, which "become the normative agenda within religious Zionist education." In the 1970s, says Schwartz, the ultra-Orthodox teachers who once dominated religious education in state religious schools began retiring — and were replaced by graduates of the Hazerah yeshivot, which taught Merkaz HaEzra's version of redemptive Zionism. "This had tremendous effect on the education of religious Zionist youth," he says.

As a formal movement, religious Zionism was born in 1922 in Vilna, after Rabbi Yitzhak Ya'akov Kook's creation of the Hazerah party and called the "World Zionist Congress" a "Congress of religious Zionists." In the state's early days, says Schwartz, Mirshah leders prized national unity and were coalition partners in governments of the left, sitting in cabinets alongside ministers from the anti-religious Mapam party.

But the seeds of discontent within religious Zionism were sown early, by the secular Zionist majority, says Schwartz. "The Orthodox were not allowed to play a role in the Zionist Congress, and later on they received fewer parcels of land" for settling

Lesson 5
Photos, Abandoned Settlements







Lesson 6
Grading Rubric, Editorials

	<u>Advanced</u>	<u>Intermediate</u>	<u>Emerging</u>
Grammar and Word Choice	Author demonstrates careful proofreading and attention to detail. Message remains consistently clear to an external audience.	Author delivers a moderately cogent message with minimal grammatical or typographical errors.	Confusing to follow and read. Editorial contains obvious grammatical errors, misspelled words and/or typographic errors.
Pacing	The author delivers a briskly paced argument that quickly and effectively makes its points. Each word appears specifically chosen to advance the author's ideas.	Author constructs an editorial that meets length requirements but seems to bog down when making certain points.	Author dawdles while discussing unimportant data or arguments, leaving little room for the main points. Author exceeds page limits of the assignment.
Perspective and Empathy	The author inhabits the target group's viewpoint as if it was his/her own, and delivers a persuasive and compelling narrative that evokes sympathy from the reader.	Author demonstrates empathy for the viewpoint, but fails to articulate the viewpoint in a fashion compelling to the reader.	Author appears distant from the subject matter and/or expresses none of the viewpoints desires.
Depth of Understanding	Weaves a compelling narrative that clearly demonstrates to the reader why the author and target group view the world in the way that they do.	Demonstrates knowledge of the factors contributing to the target group's viewpoint, but fails to make a compelling case for their relevance.	Significant omission of the factors that contribute to the ways in which the target group views the world.
Tone	The author maintains a professional voice while demonstrating vigorous passion for his/her arguments.	The editorial, for the most part, simultaneously demonstrates both passion and professionalism. At times, though, the author seems overly dismissive of critics.	Author lacks any sense of professionalism or appears bored with the arguments at hand. Author offends audience by completely dismissing potential critics.

APPENDIX TWO
Learning Materials for Unit Two

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‘UMAR PERMITS THE JEWS TO RETURN TO JERUSALEM

So every Muslim who came was in town or valley, and there came with them a group of Jews. Then he (‘Umar) ordered them to sweep the holy place (the Temple site) and to cleanse it. ‘Umar himself oversaw them at all times, and each time something was uncovered, he would ask the Jewish elders about the Rock, which was the Foundation Stone.¹ Finally, one of their scholars indicated the precise boundaries of the place, as a result of which, it was uncovered. He commanded that walls be built around the holy site and that a dome be constructed over the Foundation Stone, and that it should be gilded.²

After this, the Jews sent word to all the rest of the Jews in Palestine³ to inform them of the agreement that ‘Umar had made with them. The letter was sent back to them asking what would be the number of people who would be allowed to move to Jerusalem. So they came into ‘Umar’s presence and asked him, “How many people from the Jewish community will the Commander of the Faithful order to move to this city?” “What will your enemies (the Christians) say?” “Speak to them, and after that, I shall have the final word that will put an end to the dispute between you.”

Then the Christian Patriarch and his entourage appeared, and ‘Umar said to them, “I have made an agreement with the Jews concerning all. . . . Let there come here that number which you yourselves indicate.” The Patriarch responded, “Let the number of those who come with their families and their children be fifty households.” The Jews replied to this, “We shall not be less than two hundred households.” They kept haggling over this until ‘Umar commanded that there be seventy households—to which they agreed.

Then ‘Umar said, “Where would you wish to live in the city?” “In the southern part,” they replied. And that it is now the Market of the Jews. The aim of their request was to be near the Temple Mount and its gates, and likewise to be near the water of Silwan⁴ for ritual bathing. The Commander of the Faithful granted this to them.

¹ Heb. *even shetiyim*, which is the stone in the Temple on which the Ark of the Covenant stood.

² The gilded dome here is an anachronism. The Dome of the Rock sanctuary was not erected until half a century after ‘Umar, under the caliph ‘Abd al-Malik.

³ Ar. *al-Shām*, literally, “Syria,” but was used by Jews also in the more particular sense of Palestine.

⁴ That is, the biblical pool of Siloam or Shiloah.

Then seventy families moved from Tiberias and the area around it with their wives and children. They filled up the quarter with buildings the remains of which lasted for many generations. And after that . . .⁵

TS Arabic Box 6, f. 1. Judeo-Arabic text published by Simha Assaf, *Meqorot u-Mehqarim be-Toldot Yisra’el* (Jerusalem, 1946), pp. 20–21.

⁵ Unfortunately, the text breaks off here.

Lesson 1

“Umar Permits the Jews to Return to Jerusalem”

Lesson 1

Huda, “The Meaning of Isra’ and Mi’raj in Islam”

The Meaning of Isra' and Mi'raj in Islam

The Prophet Muhammad's Night Journey and Ascension

[Huda](#), author of *The Everything Understanding Islam Book*

The year 619 A.D. was known as the “Year of Sadness” in Islamic history. The Muslim community was under constant persecution, and in that year the Prophet Muhammad’s beloved wife Khadeeja and his uncle Abu Talib both died. Without Abu Talib’s protection, the Muslim community experienced ever-increasing harassment in Mecca. The Prophet Muhammad visited the nearby city of Taif to preach the Oneness of God and seek asylum from the Meccan oppressors; he was eventually mocked and run out of town.

In the midst of this adversity, the Prophet Muhammad had a comforting experience, which is now known as *Isra’ and Mi’raj* (the Night Visit and Ascension). During the month of Rajab, the Prophet Muhammad made a night -time trip to the city of Jerusalem (*isra’*), visited the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and from there was raised up into heaven (*mi’raj*). While there, he came face-to-face with previous prophets and received instructions about the number of prayers the Muslim community should observe each day. Muhammad and his followers perceived this as a miraculous journey, and it gave them strength and hope that God was with them despite recent setbacks.

Non-Muslims, and even some Muslims, debate over whether this event was an actual physical journey, or merely a vision. The majority view among Muslim scholars is that Muhammad truly traveled in body and soul, as a miracle from God.

Lesson 1

“The Charge of Appointment for a Nagid in Mamluk Egypt”

THE CHARGE OF APPOINTMENT FOR A NAGID IN MAMLUK EGYPT

This is the charge of office to the *Ra'īs al-Yahūd* (the Nagid) which is cited in the *Ta'rif*:¹

It is incumbent upon him to unite his community and to gather their various elements in obedience to him. He is to judge them in accordance with the principals of his religion and the customary usages of its religious leaders wherever there are clear indications for him. He is responsible for contracting marriages and for all particulars involved which they consider generally important. He should do whatever is necessary to satisfy the two parties in a marriage or a divorce.

He must abide by the law of his religion in excommunicating anyone, and the person excommunicated must submit to his judgment.

He must act in accordance with what is in the Rabbinic Tradition, and he is also to carry out any action for which there is no specific scriptural evidence, but for which there is a consensus of the Rabbis.

He must pray toward Jerusalem which is the direction of their *qibla*² and the holy place of their faith. He is to do everything according to the Law of Moses, the Interlocutor of God, and to follow his example whenever it is certain that this was the action of that noble prophet. He should uphold the restrictions of the Torah as God has revealed them without any falsification, and without any change of wording by allegory or by substitution.³

He is to follow what is made incumbent upon them in the Covenant and in all that it requires of him. He should adhere to whatever sustains their remnant and thereby prevents the shedding of their blood. He is to follow whatever the Prophets and Rabbis have decreed, and whatever the Muslims have agreed to from these, and whatever the Hebrews expressed concerning it.

In addition to all this, he must make them fulfill what is required of them and their likes among the *ahl al-dhimma* who inhabit this

¹ The book referred to is al-ʿUmari's (d. 1349) *al-Ta'rif bi'l-Muṣṭalaḥ al-Sharīf*, which like al-Qalqashandī's work was a manual for administration. For the parallel passage in the *Ta'rif*, see the Cairo edition (A.H. 1312), pp. 142–43.

² The *qibla* is the direction a worshiper faces during prayer (that is, for the Jew towards Jerusalem, for the Muslim towards Mecca).

³ The charge that the Jews (and Christians) have falsified their scriptures goes back to the time of Muḥammad's struggle with the Jews of Medina. It remained a standard accusation in Muslim polemical literature. See above, pp. 12–13 and 165–66.

country. He must also see to it that their persons are protected by their being humble and lowly and by their bowing their heads in submissiveness to the followers of the faith of Islam, by their giving way to Muslims in the streets⁴ and when they are intermingled with them in the Bath House. He must also see to it that they bear the *Dhimmi* badge which has been ordained for them as an ornament for their turbans. It is to be fastened upon their heads to preserve them just as amulets are fastened.⁵ He should know that their yellow badge is required so their red blood will not be spilled; that they are safe as long as they are under this sign; and that they may live peacefully as long as it is firmly attached. He is to urge them to continually renew the color of the badge. He is to order them that they are continually required to wear such badges clearly visible upon their heads.

They are not to show any contradiction in what he decides, nor let any opposition be understood from it. Anyone who speaks out strongly in opposition to him will meet some punishment short of death.

He is responsible for appointing the various offices of rank among his coreligionists from the rabbis on down according to their degree of merit and in accordance with their agreement. He has the final say in matters pertaining to all of their synagogues which have stood since the establishment of the *Dhimma* Covenant until now and which has been confirmed by the passage of time. There is to be no building of any new synagogues, nor any new additions made to the existing ones. Nothing is to be done which is not included in the *Dhimma* Contract or accorded their ancestors by the founding fathers of this *Umma* (the Muslim Community).

This should suffice. However, the most important of all these things is fear of God and terror of our strength.

al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā*, vol. 11
(Cairo, 1913–19), pp. 390–91.

⁴ Ar., *wa-ʿadam muḍāyaqatihim fī l-ṭuruq*. Literally, "there should be no impeding them (that is, the Muslims) in the streets." *Dhimmi*s were expected to give way and to move to the inauspicious left side.

⁵ That is, just as amulets are tightly fastened to protect the wearer from harm, so the badge of differentiation should be worn with the same care.

Lesson 2
The Arab Office, "The Arab Case for Palestine"

The Arab Office: The Arab Case for Palestine
(March 1946)

Evidence submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.

The Problem of Palestine

1. The whole Arab people is unalterably opposed to the attempt to impose Jewish immigration and settlement upon it, and ultimately to establish a Jewish State in Palestine. Its opposition is based primarily upon right. The Arabs of Palestine are descendants of the indigenous inhabitants of the country, who have been in occupation of it since the beginning of history; they cannot agree that it is right to subject an indigenous population against its will to alien immigrants, whose claim is based upon a historical connection which ceased effectively many centuries ago. Moreover they form the majority of the population; as such they cannot submit to a policy of immigration which if pursued for long will turn them from a majority into a minority in an alien state; and they claim the democratic right of a majority to make its own decisions in matters of urgent national concern . .

2. In addition to the question of right, the Arabs oppose the claims of political Zionism because of the effects which Zionist settlement has al-

ready had upon their situation and is likely to have to an even greater extent in the future. Negatively, it has diverted the whole course of their national development. Geographically Palestine is part of Syria; its indigenous inhabitants belong to the Syrian branch of the Arab family of nations; all their culture and tradition link them to the other Arab peoples; and until 1917 Palestine formed part of the Ottoman Empire which included also several of the other Arab countries. The presence and claims of the Zionists, and the support given them by certain Western Powers have resulted in Palestine being cut off from the other Arab countries and subjected to a regime, administrative, legal, fiscal and educational, different from that of the sister-countries. Quite apart from the inconvenience to individuals and the dislocation of trade which this separation has caused, it has prevented Palestine participating fully in the general development of the Arab world.

First, while the other Arab countries have attained or are near to the attainment of self-government and full membership of the U.N.O., Palestine is still under Mandate and has taken no step towards self-government; not only are there no representative institutions, but no Palestinian can rise to the higher ranks of the administration. This is unacceptable on grounds of principle, and also because of its evil consequence. It is a hardship to individual Palestinians whose opportunities of responsibility are thus curtailed; and it is demoralizing to the population to live under a government which has no basis in their consent and to which they can feel no attachment or loyalty.

Secondly, while the other Arab countries are working through the Arab League to strengthen their ties and coordinate their policies, Palestine (although her Arab inhabitants are formally represented in the League's Council) cannot participate fully in this movement so long as she has no indigenous government; thus the chasm between the administrative system and the institutions of Palestine and those of the neighbouring countries is growing, and her traditional Arab character is being weakened.

Thirdly, while the other Arab countries have succeeded in or are on the way to achieving a satisfactory definition of their relations with the Western Powers and with the world-community, expressed in their treaties with Great Britain and other Powers and their membership of the United Nations Organization, Palestine has not yet been able to establish any definite status for herself in the world, and her international destiny is still obscure.

3. All these evils are due entirely to the presence of the Zionists and the support given to them by certain of the Powers; there is no doubt that had it not been for that, Arab Palestine would by now be a self-governing member of the U.N.O. and the Arab League. Moreover, in addition to the obstacles which Zionism has thus placed in the way of Palestine's development, the presence of the Zionists gives rise to various positive evils which will increase if Zionist immigration continues.

The entry of incessant waves of immigrants prevents normal economic and social development and causes constant dislocation of the country's life; in so far as it reacts upon prices and values and makes the whole economy dependent upon the constant inflow of capital from abroad it may even in certain circumstances lead to economic disaster. It is bound moreover to arouse continuous political unrest and prevent the establishment of that political stability on which the prosperity and health of the country depend. This unrest is likely to increase in frequency and violence as the Jews come nearer to being the majority and the Arabs a minority.

Even if economic and social equilibrium is re-established, it will be to the detriment of the Arabs. The superior capital resources at the disposal of the Jews, their greater experience of modern economic technique and the existence of a deliberate policy of expansion and domination have already gone far towards giving them the economic mastery of Palestine. The biggest concessionary companies are in their hands; they possess a large proportion of the total cultivable land, and an even larger one of the land in the highest category of fertility; and the land they possess is mostly inalienable to non-Jews. The continuance of land-purchase and immigration, taken together with the refusal of Jews to employ Arabs on their lands or in their enterprises and the great increase in the Arab population, will create a situation in which the Arab population is pushed to the margin of cultivation and a landless proletariat, rural and urban, comes into existence. This evil can be palliated but not cured by attempts at increasing the absorptive capacity or the industrial production of Palestine; the possibility of such improvements is limited, they would take a long time to carry out, and would scarcely do more than keep pace with the rapid growth of the Arab population; moreover in present circumstances they would be used primarily for the benefit of the Jews and thus might increase the disparity between the two communities.

Nor is the evil economic only. Zionism is essentially a political movement, aiming at the creation of a state: immigration, land-purchase and economic expansion are only aspects of a general political strategy. If Zionism succeeds in its aim, the Arabs will become a minority in their own country; a minority which can hope for no more than a minor share in the government, for the state is to be a Jewish state, and which will find itself not only deprived of that international status which the other Arab countries possess but cut off from living contact with the Arab world of which it is an integral part.

It should not be forgotten too that Palestine contains places holy to Moslems and Christians, and neither Arab Moslems nor Arab Christians would willingly see such places subjected to the ultimate control of a Jewish Government.

4. These dangers would be serious enough at any time, but are particularly so in this age, when the first task of the awakening Arab nation is to

come to terms with the West; to define its relationship with the Western Powers and with the westernized world community on a basis of equality and mutual respect, and to adapt what is best in Western civilization to the needs of its own genius. Zionist policy is one of the greatest obstacles to the achievement of this task: both because Zionism represents to the Arabs one side of the Western spirit and because of the support given to it by some of the Western Powers. In fact Zionism has become in Arab eyes a test of Western intentions towards them. So long as the attempt of the Zionists to impose a Jewish state upon the inhabitants of Palestine is supported by some or all of the Western Governments, so long will it be difficult if not impossible for the Arabs to establish a satisfactory relationship with the Western world and its civilization, and they will tend to turn away from the West in political hostility and spiritual isolation; this will be disastrous both for the Arabs themselves and for those Western nations which have dealings with them. . . .

8. In the Arab view, any solution of the problem created by Zionist aspirations must satisfy certain conditions:

(i) It must recognize the right of the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine to continue in occupation of the country and to preserve its traditional character.

(ii) It must recognize that questions like immigration which affect the whole nature and destiny of the country, should be decided in accordance with democratic principles by the will of the population.

(iii) It must accept the principle that the only way by which the will of the population can be expressed is through the establishment of responsible representative government. (The Arabs find something inconsistent in the attitude of Zionists who demand the establishment of a free democratic commonwealth in Palestine and then hasten to add that this should not take place until the Jews are in a majority.)

(iv) This representative Government should be based upon the principle of absolute equality of all citizens irrespective of race and religion.

(v) The form of Government should be such as to make possible the development of a spirit of loyalty and cohesion among all elements of the community, which will override all sectional attachments. In other words it should be a Government which the whole community could regard as their own, which should be rooted in their consent and have a moral claim upon their obedience.

(vi) The settlement should recognize the fact that by geography and history Palestine is inescapably part of the Arab world; that the only alternative to its being part of the Arab world and accepting the implications of its position is complete isolation, which would be disastrous from every point of view; and that whether they like it or not the Jews in Palestine are dependent upon the goodwill of the Arabs.

(vii) The settlement should be such as to make possible a satisfactory

definition within the framework of U.N.O. of the relations between Palestine and the Western Powers who possess interests in the country.

(viii) The settlement should take into account that Zionism is essentially a political movement aiming at the creation of a Jewish state and should therefore avoid making any concession which might encourage Zionists in the hope that this aim can be achieved in any circumstances.

9. In accordance with these principles, the Arabs urge the establishment in Palestine of a democratic government representative of all sections of the population on a level of absolute equality; the termination of the Mandate once the Government has been established; and the entry of Palestine into the United Nations Organization as a full member of the working community.

Pending the establishment of a representative Government, all further Jewish immigration should be stopped, in pursuance of the principle that a decision on so important a matter should only be taken with the consent of the inhabitants of the country and that until representative institutions are established there is no way of determining consent. Strict measures should also continue to be taken to check illegal immigration. Once a Palestinian state has come into existence, if any section of the population favours a policy of further immigration it will be able to press its case in accordance with normal democratic procedure; but in this as in other matters the minority must abide by the decision of the majority.

Similarly, all further transfer of land from Arabs to Jews should be prohibited prior to the creation of self-governing institutions. The Land Transfer Regulations should be made more stringent and extended to the whole area of the country, and severer measures be taken to prevent infringement of them. Here again once self-government exists matters concerning land will be decided in the normal democratic manner. . . .

14. The Arabs believe that no other proposals would satisfy the conditions of a just and lasting settlement. In their view there are insuperable objections of principle or of practice to all other suggested solutions of the problem.

(i) The idea of partition and the establishment of a Jewish state in a part of Palestine is inadmissible for the same reasons of principle as the idea of establishing a Jewish state in the whole country. If it is unjust to the Arabs to impose a Jewish state on the whole of Palestine, it is equally unjust to impose it in any part of the country. Moreover, as the Woodhead Commission showed, there are grave practical difficulties in the way of partition; commerce would be strangled, communications dislocated and the public finances upset. It would also be impossible to devise frontiers which did not leave a large Arab minority in the Jewish state. This minority would not willingly accept its subjection to the Zionists, and it would not allow itself to be transferred to the Arab state. Moreover, partition would not satisfy the Zionists. It cannot be too often repeated that Zionism is a political

movement aiming at the domination at least of the whole of Palestine; to give it a foothold in part of Palestine would be to encourage it to press for more and to provide it with a base for its activities. Because of this, because of the pressure of population and in order to escape from its isolation it would inevitably be thrown into enmity with the surrounding Arab states and this enmity would disturb the stability of the whole Middle East.

(ii) Another proposal is for the establishment of a bi-national state, based upon political parity, in Palestine and its incorporation into a Syrian or Arab Federation. The Arabs would reject this as denying the majority its normal position and rights. There are also serious practical objections to the idea of a bi-national state, which cannot exist unless there is a strong sense of unity and common interest overriding the differences between the two parties. Moreover, the point made in regard to the previous suggestion may be repeated here: this scheme would in no way satisfy the Zionists, it would simply encourage them to hope for more and improve their chances of obtaining it. . . .

Lesson 4

Mahmoud Darwish, "The Palestinian Appeal"

THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S APPEAL ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NAKBA

[Palestinian Appeal, read live Monday, June 14 at 12:15 a.m. by poet Mahmoud Darwish at the end of the Nakba march]

We, the Palestinian offspring of this sacred land, advocates of universal values, seekers of peace and freedom, the living testament of endurance and human dignity in the face of adversity, victims of half a century of perpetual night of occupation and dispersion -

Declare our resounding presence in time and place, despite all attempts to uproot us from the land which has borne our name from the beginning of time. Not emerging from the darkness of myth or legend, we were born in the pristine daylight of history on this land which gave birth to the most ancient of civilizations. On this land humanity found its way to building its first home, to planting its first wheat grain, to creating its first alphabet. From the hills of Jerusalem, the first prayers of gratitude rose to the Creator. Our land, modest in size, hosted vast cultures and civilizations, both in conflict and in harmony, our own culture emerging from the fullness of this diverse and rich heritage. Our human history began with the history of humanity. Our Arab history began with the history of the Arabs. The consciousness of our national history began with our resistance to conquest and greed, which beset our land.

Today, as we confront half a century of Nakba and resistance, pained at the continuing tragedy of our recent past, we cast our sights to the future that we are molding in hope and in the promise of freedom and justice. For we have vanquished all attempts at our obliteration and denial and at the eradication of the name of Palestine from the map of Palestine. On the fiftieth anniversary of one of the greatest crimes of the age, committed against the gentle people and land of Palestine, we stand in reverence in the sight of the martyrs who had offered their lives as a libation to the continuity of the land and its immortal name, in defense of our identity and sovereign existence on our land – a land infused with the words of God to humanity as with our ancestral blood. From the bereavement of mothers, to the captivity of prisoners, to the exile of generations, we stand in awe at the heroism of the ordinary individual and the collective will to endure, both Palestinian and Arab. Victims of a myth "A land without a people for a people without a land," we dared to intrude on the course of history and expose the falsehood that sought our denial. Slated for national obliteration and severance from the land, we have affirmed our identity and ties to our homeland, snatching our reality from the jaws of oblivion.

Four hundred and eighteen living and thriving Palestinian villages were razed to the ground in 1948 by the Zionist perpetrators of the myth and the crime. Terrorized, massacred, and expelled, most of the Palestinian nation was reduced to the status of refugees and stateless persons at the mercy of various host countries. Bereft of their birthright, the Palestinian refugees carried Palestine in their hearts along with their land deeds and the keys to their homes. Both the topography and demography of our reality remain alive in our collective memory and continuity. We have refused to adopt their distorted version of our history and we remain advocates and witnesses of the authentic narrative of Palestinian endurance and the will to live.

From revolution, to Intifada, to nation building, we have extracted recognition from the world. The dual injustice of exile and occupation could not break the will of a people bent on achieving freedom, dignity and the redemption of history. Thus, it was the PLO which first offered the olive branch as a genuine alternative to the gun. Peace was in sight, but not appeasement or capitulation. The PLO, the embodiment of our collective national identity, the guardian of the integrity of our past and the vehicle to the fulfillment of our future, has ensured the independence of our utterance and our will and has shaped the course of our destiny. It obtained recognition from the international community for the Palestinian people's right to self determination and the right of return as anchors to secure us against the gales of loss and denial. Above all, Jerusalem, more than a right, is the soul

of our being and the essence of harmony.

Our commitment to democracy and the politics of inclusion were expressed in the PLO's historical proposal of a secular, pluralistic, democratic state in Palestine. While Zionism insisted on a racist exclusivity which denied the humanity and rights of the other, we sought to affirm tolerance and celebrate diversity. The inclusive sharing of the historical land of Palestine having been denied by the Israeli drive for exclusive possession, we formulated the alternative of sharing the land on the basis of the two state solution. Such a solution would meet the imperative of international legality as defined by UN resolution 181, and would grant the Palestinian people relative justice on their land. It would also grant reprieve for tortured Jerusalem to be celebrated as an eternal city and our eternal capital.

The transition from the historical memory of Palestine as a homeland to the collective endeavor to establish Palestine as a geo-political state on part of historical Palestine, signals a painful and difficult transformation in the political discourse as well as in the national ethos of the Palestinian people. While it demands recognition as a conciliatory compromise of historical magnitude, it must not be misconstrued as self-negation or weakness. Rather, it demands an immediate and unequivocal recognition of our legitimacy and right to sovereignty as a nation among equals. The vision, courage and moral magnanimity of the victim reaching out to the oppressor must not be met with further rejection, denial and victimization.

The world now is called upon to undertake not only a recognition of guilt and admission of culpability in relation to the Palestinian people, but also to undertake an active and massive process of rectification to secure the implementation of Palestinian rights. The international community is called upon to intervene effectively to rescue the peace process in the face of current Israeli extremism and politics of threat, intimidation and power, rather than succumbing to Israeli demands, pressures, and unilateral policies and measures. In pursuing a policy of colonization and land confiscation, reneging on signed agreements, negating the terms of reference of the peace process, violating the timetable and denying the agenda of permanent status talks, while continuing the imposition of collective punitive measures on the Palestinian people, Israel is not only attempting to derail the peace process but also to destroy any prospects of peace in the future. In reviving fundamentalism, hostility, and distrust, Israel is also drawing the whole region outside the course of contemporary history and into an anachronistic future of conflict and violence.

True stability, security and prosperity can emanate only from a genuine peace which incorporates the basic principle of justice. Such is the Palestinian vision and the Palestinian collective endeavor. No amount of pain or suffering can justify the victimization and infliction of injustice on others. While we extend a compassionate recognition of the unspeakable Jewish suffering during the horror of the holocaust, we find it unconscionable that the suffering of our people be denied or even rationalized.

As victims, we seek to prevent the recurrence of pain, regardless of the identity of the perpetrator or the recipient. No country or nation must pretend to be, or must be perceived to be, above the law or beyond accountability. If Israel seeks recognition and legitimacy then it must comply with the norms and laws that govern the behavior of civilized nations. The arrogance of power may prevail, but only temporarily. Only a just peace can lay claim to durability and permanence.

We do not seek to be captives of history or victims of the past. The Palestinian people have launched a redemptive journey to the future. From the ashes of our sorrow and loss, we are resurrecting a nation celebrating life and hope. We will not surrender. Nor will we lose faith in a just and genuine peace that will enable us to exercise our right to independence and sovereignty. Fifty years since the Nakba were not spent in grief over a painful memory. The past has not entirely departed, nor has the future entirely arrived yet. The present is an open potential to struggle. For 50 years, Palestinian history has stood

witness to epics of perseverance and resistance, to confronting the implications, consequences and injustices of the Nakba. For half a century Palestinian history became a living pledge to future generations for their right to a life of freedom and dignity on their own land. We have begun painstakingly the nation-building process, to ensure a free homeland for a free people. The state of Palestine is returning to contemporary history after 50 years of forced eviction, a state embodying the principles and practice of democracy, separation of powers, human rights, gender equality, accountability, and the rule of law. Despite the present constraints of geography and transition, our vision remains expansive and unfettered. For we thrive on the spirit of resistance and the longing for freedom, motivated by that will which produced the luminous flame of the Intifada.

Born in Palestine, no other land gave us birth. No other can claim our future. Nor can Jerusalem be replaced as our capital or extracted from our land and our being: It is the home of our souls and the soul of our homeland, forever.

(Nakba: The catastrophe which befell the Palestinian people in 1948, as Zionist gangs massacred innocent men, women, and children, pillaged their homes, and destroyed their villages and towns. Thus, the creation of the State of Israel over usurped Palestinian land led to the dual injustice of the dispossession and exile of the majority of the Palestinian people and the languishing of the rest under occupation.)

Lesson 5
Photos, Security Wall





Lesson 6
Grading Rubric, Graphic Advertisements

	<u>Advanced</u>	<u>Intermediate</u>	<u>Emerging</u>
Technical Proficiency and Clarity	Designer demonstrates careful proofreading and attention to detail. Message remains consistently clear to an external audience.	Designer delivers a moderately cogent message with minimal grammatical, visual, or typographical errors.	Advertisement and/or supporting paper contains obvious visual or grammatical errors, misspelled words and/or typographic errors. Visuals blurry or difficult to interpret.
Quality of Visuals	The designer delivers a compelling advertisement that engages external audiences. Each symbol appears specifically chosen to advance the designer's ideas, and the designer makes a case for each symbol in his/her supporting paper.	Graphics support the designer's arguments but fail to deliver a compelling message. Designer makes a good case for most of the symbols in his/her supporting paper.	Graphics appear haphazardly or arbitrarily chosen. Designer makes little or no case for the use of different symbols in his/her supporting paper.
Perspective and Empathy	The designer inhabits the target group's viewpoint as if it was his/her own, and delivers persuasive and compelling visuals that evoke sympathy from the viewer.	Designer demonstrates empathy for the viewpoint, but fails to articulate the viewpoint in a fashion compelling to the viewer.	Designer appears distant from the subject matter and/or expresses none of the viewpoints desires.
Depth of Understanding	Weaves a compelling narrative that clearly demonstrates to the viewer why the director and target group view the world in the way that they do.	Demonstrates knowledge of the factors contributing to the target group's viewpoint, but fails to make a compelling case for their relevance.	Significant omission of the factors that contribute to the ways in which the target group views the world.
Tone	The author maintains professionalism while demonstrating vigorous passion for his/her arguments.	The advertisement, for the most part, simultaneously demonstrates both passion and professionalism.	The advertisement lacks any sense of professionalism or appears bored with the arguments at hand.

APPENDIX THREE
Learning Materials for Unit Three

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Lesson 1

Theodore Herzl, Altneuland

1. Theodore Herzl: From "Altneuland". 1902

"The Devil take me!" cried Kingscourt. "But this looks just like Italy."
"Cultivation is everything!" roared Steineck aggressively, as if he were being contradicted. "We Jews introduced cultivation here."
"Pardon me, sir!" cried Reschid Bey with a friendly smile. "But this sort of thing was here before you came—at least there were signs of it. My father planted oranges extensively." He turned to Kingscourt and pointed to a grove at the right of the road. "I know more about it than our friend Steineck, because this used to be my father's plantation. It's mine now."

The well-tended grove was a beautiful sight. The ever-blooming trees bore flowers, green and ripe fruit, simultaneously.

"I don't deny that you had orange groves before we came," thundered Steineck, "but you could never get full value out of them." Reschid nodded. "That is correct. Our profits have grown considerably. Our orange transport has multiplied tenfold since we have had good transportation facilities to connect us with the whole world. Everything here has increased in value since your immigration."

"One question, Reschid Bey," interrupted Kingscourt. "These gentlemen will pardon me, but you are much too modest. Were not the older inhabitants of Palestine ruined by the Jewish immigration? And didn't they have to leave the country? I mean, generally speaking. That individuals here and there were the gainers proves nothing."

"What a question! It was a great blessing for all of us," returned Reschid. "Naturally, the land-owners gained most because they were able to sell to the Jewish society at high prices, or to wait for still higher ones. I, for my part, sold my land to our New Society because it was to my advantage to sell."

"Didn't you say a moment ago that those groves we passed were yours?"
"To be sure! After I had sold them to the New Society, I took them back on lease."
"Then you shouldn't have sold them in the first place."
"But it was more advantageous for me. Since I wished to join the New Society, I had to submit to its land regulations. Its members have no private property in land."
"Then Friedrichsheim does not belong to you, Mr. Littwak."
"Not the plot. I leased it only till the next jubilee year, as my friend Reschid did his groves."
"Jubilee year? Please explain that. I really seem to have overslept myself on that island."

"The jubilee year," explained David, "is not a new but an ancient institution set up by our Teacher Moses. After seven times seven years, that is to say, in the fiftieth year, land which had been sold reverted back to its original owner without compensation. We, indeed, arrange it a bit differently. The land now reverts back to the New Society. Moses, in his day, wished to distribute the land so as to ensure the ends of social justice. You will see that our methods serve the purpose none the less. The increases in land values accrue not to the individual owner, but to the public."

Steineck anticipated a possible objection from Kingscourt. "You may perhaps say that no one will care to improve a plot that does not belong to him, or to erect fine buildings upon it."

"No, sir, I should not say that. I know that in London people build houses on other people's land on ninety-nine-year leases. This is quite the same thing. But I wanted to ask you, my dear Bey, how the former inhabitants fared—those who had nothing, the numerous Moslem Arabs."

"Your question answers itself, Mr. Kingscourt," replied Reschid. "Those who had nothing stood to lose nothing, and could only gain. And they did gain: Opportunities to work, means of livelihood, prosperity. Nothing could have been more wretched than an Arab village at the end of the nineteenth century. The peasants' clay hovels were unfit for stables. The children lay naked and neglected in the streets, and grew up like dumb beasts. Now everything is different. They benefited from the progressive measures of the New Society whether they wanted to or not, whether they joined it or not. When the swamps were drained, the canals built, and the eucalyptus trees planted to drain, and 'cure' the marshy soil, the natives (who, naturally, were well acclimatized) were the first to be employed, and were paid well for their work.

"Just look at that field! It was a swamp in my boyhood. The New Society bought up this tract rather cheaply, and turned it into the best soil in the country. It belongs to that tidy settlement up there on the hill. It is a Moslem village—you can tell by the mosque. These people are better off than at any time in the past. They support themselves decently, their children are healthier and are being taught something. Their religion and ancient customs have in no wise been interfered with. They have become more prosperous—that is all."

"You're queer fellows, you Moslems. Don't you regard these Jews as intruders?"

"You speak strangely, Christian," responded the friendly Reschid. "Would you call a man a robber who takes nothing from you, but brings you something instead? The Jews have enriched us. Why should we be angry with them? They dwell among us like brothers. Why should we not love them? I have never had a better friend among my co-religionists than David Littwak here. He may come to me, by day or night, and ask what he pleases. I shall give it him. And I know that I, too, may count upon him as upon a brother. He prays in a different house to the God who is above us all. But our houses of worship stand side by side, and I always believe that our prayers, when they rise, mingle somewhere up above, and then continue on their way together until they appear before Our Father."

Reschid's gentle words had moved everyone, Kingscourt included. That gentleman cleared his throat. "Hm—hm! Quite right. Very fine. Sounds reasonable. But you're an educated man, you've studied in Europe. I hardly think the simple country or town folk will be likely to think as you do.

"They more than anyone else, Mr. Kingscourt. You must excuse my saying so, but I did not learn tolerance in the Occident. We Moslems have always had better relations with the Jews than you Christians. When the first Jewish colonists settled here half a century ago, Arabs went to the Jews to judge between them, and often asked the Jewish village councils for help and advice.

Lesson 1

David ben Gurion, Excerpts

4. David Ben Gurion 1929/30

... In my opinion it is not enough for us to give merely negative justice to our Arab neighbours. The fact that we have avoided discriminating against the Arabs is insufficient. I hold that we are duty bound to prepare a positive plan for improving the economic and cultural standards of all the inhabitants of Israel. It is impossible to build up the country without building up its inhabitants. The internal ethical, political, and economic logic of our activities in Israel obliges us to assist in raising the standard of living of the Arabs to that which we are creating for ourselves. But if you assume that Palestine is of equal importance for both Jews and Arabs—then you are missing the point again and distorting the truth. Israel is not the same thing for the Jewish and Arab nations.

The Arab nation possesses many extensive countries, the area of which in Asia alone amounts to a third of that of all Europe. The economic, cultural and national existence of the Arab nation, its independence and sovereign existence is not connected with or dependent upon Palestine. Our country is only a small part of the vast territory settled by Arabs—which is, incidentally, populated extremely sparsely. Just a very small fragment of the Arab nation—perhaps seven or eight percent (taking only the Asiatic Arab countries into account)—lives in Palestine and is linked with it. This is not the case with regard to the Jewish nation. For the entire Jewish nation—throughout its generations and dispersions—this has been the one and only country with which its historic fate and destiny as a nation, has been bound up. In this country alone can it revive and maintain its independent life, its national existence and unique culture; only here can it establish its independence and sovereign liberty. And anyone who blurs this truth risks the soul of the nation.

I maintain that Palestine is destined for the Jewish nation and for the Arabs who live there.

The first step along the path to understanding is to rise up and tell the Arab nation the whole truth: the Jewish nation number 17,000,000. For the sake of its human respect and national culture, in the sphere of the daily needs of its masses, by virtue of its historic will to live and survive, this nation aspires—is forced to aspire—to assembling the maximum possible number of its members in Palestine, in order to become an independent nation there. This fact may very well be undesirable to the Arabs of Palestine, who want to maintain the *status quo*, which is distinctly Arab in nature. And while Palestine is very small in comparison to the extensive, sparsely populated countries which surround it, countries in which Arab culture has been given considerable scope to develop and flourish unencumbered—yet nevertheless it is natural that the Palestinian Arabs should oppose the deep rooted cultural, economic and social changes which are the outcome of the return of the Jews to Palestine.

However, behind this return to Zion lies the powerful motivation and desire to exist of a nation numbering millions, a nation with a centuries long record of suffering, a stiff-necked, people which will not relinquish anything which is part of its historic destiny.

Only on the basis of Arab acceptance of this fact will understanding be possible, just as it is impossible without a consciousness on our part of another fact—with all the discomfort that this entails for us—that for hundreds of years large numbers of Arabs have been living in Palestine, that their fathers and their fathers' fathers were born here and died here and that Palestine is their country, where they want to continue living in the future. We must accept this fact with love and draw all the necessary conclusions from it. This constitutes the basis for a genuine understanding between us and the Arabs. This comprehension will not grow overnight, no matter how strongly we want it to. It undoubtedly will not come from the Arabs first, because what appears to us to be obvious—the iron determination of the Jewish nation to settle in its own country and its firm intention to build it up out of its desolation—is not so acceptable to the Arabs. As far as they are concerned there are 170,000 Jews in Palestine, and some of them do not accept even this as inevitably necessary. In their opinion, it is possible to obliterate this fact from Palestine, and to rid themselves for ever of this Jewish minority, just as larger minorities than ourselves have been disposed of in recent times.

✧ And let us not delude ourselves that the Arabs will alter their opinions readily. Only by our quantitative expansion in the country will the Arab nation learn to adopt an attitude of understanding towards our intentions, to realise that it faces the entire Jewish nation and not merely the Jews in Palestine. It is a question of time.

... There is a principle, known as the right to self-determination, which exists in the world at large. We have always, everywhere admired this principle and fought for it. We are wholeheartedly in favour of the right to self-determination of every section of the nation, of every group of people, and there can be no question that the Arab nation in Palestine has a right to self-determination. And this right is not limited or dependent upon the results of its influence on us and on our cause. The freedom of self-determination of the Arabs must not be diminished in any way out of the fear that it will make our task more difficult. The ethical essence of the Zionist idea is that the nation—any nation—is an end in itself and not the means for achieving the ends of other nations. And just as our aim is that the Jewish nation will be its own master and will be able to determine its historic destiny without being dependent upon the wishes—and even goodwill—of other nations, we must also demand the same for the Arabs... The rights of the Arabs derive from their cause and their needs, and rest upon general humanistic principles.

✧ However, the fact that the Palestinian Arabs have the right to self-determination does not mean that the Arabs have the right to govern the country.

As inhabitants of this country, the Arabs have every right to benefit from Palestine but they do not have the right, as owners of private property, to deny us the benefits of the country. Self-determination for the Arabs means the right to decide their own fate, to form their lives in accordance with their wishes and desires and to preserve and develop what their hands have produced. But it does not mean that they can be masters over things which they did not create and which are not the fruit of their labour. They cannot decide on our right to exist, work and settle on the land as long as we do this by the sweat of our brow and not at their expense.

Lesson 1

Ze'ev Jabotinsky, "Evidence Submitted to the Palestine Royal Commission"

which should be launched and which the Jews would have to provide, to pay for the amelioration and parcelation, and for creating a land reserve on both sides of the Jordan, out of which both Jewish and Arab applicants for agricultural settlement could be satisfied. Further, a plan of industrial development calculated to provide sustenance for large-scale immigration; a plan of what tariff laws and customs measures should be adopted in order to protect that development; a plan for a taxation system, as in every country under colonization, adapted to assisting the new settlers and newcomers.

Finally, measures for guaranteeing security. A nation with your colossal colonizing past experience surely knows that colonization never went on without certain conflicts with the population on the spot, so that the country had to be protected, and as the Jew never asked to be protected by someone else, the Plan should embody the Jewish demand that they should themselves be allowed to form a protecting body in Palestine, or at least a considerable part of it. Especially there should be a very careful selection of Civil Servants. Such a work, unparalleled, unprecedented, certainly needs Civil Servants first of all sympathetic, and secondly, acquainted with the work. There should be some special examination, some new branch of the Service. That is what everybody expected. I need not tell you how totally disappointed we were in hearing, instead of all that, the expression "muddling through"—hearing it even mentioned as something desirable and commendable as a system; on more solemn occasions it was called "empiricism" and sometimes "going by horse sense." I do not know if all this is good for the Empire; it is not for me to judge. I can only say that we have greatly suffered under this absence of system, this deliberate aversion from making plans while undertaking something very new, very important, and very responsible. We have suffered terribly. Yet, whenever we complained, we got the strange reply: "The man on the spot knows better." May I submit most respectfully that the Mandate was granted to Great Britain by fifty nations because those fifty nations believed in Britain's collective experience and conscience, and especially in the fact of their close control over the man on the spot. The idea of control by a nation over its executives is an English idea. We Continentals learned it from the English. So, in our submission, the Mandatory Government cannot discharge its Mandatory duty by selecting even a genius and appointing him as the man on the spot. But that was practically always their reply: "We have appointed a man on the spot, let him do it, and we shall wait and see." Or sometimes we got another reply—"Probably the Government is administered quite

JABOTINSKY: *Before the Palestine Royal Commission* 565
satisfactorily, because both Jews and Arabs have grievances and complaints." We never could understand this. Is my duty, for instance, with regard to my children or with regard to my two clients, sufficiently discharged if I have managed to make myself obnoxious to both of them? I do not think so.

We were terribly disappointed by the absence of a system and plan. We were even more disappointed by the absence of the second requirement: clarity. The Arabs were never told what the Balfour Declaration was meant by Lord Balfour and all the others to mean. They were never told. Here again, My Lord, I am going to limit myself, as being perhaps a sufficient illustration of that attitude to truth, to recall a little story which has been told to this Commission in Palestine: that instead of writing on coins, etc., "Eretz Israel" they just write the two Hebrew letters for E. I. Why? What is the meaning of it? If the country is to be called Eretz Israel, Land of Israel, if that is the name avowed, then print it in full; if it is something which cannot be allowed, remove it. But the "way out" adopted in this case illustrates the whole "system," which is to hint that there is the Balfour Declaration, and perhaps there is something in it, but then again perhaps there is nothing in it. That has been the "system" from the beginning to the end. If questioned, I am prepared to support this reproach by many facts, but I believe the Royal Commission have already had sufficient information to form their own judgment.

A very important factor in implementing the Mandate is looking after security. I presume the Commission have already had time to draw their own conclusions as to that, but it is my duty to remind them of a few aspects of it. In Palestine we were threatened with pogroms; we were telling so to the Government for years and years, but they went on cutting down and cutting down on the number of troops in Palestine. We said: "Remember that we have children and wives; legalize our self-defense, as you are doing in Kenya." In Kenya until recently every European was obliged to train for the Settlers Defense Force. Why should the Jews in Palestine be forced to prepare for self-defense underhand; as though committing a legal offense? You know what a pogrom means in Jewish history; we know what pogroms mean in the history of Mandatory Palestine. The Jews have never been allowed to prepare for that holy duty of self-defense, as every Englishman would have done. We had in our case to prepare by underhand methods, with insufficient equipment, with insufficient drilling, in an amateurish way. I really do not know how a Government can allow or tolerate such a state of things after three experiences, of which 1929

was a terrible one. . . . I am sorry if I am getting excited and I apologize to the Commission and hope they understand the reason for it; but I do not think I have overstepped the boundaries of logic in submitting to this Royal Commission my case.

If you cut down the troops in Palestine far beyond the limit of safety, and the explanation is that the British taxpayer does not want to give his money nor his sons, that is quite natural, but we—the Jews of all parties—have for years been demanding: "Why have you disbanded the Jewish Regiment? Why not allow the Jews to take over: our men and our money under British command and under British military law?" I do not claim a "Jewish Army" before there is a Jewish State; we want the Jewish Regiment just as it existed during the War, rendering decent service. Why should the impression be created in this country that we want Johnny, Tommy, and Bobby to defend us? We do not. If, in the building of Palestine, sweat and gold have to be employed, let us give the sweat and let us give the gold; if blood has to be shed by the defenders of Palestine, let it be our blood and not English blood. But that suggestion has always been turned down.

As I said: I know the attitude of this Commission in refusing to dwell on the actual course of the riots, and I have to bow before it. On the other hand—here again I must ask, not about this Commission, but about the Colonial Office, about the Mandatory Government: Is there a plan, is there a line of action? Mr. Eden in Geneva, most formally, in so many words, promised the League's Council that "a Royal Commission" had been appointed to investigate the prevailing unrest, that they would investigate the facts; and the Permanent Mandates Commission was persuaded to abstain from asking questions until "a Royal Commission"—I do not say *this* Royal Commission—had investigated actual events. This Royal Commission is, of course, sovereign to refuse to do so, and I can understand their motives, but My Lord, where is then that Royal Commission which will investigate who is guilty? Because I claim somebody is guilty, I claim that a tremendous amount of ammunition for the Arabs has been allowed to percolate into Palestine both before and during the events, I claim there was neglect of duty in examining the first victims. I claim there is something I want to understand but do not understand in the fact that while a general strike in Jaffa was in progress, there was no general strike in Haifa. I want to understand whether it is true there had been some gentlemen's agreement, a "revolt by leave" in one part of Palestine, but no revolt where it was requested

JABOTINSKY: Before the Palestine Royal Commission 567
by somebody in office that there should not be revolt. I want to understand why Mr. Kawkaji was allowed to depart from Palestine in state; why the bands were allowed to disband; why there was no subsequent disarmament of the population. I want to know why it is that such things can happen in a country and nobody is guilty, nobody is responsible.

With this famous theory of the man on the spot, I want the man on the spot to stand before a Royal Commission, before a Judicial Commission, and I want him to answer for his errors. Sometimes even a humble man like myself has the right to say the words "I accuse." They are guilty. They are guilty of commission, omission, neglect of duty. If I am not mistaken, somebody has to answer to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations who gave you the Mandate. Who is going to answer? I am informed that, instead of by this Royal Commission, a report on the events will be presented in a general way in the report of the Palestine Government to the League of Nations—the party whom we accuse will present it. I submit to this Royal Commission: Among your recommendations as to remedies (because you are requested in your terms of reference to mention remedies) the first is to find the guilty ones and to punish them. Also inquire about the Supreme Moslem Council, or whatever is the official description of that group of persons headed by His Eminence the Mufti and the other gentlemen. The Government gave them a sort of diplomatic immunity. The Government negotiated with them. I submit most respectfully and humbly that some independent Commission, independent of the Colonial Office and independent of the man on the spot, should inquire and investigate into this question of guilt. I believe it is guilt, and I believe that the person guilty should be punished, and that is what I humbly demand. As to the remedies, the main remedy in my opinion is the Plan and the truth. Arabs and Jews should be informed what the real implications of the Mandate are. To my way of thinking there is only one way of interpreting the Mandate. And a Scheme should be prepared. We call it a Ten-Year Plan. In our opinion it should embrace agrarian reforms, taxation, and customs reforms, a reform of the Civil Service, opening up of Trans-Jordan for Jewish penetration, and assurance of public security by the establishment of a Jewish contingent and by the legalization of Jewish self-defense.

At the same time, I think on the Jewish side too, reforms are necessary, for we have also committed many errors in our own systems. In my opinion it all culminates in the reform of the Jewish Agency. I

was asked by Lord Peel whether we represented a body distinct from the Jewish Agency. Yes. We claim that the Jewish Agency *de facto* does not today represent the whole or even the majority of Zionist Jewry and we think the time has come when this body should be rebuilt, with the consent of the Mandatory, on the basis of universal suffrage, because the problem of Zionism today has really become the interest of practically everybody in Jewry, no longer only of adherents of a particular political group. We think that reform is quite timely and it might put an end to many abuses which I cannot deny. One of them will be brought to the knowledge of this Commission in the report of the "Betar"—the British Trumpeldor organization—on the distribution of certificates, about which this Commission have received, to my great regret, misleading information from some other Jewish representatives.

CHAIRMAN: Are you going to tell us where it is misleading? What is the main point?

ANSWER: Yes, if you will allow me another ten minutes. There is a suggestion that when we are asking for what I am asking for, that we are trying to involve this Empire in formidable complications and obstacles. I deny it. To the best of my belief I affirm, and I am not the only one, that should Great Britain go this way and really help us to save the Jewish people as it was meant and promised in the Balfour Declaration, the course of this great experiment will be as normal as the course of any other great enterprise of social evolution. We utterly deny that it means bringing Great Britain into conflict with world Islam, we utterly deny that it means a real physical conflict with the neighboring states, we deny all this. It has been exaggerated beyond any recognition. It is not true. Given a firm resolve, made clearly known to both Jews and Arabs, all this would be performed with the normal smoothness of any other equally big colonization enterprise.

As to keeping the country quiet and avoiding disturbances: I have already submitted—try what has never been tried—try re-establishing the Jewish Regiment as part and parcel of the permanent garrison. Try legalizing Jewish self-defense. It is anyway almost inevitable. Jewish self-defense is "practically" legalized today; it is and it is not; it "should not" exist, but it does exist; it "should not" be armed, but it is armed, well . . . and so on. Well, I think the decisive step should be made in the necessary direction.

You have, of course, heard of compromises and halfway houses which are being suggested, including cantonization, or the parity

scheme, or the cultural rapprochement, or the Jews "giving in" and so on. Believe my sincerity, and it is the sincerity of the whole Movement, the sincerity of every Jew I am now trying to voice: We wish a halfway house could be possible, but it is perfectly impossible. We cannot accept cantonization, because it will be suggested by many, even among you, that even the whole of Palestine may prove too small for that humanitarian purpose we need. A corner of Palestine, a "canton," how can we promise to be satisfied with it? We cannot. We never can. Should we swear to you we would be satisfied, it would be a lie. On what other point can we "give in?" What can the "concession" be on the part of Oliver Twist? He is in such a position that he cannot concede anything; it is the workhouse people who have to concede the plateful of soup, and there is no way out of it. We do not believe in any compromise on those lines. Cantonization is a dream and parity is a lie. It will never be enforced or believed by anybody; and trying it again and again means prolonging the state of things which in my submission has led to the riots of 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1936, and it will lead again to the same result.

There is only one way of compromise. Tell the Arabs the truth, and then you will see the Arab is reasonable, the Arab is clever, the Arab is just; the Arab can realize that since there are three or four or five wholly Arab States, then it is a thing of justice which Great Britain is doing if Palestine is transformed into a Jewish State. Then there will be a change of mind among the Arabs, then there will be room for compromise, and there will be peace.

It is my very unpleasant duty to wind up by taking into consideration a melancholy pessimistic contingency: What will happen if what the Jews desire cannot be conceded by Great Britain? I wish I could omit mentioning that contingency for many reasons, personal reasons, Jewish national reasons, but to omit it is impossible. We are asked very often: "Whatever is meant by the Balfour Declaration was promised in 1917, but since then perhaps the British people have honestly come to the conclusion that they cannot do it." I deny it. I affirm they can; but when I am asked, when any Jew is asked: "What are the Jews going to pin us down to the promise and to say—you have promised the pound of flesh, pay us the pound of flesh?" Gentlemen, here I answer you in the name of the most extreme of Zionist parties: "No!" If Great Britain really is unable to do it (not unwilling, but unable) we will bow to her decision, but we then shall expect Great Britain to act as any Mandatory who feels he cannot carry out the Mandate: give back the Mandate. . . .

SIR LAURIE HAMMOND: To whom?

ANSWER: And do it in a way which will not harm the safety of the Jews who trusted you and came to Palestine on the chances of a Zionist future. This means letting a certain time elapse while the Mandatory together with the Jews will look for the alternative. I hope that time will never come. I am fully convinced that it will not be necessary. I believe in England just as I believed in England twenty years ago when I went, against nearly all Jewish opinion, and said: "Give soldiers to Great Britain!" because I believed in her. I still believe. But if Great Britain really cannot live up to the Mandate—well—we shall be the losers; and we will sit down together and think what can be done; but not that Great Britain should go on holding the Mandate and pretend it is "fulfilled" while my people are still suffering in the Diaspora and still only a minority in Palestine. No, that cannot be done. That is not cricket. Therefore, Gentlemen, I submit it cannot be done, and it shall not be done.

I thank the Commission very much for their kindness and attention. I beg your forgiveness for having kept you for an hour and a half.

CHAIM WEISZWAN 1934-1937

It is a very beautiful view of Chaim Weiszwan's life, and it is very important to see the way in which he has lived his life. He has been a leader of the Jewish people in the most important sense of the word. He has been a leader of the Jewish people in the most important sense of the word. He has been a leader of the Jewish people in the most important sense of the word.

He was born in 1892 in the town of Minsk, in the Russian Empire. He was a member of the Bund, a Jewish socialist party. He was a member of the Bund, a Jewish socialist party. He was a member of the Bund, a Jewish socialist party. He was a member of the Bund, a Jewish socialist party. He was a member of the Bund, a Jewish socialist party.

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Lesson 1

Ze'ev Jabotinsky, "An Iron Wall (We and the Arabs)"

3. Ze'ev Jabotinsky: From "The Iron Wall" 1923

Contrary to that excellent rule of getting down to the point immediately, I must begin this article with a personal introduction. The writer of these lines is considered an enemy of the Arabs, one who wishes to banish the Arabs from the land of Israel. There is no truth in all this. I have the same feelings for the Arabs as I have towards other peoples a courteous reserve. I believe that to remove them from the Land of Israel would definitely be against all reason. The land of Israel has always been inhabited by two peoples...

But the question of whether or not it is always possible to achieve peace through peaceful means comes under a different light. The answer to this question depends absolutely on the attitude of the Arabs to us and towards Zionism and not on our attitude towards them...

After this introduction I can now get to the point. That the Arabs of the land of Israel should willingly come to an agreement with us is beyond all hopes and dreams at present and in the foreseeable future. Apart from those who have been virtually blind since childhood, all the other moderate Zionists have long since understood that there is not even the slightest hope of ever obtaining the agreement of the Arabs of the land of Israel to Palestine becoming a country with a Jewish majority.

Every reader has some idea of the early history of other countries which have been settled. I suggest that he recall all such known instances. If he should attempt to seek but one instance of a country settled with the consent of those born there he would not succeed. The inhabitants (no matter whether they are civilized or savages) have always put up a stubborn fight.

This rule applies to the Arabs no less. In our peace proclamations we try to convince ourselves that the Arabs are either fools - easily deceived by a milder interpretation of our aims - or a tribe of mercenary materialists ready to give up their rights to the land of Israel in exchange for cultural or economical advantages.

I completely reject this evaluation of the Arab character. Their cultural standard is low and they do possess our endurance and willpower, but as psychologists they are just as sophisticated as we are and for hundreds of years they, much like us, have been schooled in the art of polemics and the sharpening of their wits. We can tell them as much as we want about our good intentions: but they understand no less than we, what is no good for them. They cling to the land of Israel, at least with the same instinctive love and primitive fanaticism displayed by the Aztecs to their Mexico or the Sioux to their prairies.

To think that the Arabs will voluntarily consent to the realization of Zionism in return for the cultural and economic benefits we can bestow on them is infantile and has its source in a feeling of contempt which some of our people have for the Arab people. The Arabs, according to these voices are nothing more than a rabble of crass materialists prepared to barter away their patriotism for a developed network of railroads. This view is absolutely groundless. Individual Arabs may perhaps be bought off but this hardly means that all the Arabs in Eretz Israel are willing to sell their patriotic fervour. Every indigenous people will resist alien settlers as long as they see any hope of ridding themselves of the danger of foreign settlement.

This is how the Arabs behave and will go on behaving so long as they possess a gleam of hope that they can prevent Palestine from becoming the Land of Israel.

Some of us imagined that a misunderstanding had occurred, that because the Arabs did not quite understand our intentions, they opposed us. But if we were to make it clear to them how modest and limited were our aspirations, they would then stretch out their arms in peace. This too is a fallacy that has been proved time without end.

And so we must conclude that we cannot promise anything ... to the Arabs in the land of Israel... Their voluntary agreement is out of the question. Hence those for whom an agreement with the Arabs is a prerequisite for Zionism, can be sure that this condition will never be fulfilled and that they should therefore renounce their Zionism. To continue settlement irrespective of Arab objections means having the protection of a power that does not depend on the local population.

I do not mean to assert that no agreement whatever is possible with the Arabs of the land of Israel. But a voluntary agreement is just not possible. As long as the Arabs preserve a gleam of hope that they will succeed in getting rid of us, nothing in the world -neither soft words nor alluring promises - can cause them to relinquish this hope, precisely because they are not rabble but a living people. And a living people will be ready to yield on such fateful issues only when they have given up all hope of getting rid of the alien settlers and [have understood that they are faced with an] iron wall [that they will never be able to move or to get rid of]. Only then will extremist groups with their slogan "No, never" lose their influence and only then will their influence be transferred to more moderate groups. And only then will the moderates offer suggestions for compromise. Then only will they begin bargaining with us on practical matters such as guarantees against pushing them out, and equality of civil and national rights. I am optimistically convinced that they will indeed be granted satisfactory assurances and that both peoples like good neighbours, can then live in peace. But the only way leading to such an agreement is by "erecting an iron wall", meaning that in the land of Israel there must be a power that will not under any circumstances yield to Arab pressure. In other words, the only way to achieve an agreement with them in the future is by absolutely avoiding any attempts at agreement with them at present.

Lesson 2

Howard Sachar, *A History of Israel, 443-445*

The Search for Peace and Security 443

drew UN rations. What was unavengable was not their existence but their morale. Vegetating helplessly in the squalor of their UNRWA slums, they experienced tensions so acute that their periodic outbreaks occasionally imperiled the regimes of their host countries. It, then, became the task of hundreds of thousands of embittered Arabes who were complicating the task of peace in the Middle East, the worst it has ever known, not between Israel and the Arab countries alone, but among the Arab nations themselves.

A FLICKERING OF BORDER VIOLENCE

Inevitably this frustrated and seething refugee presence made its impact along the Arab-Israeli frontiers and activated one of the most critical provisions of the four armistice agreements. It is recalled that these accords were intended to provide a transitional period in which resentments would be hopefully fading in an atmosphere favorable to peace negotiations. To that end machinery was established to lessen the danger of violence along the borders. It consisted of two elements. One was the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs), established by the armistice agreements themselves. The other was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which had been established earlier, during the Palestine war, and which therefore drew its authority and personnel from the world organization. Both elements were functionally intertwined, and the plan to reduce the threat of conflict depended upon their close cooperation. Thus, each MAC (for each of Israel's four frontiers) was composed of an equal number of Israeli and Arab delegates and presided over by the UNTSO chief of staff. The purpose of these mixed bodies was to determine if an armistice violation had occurred, and then to encourage the parties to resolve the dispute. In investigating evidence of violations, the MAC chairman was authorized to cast the decisive vote.

However, impressive in conception, this machinery depended for its effectiveness upon the willingness of the Arabs and Israelis themselves to take seriously the preamble to the armistice agreements—that is, not merely to avoid resort to force but to agree "that the establishment of the armistice is an indispensable step toward the restoration of peace in Palestine." When the agreements were signed, in 1949, none of the parties expected that more than an additional few months would be required to conclude final and binding peace treaties. Because the momentum generated at Rhodes was not sustained, however, the rot set in almost at once. The armistice machinery was not equipped to serve as a permanent substitute for peace. The configuration of the Rhodes boundaries, too, was yet another source of difficulty. The frontiers had been intended simply as temporary lines, and made no concession to civilian needs. Between Israel and Jordan they cut off Arab villages from their fields and wells. Almost nowhere was the frontier clearly marked. At once, therefore, local Arabs on the Hashemite side began crossing the artificial boundary to reclaim their possessions. Some even attempted to harvest their old fields. Large numbers

444 A HISTORY OF ISRAEL

why their chances for repatriation were limited, and to providing an immediate alternative by which the disappointed majority of the refugees could hope for an improved life elsewhere.

In January 1951 a "Committee of Palestine Refugees" in Lebanon wrote the Arab League political committee, observing that a return to their homes was less than imminent for most of the Palestinians. Until a political solution was found they could hardly be left to rot in the Arab country-side without decent food, shelter, or means of livelihood. The letter suggested that the Arab states should at least provide those refugees willing to settle outside Palestine the opportunity to do so. Yet the one affirmative response to this appeal was Abdullah's decision to confer Jordanian citizenship on the 200,000-odd refugees on the West Bank. Of these, it is recalled, some 200,000 found employment; the rest continued to live in camps on the UNRWA dole. By contrast, the Gaza Strip refugees were confined virtually as prisoners in their tiny zone. With the exception of perhaps 2000 fugitives who managed to secure jobs in Iraq and the Persian Gulf by 1951, they were denied employment or citizenship in Egypt itself. The same was true in Syria.

From time to time, meanwhile, the UNRWA directors came up with specific and well-funded employment programs for the refugees in neighboring Arab lands. The Arab governments, however, although these proposals down, allowing the money to be spent on relief, nothing more. In truth, their opposition to anything smacking of resettlement was no longer exclusively one of principle. They suspected that the refugees were not capable of being absorbed that easily. In 1949 only about 20 percent of the adult males among them possessed useful skills or training (and these quickly became self-supporting). The other 80 percent were either farmers or untrained workers living in areas already saturated with fellahin and laborers. In addition, political instability in most of the Arab nations and friction between Arab governments compounded the problems of refugee absorption. Thus, having won the sympathy and support of the Arab masses, the Palestinians frequently applied effective pressure on the various national regimes, notably in Jordan, where they comprised a third of the population, and in Lebanon, where they represented a tenth of the population. As the refugees settled in other parts of the Arab world, moreover, they tended to impart their intense feelings of bitterness and frustration to the established citizenry. Under the circumstances, the Arab governments were not eager to add to their political and economic difficulties.

For the Palestinians themselves, the "advantages" of refugee status were not altogether negligible once the relief programs were instituted and regularized. They had access to health services. The incidence of sickness and deaths accordingly was lower among them, and their birth rate higher, than among the surrounding Arab populations. Some 45 percent of their children of school age received free education. While their rations were meager—about 1,600 calories of flour, pulses, sugar, and rice per day—they did not suffer from malnutrition. By the end of 1956 only 39 percent of the registered fugitives actually lived in UNRWA camps; yet nearly all of them

new chief of staff, warned that retaliatory operations against known guerrilla sites and even army posts would continue. On March 17, 1954, a Jewish holiday bus was ambushed at Scripion's Post in the Negev; eleven passengers were killed and two wounded. When the MAC refused to condemn the Jordanian government, stating that the murder was the work of private Arab criminals, Israel angrily withdrew its delegates from the armistice commission. Powerful army raids then followed against suspected Jordanian guerrilla bases. Nor was the strategy of reprisal by any means a failure. Taking note of the growing harshness of these Israeli expeditions, Amman sought urgently to restrict further infiltration. In 1954, as a result, the number of Israelis killed by infiltrators declined to thirty-three, and in 1955 to twenty-four. Yet the most serious casualty was the Israel-Jordan MAC itself. By mid-decade it had ceased to function. The "armistice" line on Israel's eastern frontier was no man's hand again.

DEMILITARIZED ZONES AND FEDAYEEN

Still another chain reaction of violence erupted in the demilitarized zones between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The armistice agreements established four such zones: one (divided into two sections) in the north on the former Palestine-Syria border; a second encircling the Hebrew University and Hadasah hospital buildings on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem; a third on Jebel al-Mukabbar in Jerusalem, comprising the old high commissioner's palace; and a fourth, diamond-shaped area around al-Aziz on the Egyptian border. It was the Mount Scopus zone that became the initial focus of rivalry. Commanding a general view of Jerusalem, and dominating the city's eastern and northern approaches, the entire promontory lay within Hashemite lines. The Israel-Jordan armistice agreement had placed the enclave under United Nations protection, however, and off limits to the armed forces of either side, although not to Arab and Israeli civilian police. Despite this provision, both Jordanians and Israelis violated the understanding almost from the outset. The Arab Legion openly posted troops at the Augusta Victoria Church. The Israeli "police" stationed at the Hebrew University and Hadasah hospital were in fact soldiers. To ensure that their outpost on Mount Scopus could hold out in the event of attack, the Israelis periodically smuggled weapons and ammunition in "food" convoys and stashed them in the basements of university and hospital buildings.

A far more volatile zone was the one established between Israel and Syria as a "compromise" solution to the prolonged and grudging armistice negotiations of 1949. At first, the Syrians had refused to abandon their limited foothold in Israel. As an inducement for withdrawal, however, the Israelis agreed for the evacuated bridgehead to be transformed into a demilitarized zone, consisting essentially of two noncontiguous strips of 40 square miles. The first, central strip ran from the southern half of Lake Chula along the Jordan River to the mouth of Lake Galilee. The other

of refugees moved into Israel to rejoin their families, or simply because they did not know the precise demarcation of the armistice line.

The Israeli government regarded the infiltration with much concern, for it was damaging the morale of the border settlers, most of whom were new immigrants. At first the MAC was at least partially effective in dealing with the pilferage of crops and chattels. By late 1951 and early 1952, however, the theft or vandalism of farm property became particularly acute, and the Israeli response increasingly emphatic. Infiltrators who offered resistance were shot by Israeli border police each week almost as a matter of routine. In 1955 alone 394 Arabs were killed, 227 wounded, and 2,595 captured. Not all Israelis approved of this policy of toughness. The poet Natan Alterman, writing in *Davar*, exclaimed indignantly: "Oh, you Knesset members, you former passport forgers, you infiltrators, grandchildren of infiltrators, how quickly you have learned the new morality of militarism! But hesitation vanished after 1953 when Arab thefts and sabotage were compounded by murder and arson. Hardly a week passed without the slaying or wounding of Israeli civilians by Arab marauders. If the raids ordinarily were not initiated by the Hashemite government, they were nevertheless generally tolerated by lower-echelon Arab officials and the Jordanian police. What fellow Arab could have prevented the refugees from striking back, after all? Complicity was difficult to prove, even when the infiltrators' tracks led back to the police fortresses. Even so, the Israelis chose to attribute responsibility to the Arab governments, and they retaliated with increasing harshness. Thus, from June 1949 until October 1954, Israel claimed that Jordan had violated the armistice agreement 1,612 times. Jordan, in turn, accused Israel of 1,348 violations. The MAC verified that Jordan was answerable for 34 of 124 Israelis killed, and that 127 of the 256 slain Jordanians—infiltrators and soldiers alike—were Israel's responsibility.

The violence reached a crescendo of sorts in 1953. On October 13 of that year, a grenade was thrown into a house at Tirat Yehuda, well inside the Israeli frontier, killing a mother and two children. The Israel-Jordan MAC was summoned, and concluded that Jordanian terrorists had perpetrated the act. Choosing not to wait, however, for Amman to fulfill its promise "of discovering and punishing the guilty," the Israeli cabinet decided to strike back hard at known Jordanian murder bases. One of these was the village of Qibya, facing Tirat Yehuda across the border. Plans were laid for the army to attack and destroy about fifty homes there. During the course of the Israeli raid, sixty-nine Jordanians, half of them women and children, were killed within the demolished homes; they had hidden there and gone unnoticed. Shocked and embarrassed, Ben-Gurion dissented by insisting that the action was not a military operation but rather an act of revenge by civilian victims of Arab attacks. The MAC swiftly expressed the lie and condemned the action. So did the Security Council. Privately, Sharett and Eban had growing misgivings about the strategy of retaliation, concerned that it was undermining Israel's diplomatic position. The policy remained in effect, however. General Moshe Dayan, Israel's

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new chief of staff, warned that retaliatory operations against known guerrilla sites and even army posts would continue. On March 17, 1954, a Jewish holiday bus was ambushed at Scorpion's Pass in the Pegasus Pass. Passengers were killed and two wounded. When the MAC refused to condemn the Jordanian government, stating that the murder was the work of private Arab criminals, Israel angrily withdrew its delegates from the armistice commission. Powerful army raids then followed against suspected Jordanian guerrilla bases. Nor was the strategy of reprisal by any means a failure. Taking note of the growing harshness of these Israeli expeditions, Amman sought urgently to restrict further infiltration. In 1954, as a result, the number of Israelis killed by infiltrators declined to thirty-three, and in 1955 to twenty-four. Yet the most serious casualty was the Israel-Jordan MAC itself. By mid-decade it had ceased to function. The "armistice" line on Israel's eastern frontier was no man's land again.

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A far more volatile zone was the one established between Israel and Syria as a "compromise" solution to the prolonged and grudging armistice negotiations of 1949. At first the Syrians had refused to abandon their limited foothold in Israel. As an inducement for withdrawal, however, the Israelis agreed for the so-called bridgehead to be transformed into a demilitarized zone, consisting essentially of two noncontiguous strips of 40 square miles. The first, central strip ran from the southern half of Lake Chula along the Jordan River to the mouth of Lake Galilee. The other

Lesson 2

Howard Sachar, *A History of Israel, 445-450*

strip extended along the southeastern shore of Lake Galilee, with a tail projecting eastward for about 3 miles. Both sectors lay entirely within Palestine. It was understood in both Jerusalem and Damascus that even limited control over the DMZ would enable the Syrians to obstruct crucial Israeli development projects; for only within this zone could Israel undertake the work necessary to drain the Chula swamps, to build hydroelectric power stations, and to channel water to the Negev. Indeed, of all Israel's neighbors, Syria was the most favorably located, and temperamentally and politically the most eager, to cripple the Jewish nation's economic growth. To prevent any further confrontation on the issue of Israel's development, therefore, Ralph Bunche, the United Nations acting mediator, assured Israel during the 1949 armistice negotiations that normal civilian life could be resumed in the demilitarized zone. Conversely, it was Syria's understanding that the DMZ would not be regarded as sovereign Israeli territory.

The UNTSO representative, functioning as chairman of the Syria-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, was invested with responsibility for the "gradual restoration of normal civilian life" in the DMZ, without prejudice to a final settlement. Initially, it appeared to this officer that Israel's Chula drainage scheme, intended to release about 45,000 acres for cultivation, was permissible under Bunche's format. The swamps lay entirely outside the demilitarized zone. Nevertheless, once work began in January 1951, it was discovered that a road would have to be built affecting 100 acres of Arab-owned land in the DMZ. The Israelis accordingly sought to negotiate with the landowners, and at one point tentative agreement was reached on compensation. Then, at the last moment, the Arab farmers were called to Damascus and persuaded to reject all offers. Thereupon the Israelis expropriated the land, and on February 14 Syria lodged a complaint with the MAC. On March 7, 1951, the UNTSO chief of staff, General William Riley, an American marine officer, endorsed the Syrian claim that some Arab land was affected against the wishes of the owners, thus interfering with the "restoration of normal civilian life," and hence violating the armistice provisions. No party was sovereign in the DMZ, Riley declared, and the right of compulsory acquisition therefore could not be exercised.

Stung by the decision, the Israelis on March 25 overrode Riley's protests and launched into work on the enterprise. Immediately the Syrians began firing on the civilian engineers. The Israelis in turn evacuated 600 Arabs—whom they described as a potential fifth column—from the central sector of the DMZ and flattened their villages. When Syrian troops moved into the zone, Israel on April 5 bombed the garrison village of al-Hamma at the tip of the DMZ. Armed units were then rushed into both sides of the zone, and on May 2 heavy fighting began. Hostilities continued for twelve days until the Security Council forced through a cease-fire. The matter was discussed in the United Nations body, and Israel was ordered to return the evacuated Arabs forthwith and to cease work on Arab lands. The Israelis reluctantly acquiesced. Ultimately, too, they devised a means of

completing the project without using Arab land, and the tension gradually subsided. In 1953 the canal was finished and the drainage of the swamps proceeded quietly.

Other crises subsequently arose in demilitarized territory. One, an effort to construct a hydroelectric power plant at the P'not Ya'akov bridge, just north of Lake Galilee, involved the building of a water diversion canal in the DMZ that would have affected the flow of the Jordan River in Syrian territory. Although the Israelis were prepared to guarantee the Syrians their allocated share of water under the impending Johnston irrigation scheme (p. 457), the Damascus government took the issue to the United Nations, and there it was upheld. The Israelis consequently dropped their work on the project. By then, too, a potentially even more explosive issue had arisen over fishing rights on Lake Galilee. This placed little water body lay entirely within Israeli territory, although in places the Syrian border reached to within 10 meters of the eastern bank. Israeli fishing boats approaching the northeastern shore often were fired upon. In August 1951, Israel agreed to reduce tension by keeping the boats at least 250 meters from the shore. But in December of that year, Syrian regular army units shot and killed several Israeli fishermen close to the eastern bank. Immediately afterward Damascus announced that Israelis would not be permitted closer than 400 meters from the water's edge. Israel rejected this delimitation, incidents of violence continued during the next few years, and occasionally the Syrians shelled Israeli boats.

In October 1955 five Israeli soldiers were captured inside Syria as they repaired a wiretap. When the Arabs refused to release the prisoners, two Israeli platoons crossed the DMZ on Lake Galilee's northern shore, destroyed a Syrian military convoy, and took five soldiers as hostages for their own imprisoned men. Renewed efforts to negotiate an exchange failed, and the Syrians continued to fire on Israeli vessels. Whereupon the Israeli army launched a powerful retaliation raid on the night of December 11, hitting a series of Syrian military positions along the northeastern shore, killing twenty-six soldiers and twelve civilians and taking thirty Syrian prisoners. After evaluating a report from the Israel-Syrian MAC on January 12, 1956, the Security Council denounced the Israeli attack and warned of firm United Nations measures if the raids were not halted. The Israelis were sobered by the threat. For the time being they exercised restraint. The number of Syrian shootings also declined. The storm between Israel and Syria was postponed.

During the interval, however, in the 1950s, it was the southern line of confrontation, in the demilitarized zone of al-Auja and particularly the Egyptian-ruled Gaza Strip, that was transformed into the single most lethal battleground between Israel and its enemies. The al-Auja DMZ, evacuated by the Egyptians in return for assurances of tactical sterilization, lay roughly diamond-shaped for a distance of 22 miles along the former Palestine-Egypt Sinai border. Virtually from the outset of the armistice, the Israelis made repeated efforts to establish a military camp in the area under the guise of a kibbutz—thereby circumventing the de-

during these seven years. Virtually all of these were condemned by the Egypt-Israel MAC or censured by the Security Council—as, occasionally, were Arab provocations. It was Israel's apparent failure to win the understanding of the world body that convinced Abba Eban, Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, that retaliation was a dead end. In the aftermath of a unanimous Security Council condemnation, following Israel's Gaza raid of spring 1955 (p. 481), Eban wrote a friend: "Retaliation is just finished as a policy, and our people should become used to obeying the same rules, even under provocation, as other governments when provoked."

Living abroad during those years, Eban perhaps failed to appreciate the intensity of his nation's exasperation. He himself cited to the Security Council the figures of Israeli casualties in the 1950s, the victims of Arab infiltrators and trained marauders. Through shellings, military assaults, and hit-and-run tactics of fedayeen-trained "suicide" forces—the Arabs inflicted 2,900 Israeli casualties between 1949 and 1956. Four-fifths of those losses were civilian (two-thirds of the Arab casualties were military), and they included many women and children. Each death, too, was measured against the context of unmitigated Arab hostility toward Israel, a juridical and emotional state of war that utilized yet additional techniques—quarantine, blockade, and propaganda—designed to capsize Israel's economy, sap its powers of resistance, and ultimately efface the Jewish republic from the community of nations.

THE DYNAMICS OF ARAB BELLIGERENCY

As we recall, little of this militancy could have been prophesied from the armistice agreements of 1949. The documents manifestly had been intended as transitional steps toward permanent peace. For that matter, the Arab governments no less than Israel were known to have vested interests in a policy of mutual recognition. Presumably they had urgent problems that required solution, among them arbitrary and volatile frontiers based on immediate military necessities; the demilitarized zones; the need for an outlet on the Israeli Mediterranean coast, for Egyptian-Hashemite access through the Negev, and for a defined status for Jerusalem. It developed, also, that Abdullah was intensely eager for a compromise agreement that would placate the tens of thousands of restive Palestine Arabs living on the west bank of the Jordan. If he succeeded in winning meaningful concessions from the Jews, the refugees might regard him as a savior rather than as a scapegoat. Confident, too, of his negotiating skills, Abdullah decided to risk the ire of his fellow Arab rulers and the possible misunderstanding of his subjects. He renewed his secret contacts with Lieutenant Colonel Moshe Dayan, the Israeli military commander in Jerusalem.

At first the Israelis responded to Abdullah's feelers somewhat reluctantly. It was felt that a prior agreement with Egypt would secure broader territorial concessions from the Hashemite ruler. Nor were Abdullah's initial demands modest. He wanted access to the Mediter-

anean through BeerSheba and Gaza, the return of the Arab quarters of New Jerusalem, passage along the Jerusalem-Bethlehem road, and a free port in Haifa. In return, he offered Israel access to the potash works on the north shore of the Dead Sea and a free port on the Gulf of Aqaba, a quiet *pro quo* implying that at least a portion of the southern Negev would be returned to Transjordan. The Israeli government had no objection to the inclusion of Gaza within Hashemite territory—this was a purely Arab matter—and was willing even to concede Transjordan access to the sea. Yet the Jews were by no means eager to permit an easement through the south, for the danger was greater of fracturing their country in this comparatively empty terrain. What Ben-Curion had in mind was a corridor yards wide, Abdullah was thinking in terms of a corridor miles wide. No agreement seemed possible at first.

Meanwhile, accounts of the secret talks reached the Arab press. Egypt retaliated by appealing to the United Nations to endorse the territorial internationalization of Jerusalem; and this effort, it is recalled, succeeded in December 1949. It was the setback on Jerusalem, in turn, that revitalized Israeli-Hashemite negotiations. This time the discussions bore fruit. A formal agreement was reached early in 1950. By its provisions, the frontiers between Transjordan and Israel would remain unchanged for five years. Certain unresolved problems would be assigned to various joint committees; but in the meanwhile normal trade and travel would proceed between the two countries. Transjordan would enjoy a free port zone in Haifa, linked by a narrow corridor across the more densely inhabited part of northern Israel. Finally, both peoples would be guaranteed mutual access to their holy places in both parts of Jerusalem. In March 1950 the draft treaty was initialed by the Israeli and Transjordanian representatives.

The moment news of the agreement leaked to the rest of the Arab world, a storm broke over Abdullah's head. He faced a crisis within his own cabinet. The West Bank refugee population seethed. Warnings and accusations poured into Amman. Syria threatened to close its Transjordanian frontier. When the Arab League met in Cairo several days later, Egypt and Saudi Arabia proposed expelling Transjordan from the organization. The measure was averted at the last moment, but only at the price of Transjordanian acceptance of a resolution barring separate agreements with Israel. Privately, the Hashemite king sent reassurance to the Israelis: "Abdullah, the son of Hussein, does not break his word." The little monarch anticipated that the impending election in Transjordan would vindicate his policy, and that it would be safe then to ignore Egypt. Instead, the election returned candidates flatly hostile to the notion of peace with Israel. From then on, Abdullah decided to move cautiously *vis-à-vis* the Jews. On January 1, 1950, he annexed all of Arab Palestine, and on April 25 entitled his realm the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Arab League protested, but did nothing. The king decided he had gone far enough at the moment; he would not risk publication of his treaty with Israel. Indeed, he had already gone too far. On July 30, 1951,

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Lesson 2

Howard Sachar, *A History of Israel, 450-453*

an assassin in the pay of Egypt shot Abdullah dead on the steps of the Mosque of Omar in Jerusalem.

To the Israelis, the hardening of Arab opposition was apparent as early as the stalemated FCC negotiations in Lausanne. The truth was that the Arab states had not really experienced the cost of the war in a physical or territorial sense. Except for the Palestinians, they had suffered almost no property destruction and had abandoned no territory. Militarily, their losses were negligible in relation to their populations. Their entire war expenditures had come to roughly \$300 million, a trifling sum. Their price levels continued relatively stable afterward, and hunger among their fellahin was no greater than ordinary. Nor did the burden of the refugees fall on them; they simply refused to accept it. After the Rhodes armistices, in fact, the Arab governments—with the possible exceptions of Jordan and, intermittently, Lebanon—saw little to gain and much to lose by making peace. The restoration of land communications between Egypt and the other Arab countries was of marginal importance; little trade passed over these routes. Territorial concessions to be gained through peace were of small value to any country except Jordan. Rather, a formal end of the war would have obliged Lebanon to share its transit and oil pipeline outlets with Haifa. An Israel at peace with its neighbors, exploiting its advanced economic and technological position, was likely to prove a strong competitor for Middle Eastern markets.

By the same token, fear of potential Israeli expansion was very real in the Arab world. "The Arabs are keenly aware," said an article in *al-Hayat* of Nisy, 1964, "that the population growth in Israel's now narrow territory will undoubtedly lead her to seek ways of expanding her living space. And it is clear that she will not achieve this except at the expense of her neighbors, the Arab states on her borders. Politically, too, it would have been dangerous and conceivably fatal for the Arab leadership to make peace with Israel. Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha was assassinated by a Moslem Brotherhood gunman merely for having accepted a cease-fire, even before Egypt had signed the Rhodes armistice agreement. As punishment both for losing the war and for signing the armistice accord, the entire Syrian regime was overthrown by a military coup. Prime Minister Riad al-Sulhi of Lebanon was assassinated for displaying moderation, although his country had played only a minor part in the hostilities. And Abdullah was murdered for negotiating peace. Whenever inter-Arab relations reached a point of crisis, moreover, enmity toward Israel was usefully invoked for Pan-Arab purposes. Through the years since 1948, a boycott of Israel and other expressions of hostility proved to be the one dependable integument among contending governments and factions in the Arab world.

Psychologically, most important of all, the Arabs simply could not bring themselves to admit defeat at the hands of the "Zionist gangs." The Moslem tradition of jihad—of unceasing warfare against infidel interlopers—played a role here. Pride and self-esteem were equally critical factors, however. Once signed, the peace treaties would have been admission

that the game was over. Azzam Pasha put the matter forthrightly: "We have a secret weapon which we can use better than guns and machine guns, and this is time. As long as we do not make peace with the Zionists, the war is not over; and as long as the war is not over, there is neither victor nor vanquished." Even Arabs formerly known for their moderation burned with resentment at Israel's 1948 victory. Kay Antonius, widow of the distinguished Arab historian George Antonius, expressed this bitterness: "Before . . . the Jewish state I knew many Jews in Jerusalem and enjoyed good relations with them socially. Now I will slap the face of any Arab friend of mine who tries to trade with a Jew. We lost the first round, we haven't lost the war." The Zionists were also equated, in this regard, with the medieval Crusaders and with modern imperialism, and the history of the Arab world characteristically was described as a prolonged resistance to European invasion and domination (Chapter XXI). The venom and gall directed by the Arab press and even Arab scholars against Zionism and Israel, against the Jews as a "treacherous race" and Judaism as a "vipers' nest of cunning," gained momentum in the 1950s, as it had not in the pre-Israel period. It was a measure of this animus that Egypt's most respected writer, the former Palestinian Muhammad Izzat Darwazah, could indict Jews for their "historical" malice, treachery, and selfishness. "How extraordinary it is," he wrote, "that we realize that their characteristics today, although they live in various places, are exactly as they were described by the Koran. . . . Time does not add to their qualities, but makes them more deeply rooted. . . . The vices pass on from fathers to sons."

THE MECHANICS OF ARAB BELLIGERENCY

As the Arabs moved almost imperceptibly toward a policy of heightened belligerence, the likelihood of peace treaties correspondingly diminished in the early 1950s. For the while, the techniques of revenge were essentially nonmilitary. Their purpose henceforth was to isolate, harass, and eventually strangle Israel through political pressure, boycott, blockade, propaganda, and border violence. In this effort, the Arab rationale was that the armistice agreements had not yet transcended the juridical state of war.

One of the most effective Arab maneuvers was diplomatic quarantine. All borders with Israel were closed, except for a tiny cervice at Rosh HaNikrah, at the Lebanese frontier, which was open to foreign diplomats, and the Mandelbaum Gate in Jerusalem, which was limited to non-Jews passing to and from the Jewish sector. All postal, telephone, and telegraph facilities between the Arab nations and Israel, all sea, air, road, and rail communications, were severed. Moreover, no person whose passport bore an Israeli visa was given entry into any Arab state; neutral travelers were obliged to carry two passports. The Arab governments were relentless, too, in their attempts to dissuade other nations from establishing diplo-

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be obliterated left in doubt. "We shall not enter Palestine with its soil covered in sand," Nasser asserted in March 1965. "We shall enter it with its soil saturated in blood."

Declarations were less easily translated into facts, of course, or even into meaningful plans. It was true that Nasser had emerged from the Sinai Campaign with his power intact. The British, French, and Israelis were out of Egypt after all. In February 1968, too, Damascus and Cairo jointly proclaimed the merger of their nations in a United Arab Republic. Disjointed as this political hybrid was, it appeared unchallengeable as the major political bloc in the Arab world. Indeed, subsequent Iraqi and Jordanian attempts to counterbalance the UAR, by announcing a federation of their own, endured less than six months. In July 1965 the officers of Iraq's army revolted, murdered King Feisal and Prime Minister Nuri es-Said, and supplanted them with an ostensibly pro-Egyptian military junta. Nasser was riding high by then: "sayid" of the Arab world, standard-bearer of Pan-Arabism, a respected spokesman for the Third World of Afro-Asian nations, courted by East and West.

The following year, nevertheless, the tide shifted against the Egyptian president. Amid mutual recriminations, Syria chose to withdraw from the UAR. In 1964 civil violence erupted in the Yemen between Nasserist and proroyalist factions, the latter supported by Saudi Arabia. Compulsively intervening in the hostilities, Nasser was obliged eventually to dispatch 60,000 of his troops to the quagmire of a ferocious and inconclusive war. In Iraq, too, the regime of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim proclaimed its own alternative road to Arab unity, in opposition to Nasser's "Tautly and egotistical" path. Soon the revolutionary governments of Cairo and Baghdad were engaged in open ideological battle. Jordan and Saudi Arabia had long been fearful of Nasser's ambitions, even as the Tunisian and Moroccan governments belatedly awoke to Nasser's imperialist designs on their own lands. Moreover, the Third World by then was slowly tilting away from the Left, and Nasser's closest friends—Nehru, Ben Bella, Nkrumah, Sukarno—were passing from the scene. To compound the Egyptian ruler's difficulties, his nation's economy was on the verge of bankruptcy by the early 1960s. The government's investment effort, its purchases of vast quantities of industrial equipment abroad, the costs of the debilitating war in Yemen, all seriously drained Egypt's foreign reserves. Unemployment was rising, and an immense mass of destitute subproletariat was engaging the slums of Cairo.

With Nasser's problems metastasizing at home and elsewhere in the Arab world, Israel for its part appeared simply too formidable to tackle, both in its own military power and in its growing network of international support. It is recalled that a major example of this cooperation was in Africa, where the Israelis had launched highly successful programs of economic and technological help. In fact, Nasser got his bloodiest nose in Africa almost directly at Israeli hands. Unnoticed at the time, Israeli intervention helped prevent the Egyptians, and the Soviets behind them, from taking over the former Belgian Congo in 1963, the largest and potentially

the richest new state in Africa. At Brazzaville, it was known that the Egyptian embassy was distributing arms clandestinely to rebel forces led by the pro-Communist Antoine Gizenga. And in Cairo, followers of Gizenga announced the creation of a "People's Republic of the Congo." To deal with this incipient civil war, Lieutenant General Joseph Mobutu, commander of the Congolese army (and later his nation's president), sought help from the Israeli embassy, which in turn summoned a panel of Israeli military advisers. The latter recommended the creation of an elite corps of paratroops as a mobile force to scotch the uprising. Thereupon Mobutu picked 250 officers and men and departed with them to Israel for an intensive course in paratroop jumping and tactics. On his return to the Congo, the general dispatched other trainees to Israel, until in 1964 he had accumulated a crack brigade of 2,000. At that point Mobutu's army, spearheaded by the Israel-trained paratroops and commanded by white mercenaries, effectively put the rebels to flight.

With a realistic appraisal, then, of his own weaknesses and of his enemy's strength, Nasser ignored Hashemite taunts to renew the blockade of the Strait of Tiran, and Syrian appeals to obstruct Israel's irrigation project at the headwaters of the Jordan. Somewhat lamely, he explained that war with Israel would have to be delayed until the Arabs were ready. In his memoirs, Ahran Mauraui, the Syrian vice-president, recalled his talk with Nasser on November 29, 1963, when Mauraui proposed the use of force to block Israel's water development plans. Nasser replied: "Ahran, my brother, and what will happen if Israel bombs Damascus?" The implication was plain that the Syrians should not then look to Cairo.

A SYRIAN TIGER IS LOOSED

Despite this pained admission of Egyptian helplessness, by 1965 the Syrian regime had allowed its 47-mile frontier with Israel to become the Middle East's single most explosive boundary. There were a number of ingredients in the Syrian-Israeli tinderbox. One was Israel's irrigation project. It is recalled that in 1959, four years after the breakdown of the Johnston negotiations, Israel made the decision to embark on its own phase of the regional water plan. To avoid any further controversies on the status of the northern DMZ, the Israelis modified their original irrigation blueprint in favor of pumping water directly from Lake Galilee. Yet no sooner had construction of a pumping station begun at the northwestern corner of the lake than Damascus lodged a complaint with the Security Council. Jerusalem's response was forthright: the undertaking did not prejudice the rights of Israel's neighbors, and an independent nation could not be denied the right to pursue its vital water development needs.

When the United Nations declined to take action on the Syrian protest, foreign ministers of eleven Arab governments met in Cairo in December 1963 and there reached agreement on their next step. They would divert those tributaries of the Jordan River—essentially, the Chazbani and the

Lesson 2

Howard Sachar, *A History of Israel, 617-622*

Banias—that arose on the Arab side of the line, and in this fashion prevent their waters from reaching Israeli territory. To that end, in February 1964, Syrian and Lebanese engineering teams began the construction of diversion canals several miles within their own frontiers. They did not get far. Israeli artillery promptly shelled and destroyed their bulldozers. When the operation was resumed in the summer of 1965, it was bombed and strafed by Israeli planes. By then, in any case, the Syrians had completed only about 1 percent of the necessary diversion.

Even more incendiary in Israeli-Syrian relations was the acute state of tension along the demilitarized zones (Chapter xv). Nowhere were Israeli citizens more vulnerable to attack; for along the main DMZ area Syrian gun positions in the Golan Heights dominated the Chula stretch of the frontier. It became virtually impossible for Israeli farmers to secure advance approval from the Mixed Armistice Commission to work the land; the MAC's Syrian representative withheld his consent. Disputes over cultivation rights arose essentially in the southern and central demilitarized zones (see map, p. 448), where the land was approximately half Arab and half Israeli, divided into narrow parallel strips. All efforts to reach a delimitation agreement foundered, and incidents erupted with growing frequency throughout 1962 and 1963. Firing from the Golan ultimately became so persistent that the Israelis used armored tractors as standard equipment. During an especially heavy clash in the Almsagor region, in August 1963, several Israeli drivers were killed. The UNTSO promptly confirmed Syria's guilt. When the Security Council upheld Israel's complaint, however, and endorsed a draft resolution of censure against Syria, the Soviet representative vetoed it. Repeated exchanges of fire in the Almsagor sector caused additional Israeli deaths. The Russian veto blocked all Security Council action.

By then, the confrontation along the Israeli-Syrian frontier was escalating into prolonged artillery duels and even aerial dogfights. Nor was it confined to the DMZ areas. Indeed, the violence no longer could be related simply to territorial claims and counterclaims. Much of it reflected the unique nature of the Syrian Ba'ath regime. The Ba'ath (Renaissance) party had been founded originally in the 1940s by two Syrian intellectuals, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar. Their political ideology was a unique mixture of Leninism and Pan-Arabism, although with increasing emphasis on the latter. Eventually, in 1962, an uprising of army colonels brought the Ba'athists to power in Damascus. The new government's essential achievement henceforth was the militarization of Syrian public life and an intensification of public hostility toward the "imperialist" West and Israel. At first the country's new strong man, Colonel Amin al-Hafez, ruled through the original Ba'ath leadership of Aflaq and Bitar. This group was soon challenged, however, by another army junta led by Colonel Salah Jadid, who in turn demanded a more "Socialist-nationalist" policy on every front—against Israel, the United States, and the West—and closer collaboration with the Soviet Union, China, and the local Communists. The political conflict was by no means limited to ideology, however. It was also a rivalry

between sectarian groups. Hafez was a member of the majority Sunni Moslem population. Jadid belonged to the Alawite Moslem minority. During 1965, a tug-of-war ensued between the two sides. Eventually, in February 1966, a coup brought Colonel Jadid to power; the old leadership was deposed, a number of its members imprisoned, and several executed.

The Jadid regime soon became the most grimly chauvinist in the Middle East. Its diatribes on behalf of the Viet Cong, the Maoists, and the Cuervarists, and against the United States and Israel, were violent and at times psychotic. The truth was that the government enjoyed little popular support, and barely survived two armed revolts in September 1966 and February 1967. Under the circumstances, it was not the strength of the Alawite cabal that frightened outside observers, but rather its vulnerability. For this very weakness was propelling Jadid and his colleagues into a militant stance on the one issue that was universally popular—a war of liberation against Israel.

In its anti-Israel campaign, the Syrian government was determined as well to make active use of the Palestine refugees. Actually, the decision had been made as early as the Arab summit meeting of January 1964, when the Palestinians were formally authorized "to carry out their role in liberating their homeland and determining their destiny." Several months later, an assembly of Palestine Arabs was convened in Hashemite Jerusalem, and from its proceedings emerged the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO goal, baldly stated, was "to attain the objective of liquidating Israel," and for that purpose to establish a "Palestine Liberation Army." To ensure his own tight control, then, over this potentially volatile movement, Nasser placed the Sinai and the Gaza Strip at the PLO's "disposal." The "Liberation Army" thereupon recruited its troops from Palestinians scattered throughout the various Arab countries, although mainly from the Gaza Strip, while its budget was financed by contributions from Arab governments and by a tax levied on the Palestinians themselves. Notwithstanding this ostensible breadth of support, the PLO's elected chairman, Ahmed Shukeiry, a former Acre lawyer, drew his principal backing from the Socialist states of Egypt and Syria and launched a campaign of vilification against the "reactionary" governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. The latter in turn encouraged conspiracies against Shukeiry, and in February 1967 the PLO leader was wounded in an assassination attempt. For the while, as a result, the organization was at least partially immobilized by factional intrigues.

Not so a rival, and even more radical, Palestinian group in Syria, the Fatah (Arab Liberation Movement), organized several years earlier by veterans of the Mufti's former Arab Higher Committee. Disillusioned with the official Arab governments and the windy resolutions on Palestine issued each year by the Arab League, the Fatah leadership spoke in terms of immediate, direct military action to regain the usurped homeland. After 1965, too, the Fatah gravitated increasingly into the orbit of Syria's militant Ba'ath regime. From the DMZ area it began striking occasionally into Israel, and from the Syrian army it received its weapons and a limited

military training. In the wake of the fiasco coup of 1966, moreover, the Damascus government undertook to back a considerably larger scale of Fatah operations. The latter's raids against Israel, particularly in the Almagor DMZ area, became more ambitious. Even as Syrian troops, ensconced on the Golan, shelled and mortared Israeli farm settlements on the Chilia Valley floor, Fatah guerrillas were laying repeated ambushes for Israeli army patrols and inflicting numerous casualties. The Syrian prime minister, Yusuf Zayen, virtually admitted his government's complicity in these attacks, declaring in a broadcast: "We are not the protectors of Israel. We shall never restrain the revolution of the Palestinian people who are seeking to liberate their homeland." The Syrian president, Nureddin al-Atassi, went further, appealing for a "people's war" of resistance, sabotage, and terror. "We want a policy of scorched earth for Palestine," he declared.

Nasser, on the other hand, regarded the mounting campaign of Ba'athist and Fatah violence with a distinct lack of enthusiasm. Not having extricated himself entirely from the Yemeni war, the Egyptian ruler was less than certain of his ability to defeat Israel if he were sucked into a full-scale confrontation. Accordingly, his 1964 defense treaty with Syria was proved a dead letter on April 7, 1967, when an incident on the Israeli-Syrian frontier developed into a major air battle. A flight of Israeli jets penetrated Syrian air space and downed six MiGs before circling freely over Damascus. The Egyptian army did not budge. In an effort, rather, to dampen Syrian militance, Nasser sent his prime minister to Damascus on May 5. The latter issued a stern warning that "our agreement for mutual defense will apply only in the event of a general attack on Syria by Israel. No merely local incident will cause us to intervene."

MOSCOW RIDES THE TIGER

It was the intercession not of Syria, but of the Soviet Union, that forced Nasser's hand. No basic policy change had occurred in the Soviet approach to the Middle East following the Suez-Sinai war. Relations between Moscow and Jerusalem had all but lapsed. The Russians continued to provide unlimited diplomatic support for Egypt's Suez blockade against Israeli ships, for Syrian efforts to divert the headwaters of the Jordan, and for Syrian attacks along the DMZ. Soviet newspaper and radio propaganda was unceasing in its campaign against Israel as an "outpost of American imperialism." Yet the perceptible intensification of Soviet efforts on behalf of the Arabs, and notably on behalf of Egypt and Syria, reflected in part Moscow's acute concern for the demise of Socialist regimes elsewhere. It was in this period, after all, that the downfall of Ben Bella in Algeria was followed by the overthrow of Sukarno in Indonesia and of Nkrumah in Ghana. In the Congo rightist elements had assumed power. In Greece the military regime was stamping out leftist opposition. In Syria unrest was mounting against the Ba'athist government. To the Kremlin it

appeared, then, that Washington was manipulating events behind the scenes. More ominously yet, Communist Chinese representatives were descending upon Arab capitals with offers of weapons, specialists, and economic aid. Caught between these two fires, the Russians envisaged only one solution. It was to continue to outbid all others in support of the Arab "national liberation" movement. No other force offered as likely a vehicle for Soviet penetration into the Middle East.

Nasser was prepared to encourage this Soviet hope. In 1965, when Russia's Marshal Andrei Gretchko visited Cairo, the Egyptian president expressed his warm gratitude for Soviet military and financial help. After earlier periods of strain, the Russians once again had become for Nasser "our true and selfless friends", while the Americans, conversely, were the "bloodsuckers of the people, the arch criminals of the twentieth century, the savage barbarians." In 1966, Nasser and Gretchko signed a new defense agreement. Under its terms, the Russians were extended naval facilities at the Mediterranean ports of Mesa Matruh and Sidi Barrani, at the Red Sea port of Quseir, and at three Red Sea fishing villages. Three airports were placed at the Soviets' disposal. In return, Moscow undertook to increase its shipments of arms and technicians. On May 15, 1966, Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin arrived in Cairo to pledge his government's backing for Egypt's "struggle against imperialism."

That year, too, a series of windfalls appeared likely to transform Russia's cautious infiltration of the Middle East into a galloping conquest. The first was London's announcement that Britain intended to withdraw its military forces from Aden by 1968. Inasmuch as the Egyptians already were ensconced in southern Yemen, the way now appeared open for a Soviet move into the Persian Gulf area following British departure. The second decisive shift occurred in February 1966 when the Jaldid faction of the Ba'ath party seized office in Damascus. Prodded by its Russian benefactors, the new Syrian regime included two Communists in the government, dispatched their younger leaders to Moscow for training in "leadership," and nationalized a great many of the country's larger business enterprises. With Syria evidently in the process of becoming the first Communist state in the Arab world, the Soviets were certain that they had access to a Mediterranean base even more dependable than Egypt. Their technicians immediately began operating Syrian electronic and monitoring equipment, and within half a year transformed this Arab nation into an intelligence clearinghouse and relay center for Soviet military personnel and diplomats on both ends of the Mediterranean—and as far east as the Persian Gulf.

Determined at all costs to preserve their Middle Eastern foothold, the Russians began loosing a tough series of hints to Israel about the "possible consequences" of further military action against Syria. On April 21, 1967, two weeks after the Israeli-Syrian aerial battle, Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik bluntly warned the Israelis that they were endangering "the very fate of their state." It was the most ominous threat since the Sinai Campaign of 1956. Yet there could be little question by then that the

deteriorating border situation was electric with danger. Fatah infiltration raiders were crossing over with greater frequency, each time accompanied by larger numbers of Syrian regular army troops. As early as January 1967, after a particularly violent series of firefights along the DMZ, Prime Minister Eshkol issued an open warning to the Syrians: "I cannot exclude the possibility that we may have no other recourse but deterrent measures." The air action of April 7 seemed an omen of even graver retaliatory moves. In a panic, the Syrians trundled heavy artillery directly into the DMZ, and the Israelis responded with a concentration of their own troops and weapons. On May 11, finally, Jerusalem notified the Security Council that unless Syrian provocations ended, the Israeli government regarded "itself as fully entitled to act in self-defense." At that point, deeply alarmed for the security of their favored Arab protégé, the Russians took their most calamitous misstep since the beginning of their intrusion into the Near East.

NASSER RETURNS TO GAZA AND SHARM ES-SHEIKH

As early as mid-April 1967, Leonid Chuvakhin, the Soviet ambassador in Israel, had complained to Prime Minister Eshkol about "heavy concentrations of Israeli forces on the Syrian border." Eshkol promptly offered to drive Chuvakhin to the border, to enable the Russian to see for himself that his information was false. It was questionable if Chuvakhin seriously believed that the Jews intended to attack Syria's formidable topographical defenses. Anyway, Israel's Independence Day celebrations were in the offing, and this was hardly the time for a large-scale military operation. But to the Soviets the very accusation of Israeli troop movements could fulfill a useful diplomatic purpose. If the Jews subsequently failed to move, their inaction could be attributed to Russian support for the Ba'ath regime—thus reinforcing the pro-Soviet government in Damascus. On May 12, therefore, Dimitri Podyevyev, the Soviet ambassador in Cairo, wired Moscow: "Today we passed on to the Egyptian authorities information concerning the massing of Israeli troops on the northern frontier for a surprise attack on Syria. We have advised the UAR government to take the necessary steps."

Nasser in turn agreed to dispatch a series of military missions to Syria. Upon being taken to the southern frontier line with Israel, however, the Egyptian visitors were less than impressed by the evidence they found of Israeli "concentrations." In his testimony at the "conspiracy" trial in Cairo on February 24, 1968, one of the accused, Shams Badran, the former Egyptian war minister, said: "General Mahmud Fawzi [the Egyptian commander in chief] . . . found these assumptions [of an imminent Israeli attack] without foundation." Nasser's decision to allow the crisis to escalate was based, rather, on other factors. Ironically, one of these was his country's desperate financial plight. In 1966, Washington had informed the Cairo government that American wheat shipments would be

terminated unless Egypt abandoned its quest for long-range missiles and reduced its armed forces. Nasser refused, and American agricultural help promptly ended. So did loans from Western commercial banks and the International Monetary Fund. Egypt was spending more than it earned. Almost immediately, then, food shortages and growing unemployment exacerbated public unrest and threatened Nasser's regime. In earlier years these factors might have inhibited a policy of adventurism. Now they seemed to offer an inducement for a diversion against Israel. Moreover, Nasser was being systematically taunted by the Hashemite and Saudi governments for his "cowardice" in reducing border friction with Israel, and in tolerating United Nations forces on his soil. Somehow the wind had to be taken out of his rivals' sails. Not least of all, the Egyptian ruler appreciated the extent of his economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union. If the Russians asked him to make a gesture to shore up the Ba'athist cabal in Syria, he could hardly ignore their request.

The question related simply to the form a military gesture would take. During their visits in April and May of 1967, the Egyptian military missions were shocked by the condition of the Syrian army, the low caliber of its officers. The disarray should not have been surprising, actually, for each of the numerous Syrian revolutions had liquidated a full echelon of commanders. Yet an attempt now to dispatch forces to Syrian soil would take far too long. Nasser decided instead to concentrate the bulk of his army in the Sinai Peninsula, a move that would relieve any potential Israeli threat against Syria, gratify the Russians, nonplus the Americans, and perhaps once and for all disarm his Arab critics. On May 15, therefore, Cairo announced a state of military emergency and sent two armorclad divisions moving ostentatiously through the boulevards of Cairo, and then crossing over the Suez into Sinai. May 15, by no coincidence, was Israel's Independence Day, and major units of the Israeli army were parading through Jerusalem. Indeed, news of the Egyptian deployment was brought to Israel's commander in chief, Lieutenant General Yitzchak Rabin, at the very moment he was reviewing his own troops along the Jerusalem route of march. Although Rabin immediately ordered a tank brigade dispatched toward the Gaza Strip, he regarded the Egyptian maneuver as essentially bluff. The Israeli government, meanwhile, took pains to assure the Great Powers that its reaction was entirely defensive. But at the same time, it asked Washington and Moscow to persuade the Egyptian dictator to rescind his troop concentrations.

Then, on the night of May 16, Nasser suddenly gave orders for the 3,400-man UNEF force near Gaza to redeploy in encampments within the Strip itself. Learning of this Egyptian demand, U Thant, the Burmese secretary-general of the United Nations, called an urgent meeting with his deputy, Ralph Bunche, and with the Egyptian delegate at the world body, Muhammad Awad al-Kony. At Bunche's suggestion, the secretary-general informed al-Kony that the United Nations would accept no "half measures"; either the UNEF accomplished its mission without reservation, or it would be withdrawn altogether from Egypt. The two United Nations

Lesson 2

Gamal Abdel Nasser, on Zionism and Israel

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser: On Zionism and Israel (1960–1963)

The following excerpts are from Nasser's "The Philosophy of the Revolution," and speeches on various occasions between 1960 and 1963. Nasser served as an army officer in the Palestine War of 1948. The liberation of Palestine has been one of the chief planks of his political program, but there have been conflicting statements as to whether there was a definitive plan for the liberation. On several occasions, he announced that his army would soon be ready to enter Palestine on "a carpet of blood," on others that the time was not ripe yet.

As far as I am concerned I remember that the first elements of Arab consciousness began to filter into my mind as a student in secondary schools, wherefrom I went out with my fellow schoolboys on strike on December 2nd of every year as a protest against the Balfour Declaration whereby England gave the Jews a national home usurped unjustly from its legal owners.

When I asked myself at that time why I left my school enthusiastically and why I was angry for this land which I never saw I could not find an answer except the echoes of sentiment. Later a form of comprehension of this subject began when I was a cadet in the Military College studying the Palestine campaigns in particular and the history and conditions of this region in general which rendered it, throughout the last century, an easy prey ravaged by the claws of a pack of hungry beasts.

My comprehension began to be clearer as the foundation of its facts stood out when I began to study, as a student in the Staff College, the Palestine campaign and the problems of the Mediterranean in greater detail.

And when the Palestine crisis loomed on the horizon I was firmly convinced that the fighting in Palestine was not fighting on foreign territory. Nor was it inspired by sentiment. It was a duty imposed by self-defense.

Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Aleppo (February 17, 1960)

Yesterday, the elderly Foreign Minister of Israel threatened the U.A.R. and said that Israel would not tolerate the ban on Israeli ships transiting the Suez Canal.

I would like to tell her and her master, Ben Gurion, as well as the Israeli people, that Israeli ships and cargoes will not, under any circumstances, transit the Canal.

Once these cargoes arrive in Port-Said or in any other port in the U.A.R. they become the property of the people of Palestine against whom Zionism and imperialism have conspired.

Eleven years after this tragedy, the people of Palestine have not changed. They, and we, are working for the restoration of their rights in their homeland. The rights of the people of Palestine are Arab rights above all. We feel it is our sacred duty to regain those rights for the people of Palestine.

By this unity which is binding you and the power of Arab unity and Arab nationalism, we can march along the road of freedom and liberation in order to get back the usurped rights of the Palestine Arabs.

Speech by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at a Mass Rally of the Youth Organisations in Damascus (October 18, 1960)

Now for the Palestinian issue. Wherever I have been in this or the Southern Region I hear the strong call for the liberation of this Arab territory of Palestine, and I would like to tell you, Brethren, that all that we are now doing is just a part of the battle for Palestine. Once we are fully emancipated from the shackles of colonialism and the intrigues of colonialist agents, we shall take a further step forward towards the liberation of Palestine.

When we have brought our armed forces to full strength and made our own armaments we will take another step forward towards the liberation of Palestine, and when we have manufactured jet aircraft and tanks we will embark upon the final stage of this liberation.

Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser on the 11th Anniversary of the Revolution at the Republican Square, Cairo (July 22, 1963)

Work and readiness are the only means to protect the Arab's right in Palestine.

Arab unity is our hope of liberating Palestine and restoring the rights of the people of Palestine.

Arab unity is a sort of preparation, a human and national preparation as well as a preparation with weapons and plans in all fields. It is not enough

to deliver speeches declaring that we would liberate Palestine and liberate it just on paper for political consumption. As I said before, we do not have any defined plan for the liberation of Palestine. I mention this because I find it my duty to say it. But we have a plan to be implemented in case of any Israeli aggression against us or against any Arab country.

In this case, we know well what to do. We have to be prepared. We have a plan for this preparation and for the unification of the Arab world which is the only means to protect the Arab land and safeguard Arab Nationalism.

God be with you and may his peace and mercy be upon you.

*Speech Delivered by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at Alexandria on the
Return of Another Contingent of U.A.R. Troops in Yemen
(August 11, 1963)*

The Armed Forces are getting ready for the restoration of the rights of the Palestine people because the Palestine battle was a smear on the entire Arab nation. No one can forget the shame brought by the battle of 1948. The rights of the Palestine people must be restored. Therefore, we must get ready to face Israel and Zionism as well as Imperialism which stands behind them.

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Lesson 2

“Palestinian Liberation Organization: Draft Constitution”

Palestine Liberation Organization: Draft Constitution (1963)

The charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was prepared under Egyptian auspices following an agreement at the Arab Summit Conference in 1963 by Ahmed Shukairy, a lawyer born in Palestine who represented Saudi Arabia and later Syria in the United Nations and ultimately became President of the PLO. The role of the PLO on the eve of the Arab-Israeli war was later criticized in the Arab capitals and Shukairy forced to resign in December 1967.

1. In accordance with this constitution, an organisation known as “The Palestine Liberation Organization” shall be formed, and shall launch its responsibilities in accordance with the principles of the National Charter and clauses of this constitution.
2. All the Palestinians are natural members in the Liberation Organization exercising their duty in the liberation of their homeland in accordance with their abilities and efficiency.
3. The Palestinian people shall form the larger base for this Organization; and the Organization, after its creation, shall work closely and constantly with the Palestine people for the sake of their organization and mobilization so they may be able to assume their responsibility in the liberation of their country.
4. Until suitable conditions are available for holding free general elections among all the Palestinians and in all the countries in which they reside, the Liberation Organization shall be set up in accordance with the rules set in this constitution.
5. Measures listed in this constitution shall be taken for the convocation of a Palestinian General Assembly in which shall be represented all Palestinian factions, emigrants and residents, including organisations, societies, unions, trade unions and representatives of (Palestinian) public opinions of various ideological trends; this assembly shall be called The National Assembly of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
6. In preparation and facilitation of work of the assembly, the Palestin-

ian representative at the Arab League (i.e., Ahmed Shukairy), shall, after holding consultations with various Palestinian factions, form:

a)—A Preparatory Committee in every Arab country hosting a minimum of 10,000 Palestinians; the mission of each one of these committees is to prepare lists according to which Palestinian candidates in the respective Arab country will be chosen as members of the assembly; these committees shall also prepare studies and proposals which may help the assembly carry out its work; these studies and proposals shall be presented to the Coordination Committee listed below.

b)—A Coordination Committee, with headquarters in Jerusalem; the mission of this committee shall be to issue invitations to the assembly, adopt all necessary measures for the holding of the assembly, and coordinate all proposals and studies as well as lists of candidates to the assembly, as specified in the clause above; also the committee shall prepare a provisional agenda—or as a whole, undertake all that is required for the holding and success of the assembly in the execution of its mission.

7. The National Assembly shall be held once every two years; its venue rotates between Jerusalem and Gaza; the National Assembly shall meet for the first time on May 14, 1964, in the city of Jerusalem.

8. To facilitate its work, the Assembly shall form the following committees:

a)—The Political Committee: shall be in charge of studying the political sides of the Palestine question in the Arab and international fields.

b)—The Charter By-laws and Lists Committee: shall consider the National Charter as well as the various by-laws and lists required by the Organization in the execution of its duties.

c)—The Financial Committee: shall formulate a complete plan for the National Palestinian Fund required for financing the Organization.

d)—Information Committee: shall work out a complete scheme for information and offices to be established in various parts of the world.

e)—The Juridical Committee: shall study the various legal aspects of the Palestine question, be it in relation to principles of International Law, U.N. Charter, or international documents pertaining to the Palestine question.

f)—Proposals and Nomination Committee: shall coordinate proposals and nominations submitted to the Assembly.

g)—Awakening Committee: shall study ways and means for the upbringing of the new generations both ideologically and spiritually so they may serve their country and work for the liberation of their homeland.

h)—The National Organization Committee: shall lay down general plans pertaining to trade unions, federations, sports organisations and scouts groups; this is in accordance with rules and laws in effect in Arab countries.

9. The National Assembly shall have a Presidency Office composed of the president, two vice presidents, a secretary, and a secretary general; these officers shall be elected by the National Assembly when it meets.

10. These (above-listed eight committees) shall submit their reports and recommendations to the National Assembly which, in turn, shall discuss them and issue the necessary resolutions.

11. The National Assembly shall have an executive apparatus to be called "The Executive Committee of the Liberation Organisation" which shall practice all responsibilities of the Liberation Organisation in accordance with the general plans and resolutions issued by the National Assembly.

12. The Executive Committee shall be formed of fifteen members elected by the National Assembly; the Committee shall in its turn elect a president, two vice presidents and a secretary general.

13. The Executive Committee can be called to a meeting in the time and place decided by the president, or by a proposal submitted by five members of the Committee.

14. The president of the Executive Committee shall represent the Palestinians at the Arab League; therefore, his office shall be in Cairo since the Arab League Headquarters is there.

15. The Executive Committee shall establish the following departments:

a)—Department of Political and Information Affairs.

b)—Department of the National Fund.

c)—Department of General Affairs.

Each one of these departments shall have a director general and the needed number of employees. Duties of each one of these departments shall be defined by special by-laws prepared by the Executive Committee.

16. The Executive Committee has the right of calling the National Assembly to meet in a place and time it specifies; it has the right also to call to a meeting any committee of the National Assembly to study certain subjects.

17. The Executive Committee shall have a consultative council to be known as "The Shura (Consultative) Council"; the Executive Committee shall select the president and members of this council from people of opinion and prestige among the Palestinians; prerogatives of the Consultative Council are in matters proposed to it by the Executive Committee.

18. The Arab states shall avail the sons of Palestine the opportunity of enlisting in their regular armies on the widest scale possible.

19. Private Palestinian contingents shall be formed in accordance with the military needs and plans decided by the Unified Arab Military Command in agreement and cooperation with the concerned Arab states.

20. A Fund, to be known as "The National Palestinian Fund," shall be established to finance operations of the Executive Committee: the Fund shall have a Board of Directors whose members shall be elected by the National Assembly.

21. Sources of the Fund are to be from:

a)—Fixed taxes levied on Palestinians and collected in accordance with special laws.

b)—Financial assistance offered by the Arab governments and people.

c)—A "Liberation Stamp" to be issued by the Arab states and be used in postal and other transactions.

d)—Donations on national occasions.


e)—Loans and assistance given by the Arabs or by friendly nations.

22. Committees, to be known as "Support Palestine Committees," shall be established in Arab and friendly countries to collect donations and to support the Liberation Organization.


23. The Executive Committee shall have the right to issue by-laws for fulfillment of provisions of this constitution.

24. This draft constitution shall be submitted to the National Assembly for consideration; what is ratified of it cannot be changed except by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly.

Lesson 2
Map of Israel (1967 Borders)



Lesson 2
Map of Israel (1967 Borders and Defense Perimeter)



Lesson 3

Bill Clinton, "Summarizing his Experience with the Peace Process"

U.S. President Bill Clinton: Summarizing His Experience • 573

UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and international law. In view of the tremendous human cost caused by each delay in negotiation, we recognize the need to resolve this conflict as soon as possible. We cannot, however, accept a proposal that secures neither the establishment of a viable Palestinian state nor the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes.

U.S. President Bill Clinton: Summarizing His Experience with the Peace Process (January 7, 2001)*

Prime Minister Barak . . . came to office with absolute conviction that in the end, Israel could not be secure unless a just and lasting peace could be reached with its neighbors, beginning with the Palestinians. That if that turned out not to be possible, then the next best thing was to be as strong as possible and as effective in the use of that strength.

But his knowledge of war has fed a passion for peace. And his understanding of the changing technology of war has made him more passionate, not because he thinks the existence of Israel is less secure—if anything, it's more secure—but because the sophisticated weapons available to terrorists today mean even though they still lose, they can exact a higher price along the way. . . .

But no dilemma I have ever faced approximates in difficulty or comes close to the choice that Prime Minister Barak had to make when he took office. He realized that he couldn't know for sure what the final intentions of the Palestinian leadership were without testing them. He further realized that even if the intentions were there, there was a lot of competition among the Palestinians and from outside forces, from people who are enemies of peace because they don't give a rip how the ordinary Palestinians have to live and they're pursuing a whole different agenda.

He knew nine things could go wrong and only one thing could go right. But he promised himself that he would have to try. And as long as he knew Israel in the end could defend itself and maintain its security, he would keep taking risks. And that's what he's done, down to these days. There may be those who disagree with him, but he has demonstrated as much bravery in the office of Prime Minister as he ever did on the field of battle and no one should ever question that. . . .

All the dreams we had in 1993 that were revived when we had the peace with Jordan, revived again when we had the Wye River accords—

*Speech at the Israel Policy Forum in New York.

that was, I think, the most interesting peace talks I was ever involved in. My strategy was the same used to break prisoners of war, I just didn't let anybody sleep for nine days and, finally, out of exhaustion, we made a deal—just so people could go home and go to bed. I've been looking for an opportunity to employ it again, ever since.

There have been a lot of positive things, and I think it's worth remembering that there have been positive developments along the way. But this is heartbreaking, what we've been through these last few months, for all of you who have believed for eight years in the Oslo process; all of you whose hearts soared on September 19, 1993, when Yasir Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin signed that agreement.

For over three months we have lived through a tragic cycle of violence that has cost hundreds of lives. It has shattered the confidence in the peace process. It has raised questions in some people's minds about whether Palestinians and Israelis could ever really live and work together, support each other's peace and prosperity and security. It's been a heartbreaking time for me, too. But we have done our best to work with the parties to restore calm, to end the bloodshed and to get back to working on an agreement to address the underlying causes that continuously erupt in conflicts. . . .

From my first day as president, we have worked to advance interests in the Middle East that are long standing and historically bipartisan. . . . Along the way since 1993, through the positive agreements that have been reached between those two sides, through the peace between Israel and Jordan, through last summer's withdrawal from Lebanon in which Israel fulfilled its part of implementing UN Security Council resolution 425—along this way we have learned some important lessons, not only because of the benchmarks of progress, because of the occasional eruption of terrorism, bombing, death and then these months of conflict. I think these lessons have to guide any effort, now or in the future, to reach a comprehensive peace. Here's what I think they are. Most of you probably believed in them, up to the last three months. I still do. First, the Arab-Israeli conflict is not just a morality play between good and evil. It is a conflict with a complex history, whose resolution requires balancing the needs of both sides, including respect for their national identities and religious beliefs.

Second, there is no place for violence, and no military solution to this conflict. The only path to a just and durable resolution is through negotiation. Third, there will be no lasting peace or regional stability without a strong and secure Israel, secure enough to make peace, strong enough to deter the adversaries which will still be there, even if a peace is made in complete good faith. And clearly that is why the United States must maintain its commitment to preserving Israel's qualitative edge in military superiority.

Fourth, talks must be accompanied by acts—acts which show trust and

partnership. For goodwill at the negotiating table cannot survive forever ill intent on the ground. And it is important that each side understands how the other reads actions.

For example, on the one hand, the tolerance of violence and incitement of hatred in classrooms and the media in the Palestinian communities, or on the other hand, humiliating treatment on the streets or at checkpoints by Israelis are real obstacles to even getting people to talk about building a genuine peace.

Fifth, in the resolution of remaining differences, whether they come today or after several years of heartbreak and bloodshed, the fundamental, painful, but necessary choices will almost certainly remain the same whenever the decision is made. The parties will face the same history, the same geography, the same neighbors, the same passions, the same hatreds. This is not a problem time will take care of. . . . because there are all these independent actors . . . independent of the Palestinian Authority and not under the direct control of any international legal body—who don't want this peace to work. So that even if we can get an agreement, and the Palestinian Authority works as hard as they can, and the Israelis works as hard as they can, we're all going to have to pitch in, send in an international force like we did in the Sinai, and hang tough, because there are enemies of peace out there, number one.

Number two, because the enemies of peace know they can drive the Israelis to close the borders if they can blow up enough bombs. They do it periodically to make sure that the Palestinians in the street cannot enjoy the benefits of peace that have come to the people in Northern Ireland. So as long as they can keep the people miserable, and they can keep the fundamental decisions from being made, they still have a hope, the enemies of peace, of derailing the whole thing. . . .

The fundamental realities are not going to be changed by delays. . . . We can wait until [a whole generation] and we've got a whole lot more bodies and a lot more funerals, a lot more crying and a lot more hatred, and I'll swear the decisions will still be the same ones that will have to be made today. . . .

I'm a little concerned that we could draw the wrong lessons from this tragic, still relatively brief, chapter in the history of the Middle East. The violence does not demonstrate that the quest for peace has gone too far or too fast. It demonstrates what happens when you've got a problem that is profoundly difficult and you never quite get to the end, so there is no settlement, no resolution, anxiety prevailed, and at least some people never get any concrete benefits out of it.

And I believe that the last few months demonstrate the futility of force or terrorism as an ultimate solution. . . . I believe that the violence confirms the need to do more to prepare both publics for the requirements of peace, not to condition people for the so-called glory of further conflict.

Now, what are we going to do now? The first priority, obviously, has got to be to drastically reduce the current cycle of violence. But beyond that, on the Palestinian side, there must be an end to the culture of violence and the culture of incitement that, since Oslo, has not gone unchecked. Young children still are being educated to believe in confrontation with Israel, and multiple militia-like groups carry and use weapons with impunity. Voices of reason in that kind of environment will be drowned out too often by voices of revenge.

Such conduct is inconsistent with the Palestinian leadership's commitment to Oslo's nonviolent path to peace and its persistence sends the wrong message to the Israeli people, and makes it much more difficult for them to support their leaders in making the compromises necessary to get a lasting agreement.

For their part, the Israeli people also must understand that they're creating a few problems, too; that the settlement enterprise and building bypass roads in the heart of what they already know will one day be part of a Palestinian state is inconsistent with the Oslo commitment that both sides negotiate a compromise.

And restoring confidence requires the Palestinians being able to lead a normal existence, and not be subject to daily, often humiliating reminders that they lack basic freedom and control over their lives.

These, too, make it harder for the Palestinians to believe the commitments made to them will be kept. Can two peoples with this kind of present trouble and troubling history still conclude a genuine and lasting peace? . . . They share such a small piece of land with such a profound history of importance to more than a billion people around the world. So I believe with all my heart not only that they can, but that they must.

At Camp David, I saw Israeli and Palestinian negotiators who knew how many children each other had, who knew how many grandchildren each other had, who knew how they met their spouses, who knew what their family tragedies were, who trusted each other in their word. It was almost shocking to see what could happen and how people still felt on the ground when I saw how their leaders felt about each other and the respect and the confidence they had in each other when they were talking.

The alternative to getting this peace done is being played out before our very eyes. But amidst the agony, I will say again, there are signs of hope. And let me try to put this into what I think is a realistic context.

Camp David was a transformative event, because the two sides faced the core issue of their dispute in a forum that was official for the first time. And they had to debate the tradeoffs required to resolve the issues. Just as Oslo forced Israelis and Palestinians to come to terms with each other's existence, the discussions of the past six months have forced them to come to terms with each other's needs and the contours of a peace that ultimately they will have to reach.

That's why Prime Minister Barak, I think, has demonstrated real courage and vision in moving toward peace in difficult circumstances while trying to find a way to continue to protect Israel's security and vital interests.

So that's a fancy way of saying we know what we have to do and we've got a mess on our hands. So where do we go from here? Given the impasse and the tragic deterioration on the ground, a couple of weeks ago both sides asked me to present my ideas. So I put forward parameters that I wanted to be a guide toward a comprehensive agreement; parameters based on eight years of listening carefully to both sides and hearing them describe with increasing clarity their respective grievances and needs.

Both Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat have now accepted these parameters as the basis for further efforts. . . . The parameters I put forward contemplate a settlement in response to each side's essential needs, if not to their utmost desires. A settlement based on sovereign homelands, security, peace and dignity for both Israelis and Palestinians. These parameters don't begin to answer every question, they just narrow the questions that have to be answered.

Here they are. First, I think there can be no genuine resolution to the conflict without a sovereign, viable, Palestinian state that accommodates Israeli's security requirements and the demographic realities. That suggests Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza, the vast majority of the West Bank, the incorporation into Israel of settlement blocks, with the goal of maximizing the number of settlers in Israel while minimizing the land annex for Palestine to be viable must be a geographically contiguous state.

Now, the land annexed into Israel into settlement blocks should include as few Palestinians as possible, consistent with the logic of two separate homelands. And to make the agreement durable, I think there will have to be some territorial swaps and other arrangements.

Second, a solution will have to be found for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered a great deal—particularly some of them. A solution that allows them to return to a Palestinian state that will provide all Palestinians with a place they can safely and proudly call home. All Palestinian refugees who wish to live in this homeland should have the right to do so. All others who want to find new homes, whether in their current locations or in third countries, should be able to do so, consistent with those countries' sovereign decisions. And that includes Israel.

All refugees should receive compensation from the international community for their losses, and assistance in building new lives.

Now, you all know what the rub is. That was a lot of artful language for saying that you cannot expect Israel to acknowledge an unlimited right of return to present day Israel, and at the same time, to give up Gaza and the West Bank and have the settlement blocks as compact as possible, because of where a lot of these refugees came from. We cannot expect Israel to make a

decision that would threaten the very foundations of the state of Israel, and would undermine the whole logic of peace. And it shouldn't be done.

But I have made it very clear that the refugees will be a high priority, and that the United States will take a lead in raising the money necessary to relocate them in the most appropriate manner. . . . But there cannot be an unlimited language in an agreement that would undermine the very foundations of the Israeli state or the whole reason for creating the Palestinian state. So that's what we're working on.

Third, there will be no peace, and no peace agreement, unless the Israeli people have lasting security guarantees. These need not and should not come at the expense of Palestinian sovereignty, or interfere with Palestinian territorial integrity. So my parameters rely on an international presence in Palestine to provide border security along the Jordan Valley and to monitor implementation of the final agreement. They rely on a non-militarized Palestine, a phased Israeli withdrawal, to address Israeli security needs in the Jordan Valley, and other essential arrangements to ensure Israel's ability to defend itself.

Fourth, I come to the issue of Jerusalem, perhaps the most emotional and sensitive of all. It is a historic, cultural and political center for both Israelis and Palestinians, a unique city sacred to all three monotheistic religions. And I believe the parameters I have established flow from four fair and logical propositions.

First, Jerusalem should be an open and undivided city, with assured freedom of access and worship for all. It should encompass the internationally recognized capitals of two states, Israel and Palestine. Second, what is Arab should be Palestinian, for why would Israel want to govern in perpetuity the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians? Third, what is Jewish should be Israeli. That would give rise to a Jewish Jerusalem, larger and more vibrant than any in history. Fourth, what is holy to both requires a special care to meet the needs of all. I was glad to hear what the Speaker said about that. No peace agreement will last if not premised on mutual respect for the religious beliefs and holy shrines of Jews, Muslims and Christians.

I have offered formulations on the Haram Ash-Shareef, and the area holy to the Jewish people, an area which for 2,000 years, as I said at Camp David, has been the focus of Jewish yearning, that I believed fairly addressed the concerns of both sides.

Fifth and, finally, any agreement will have to mark the decision to end the conflict, for neither side can afford to make these painful compromises, only to be subjected to further demands. They are both entitled to know that if they take the last drop of blood out of each other's turnip, that's it. It really will have to be the end of the struggle that has pitted Palestinians and Israelis against one another for too long. And the end of the conflict must manifest itself with concrete acts that demonstrate a new attitude and

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a new approach by Palestinians and Israelis toward each other, and by other states in the region toward Israel, and by the entire region toward Palestine, to help it get off to a good start.

The parties' experience with interim accords has not always been happy—too many deadlines missed, too many commitments unfulfilled on both sides. So for this to signify a real end of the conflict, there must be effective mechanisms to provide guarantees of implementation. . . .

Now, I still think the benefits of the agreement, based on these parameters, far outweigh the burdens. For the people of Israel, they are an end to conflict, secure and defensible borders, the incorporation of most of the settlers into Israel, and the Jewish capital of Jerusalem, recognized by all, not just the United States, by everybody in the world. It's a big deal, and it needs to be done.

For the Palestinian people, it means the freedom to determine their own future on their own land, a new life for the refugees, an independent and sovereign state with al-Quds as its capital, recognized by all. And for America, it means that we could have new flags flying over new embassies in both these capitals. . . .

Let me say those who believe that my ideas can be altered to one party's exclusive benefit are mistaken. I think to press for more will produce less. There can be no peace without compromise. . . . I have said what I have out of a profound lifetime commitment to and love for the state of Israel, out of a conviction that the Palestinian people have been ignored or used as political footballs by others for long enough, and they ought to have a chance to make their own life with dignity. And out of a belief that in the homeland of the world's three great religions that believe we are all the creatures of one God, we ought to be able to prove that one person's win is not, by definition, another's loss; that one person's dignity is not, by definition, another's humiliation; that one person's work of God is not, by definition, another's heresy. There has to be a way for us to find a truth we can share. There has to be a way for us to reach those young Palestinian kids who . . . don't imagine a future in which they would ever put on clothes like this and sit at a dinner like this.

There has to be a way for us to say to them, struggle and pain and destruction and self-destruction are way overrated, and not the only option. There has to be a way for us to reach those people in Israel who have paid such a high price and believe, frankly, that people who embrace the ideas I just outlined are nuts, because Israel is a little country and this agreement would make it smaller; to understand that the world in which we live and the technology of modern weaponry no longer make defense primarily a matter of geography and of politics and the human feeling and the interdependence and the cooperation and the shared values and the shared interests are more important and worth the considered risk, especially if the United States remains committed to the military capacity of the state of Israel.

So I say to the Palestinians: there will always be those who are sitting outside . . . urging you to hold out for more, or to plant one more bomb. But all the people who do that, they're not the refugees languishing in those camps—you are. They're not the ones with children growing up in poverty whose income is lower today than it was the day we had the signing on the White House Lawn in 1993—you are.

All the people that are saying to the Palestinian people: Stay on the path of no, are people that have a vested interest in the failure of the peace process that has nothing to do with how those kids in Gaza and the West Bank are going to grow up and live and raise their own children.

To the citizens of Israel who have returned to an ancient homeland after 2,000 years, whose hopes and dreams almost vanished in the Holocaust, who have hardly had one day of peace and quiet since the state of Israel was created, I understand, I believe, something of the disillusionment, the anger, the frustration that so many feel when, just at the moment peace seemed within reach, all this violence broke out and raised the question of whether it is ever possible.

The fact is that the people of Israel dreamed of a homeland. The dream came through; but when they came home, the land was not all vacant. Your land is also their land, it is the homeland of two people. And, therefore, there is no choice but to create two states and make the best of it.

If it happens today, it will be better than if it happens tomorrow, because fewer people will die. And after it happens, the motives of those who continue the violence will be clearer to all than they are today. . . . New York has its own high-tech corridor called "Silicon Alley." The number one foreign recipient of venture capital from Silicon Alley is Israel. Palestinians who have come to the United States, to Chile, to Canada, to Europe, have done fabulously well—in business, in the sciences, in academia.

If we could ever let a lot of this stuff go and realize that . . . the enemies of peace in the Middle East are overlooking . . . what has happened to the state of Israel since its birth, and how fabulously well the people of Palestinian descent have done everywhere else in the world except in their homeland—where they are in the grip of forces that have not permitted them to reconcile with one another and with the people of Israel—listen, if you guys ever got together, ten years from now we would all wonder what the heck happened for thirty years before.

And the center of energy and creativity and economic power and political influence in the entire region would be with the Israelis and the Palestinians because of their gifts. It could happen. But somebody has got to take the long leap, and they have to be somebodies on both sides. . . .

Lesson 3

Benny Morris, “Camp David and After: An Exchange”

The following interview with Ehud Barak took place in Tel Aviv during late March and early April. I have supplied explanatory references in brackets with Mr. Barak’s approval.

The call from Bill Clinton came hours after the publication in *The New York Times* of Deborah Sontag’s “revisionist” article (“Quest for Middle East Peace: How and Why It Failed,” July 26, 2001) on the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Ehud Barak, Israel’s former prime minister, on vacation, was swimming in a cove in Sardinia. Clinton said (according to Barak):

What the hell is this? Why is she turning the mistakes we [i.e., the US and Israel] made into the essence? The true story of Camp David was that for the first time in the history of the conflict the American president put on the table a proposal, based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, very close to the Palestinian demands, and Arafat refused even to accept it as a basis for negotiations, walked out of the room, and deliberately turned to terrorism. That’s the real story— all the rest is gossip.

Clinton was speaking of the two-week-long July 2000 Camp David conference that he had organized and mediated and its failure, and the eruption at the end of September of the Palestinian intifada, or campaign of anti-Israeli violence, which has continued ever since and which currently plagues the Middle East, with no end in sight. Midway in the conference, apparently on July 18, Clinton had “slowly”—to avoid misunderstanding—read out to Arafat a document, endorsed in advance by Barak, outlining the main points of a future settlement. The proposals included the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state on some 92 percent of the West Bank and 100 percent of the Gaza Strip, with some territorial compensation for the Palestinians from pre-1967 Israeli territory; the dismantling of most of the settlements and the concentration of the bulk of the settlers inside the 8 percent of the West Bank to be annexed by Israel; the establishment of the Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, in which some Arab neighborhoods would become sovereign Palestinian territory and others would enjoy “functional autonomy”; Palestinian sovereignty over half the Old City of Jerusalem (the Muslim and Christian quarters) and “custodianship,” though not sovereignty, over the Temple Mount; a return of refugees to the prospective Palestinian state though with no “right of return” to Israel proper; and the organization by the international community of a massive aid program to facilitate the refugees’ rehabilitation.

Arafat said “No.” Clinton, enraged, banged on the table and said: “You are leading your people and the region to a catastrophe.” A formal Palestinian rejection of the proposals reached the Americans the next day. The summit sputtered on for a few days more but to all intents and purposes it was over.

Barak today portrays Arafat’s behavior at Camp David as a “performance” geared to exacting from the Israelis as many concessions as possible without ever seriously intending to reach a peace settlement or sign an “end to the conflict.” “He did not negotiate in good faith, indeed, he did not negotiate at all. He just kept saying ‘no’ to every offer, never making any

counterproposals of his own,” he says. Barak continuously shifts between charging Arafat with “lacking the character or will” to make a historic compromise (as did the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1977–1979, when he made peace with Israel) and accusing him of secretly planning Israel’s demise while he strings along a succession of Israeli and Western leaders and, on the way, hoodwinks “naive journalists”—in Barak’s phrase—like Sontag and officials such as former US National Security Council expert Robert Malley (who, with Hussein Agha, published another “revisionist” article on Camp David, “Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors”⁴). According to Barak:

What they [Arafat and his colleagues] want is a Palestinian state in all of Palestine. What we see as self-evident, [the need for] two states for two peoples, they reject. Israel is too strong at the moment to defeat, so they formally recognize it. But their game plan is to establish a Palestinian state while always leaving an opening for further “legitimate” demands down the road. For now, they are willing to agree to a temporary truce à la Hudnat Hudaybiyah [a temporary truce that the Prophet Muhammad concluded with the leaders of Mecca during 628–629, which he subsequently unilaterally violated]. They will exploit the tolerance and democracy of Israel first to turn it into “a state for all its citizens,” as demanded by the extreme nationalist wing of Israel’s Arabs and extremist left-wing Jewish Israelis. Then they will push for a binational state and then, demography and attrition will lead to a state with a Muslim majority and a Jewish minority. This would not necessarily involve kicking out all the Jews. But it would mean the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state. This, I believe, is their vision. They may not talk about it often, openly, but this is their vision. Arafat sees himself as a reborn Saladin—the Kurdish Muslim general who defeated the Crusaders in the twelfth century—and Israel as just another, ephemeral Crusader state.

Barak believes that Arafat sees the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and their descendants, numbering close to four million, as the main demographic-political tool for subverting the Jewish state.

Arafat, says Barak, believes that Israel “has no right to exist, and he seeks its demise.” Barak buttresses this by arguing that Arafat “does not recognize the existence of a Jewish people or nation, only a Jewish religion, because it is mentioned in the Koran and because he remembers seeing, as a kid, Jews praying at the Wailing Wall.” This, Barak believes, underlay Arafat’s insistence at Camp David (and since) that the Palestinians have sole sovereignty over the Temple Mount compound (Haram al-Sharif—the noble sanctuary) in the southeastern corner of Jerusalem’s Old City. Arafat denies that any Jewish temple has ever stood there—and this is a microcosm of his denial of the Jews’ historical connection and claim to the Land of Israel/Palestine. Hence, in December 2000, Arafat refused to accept even the vague formulation proposed by Clinton positing Israeli sovereignty over the earth beneath the Temple Mount’s surface area.

Barak recalls Clinton telling him that during the Camp David talks he had attended Sunday services and the minister had preached a sermon mentioning Solomon, the king who built the First Temple. Later that evening, he had met Arafat and spoke of the sermon. Arafat had said: “There is nothing there [i.e., no trace of a temple on the Temple Mount].” Clinton responded that “not only the Jews but I, too, believe that under the surface there are remains of Solomon’s

temple.” (At this point one of Clinton’s [Jewish] aides whispered to the President that he should tell Arafat that this is his personal opinion, not an official American position.)

Repeatedly during our prolonged interview, conducted in his office in a Tel Aviv skyscraper, Barak shook his head—in bewilderment and sadness—at what he regards as Palestinian, and especially Arafat’s, mendacity:

They are products of a culture in which to tell a lie...creates no dissonance. They don’t suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judeo-Christian culture. Truth is seen as an irrelevant category. There is only that which serves your purpose and that which doesn’t. They see themselves as emissaries of a national movement for whom everything is permissible. There is no such thing as “the truth.”

Speaking of Arab society, Barak recalls: “The deputy director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation once told me that there are societies in which lie detector tests don’t work, societies in which lies do not create cognitive dissonance [on which the tests are based].” Barak gives an example: back in October 2000, shortly after the start of the current Intifada, he met with then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Arafat in the residence of the US ambassador in Paris. Albright was trying to broker a cease-fire. Arafat had agreed to call a number of his police commanders in the West Bank and Gaza, including Tawfik Tirawi, to implement a truce. Barak said:

I interjected: “But these are not the people organizing the violence. If you are serious [in seeking a cease-fire], then call Marwan Bargouti and Hussein al-Sheikh” [the West Bank heads of the Fatah, Arafat’s own political party, who were orchestrating the violence. Bargouti has since been arrested by Israeli troops and is currently awaiting trial for launching dozens of terrorist attacks].

Arafat looked at me, with an expression of blank innocence, as if I had mentioned the names of two polar bears, and said: “Who? Who?” So I repeated the names, this time with a pronounced, clear Arabic inflection—”Mar-wan Bar-gou-ti” and “Hsein a Sheikh”—and Arafat again said, “Who? Who?” At this, some of his aides couldn’t stop themselves and burst out laughing. And Arafat, forced to drop the pretense, agreed to call them later. [Of course, nothing happened and the shooting continued.]

But Barak is far from dismissive of Arafat, who appears to many Israelis to be a sick, slightly doddering buffoon and, at the same time, sly and murderous. Barak sees him as “a great actor, very sharp, very elusive, slippery.” He cautions that Arafat “uses his broken English” to excellent effect.

Barak was elected prime minister, following three years of Benjamin Netanyahu’s premiership, in May 1999 and took office in July. He immediately embarked on his multipronged peace effort—vis-à-vis Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians—feeling that Israel and the Middle East were headed for “an iceberg and a certain crash and that it was the leaders’ moral and political responsibility to try to avoid a catastrophe.” He understood that the year and a half left of Clinton’s presidency afforded a small window of opportunity inside a larger, but also limited, regional window of opportunity. That window was opened by the collapse of the Soviet Empire,

which had since the 1950s supported the Arabs against Israel, and the defeat of Iraq in Kuwait in 1991, and would close when and if Iran and/or Iraq obtained nuclear weapons and when and if Islamic fundamentalist movements took over states bordering Israel.

Barak said he wanted to complete what Rabin had begun with the Oslo agreement, which inaugurated mutual Israeli–Palestinian recognition and partial Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank and Gaza Strip back in 1993. A formal peace agreement, he felt, would not necessarily “end the conflict, that will take education over generations, but there is a tremendous value to an [official] framework of peace that places pacific handcuffs on these societies.” Formal peace treaties, backed by the international community, will have “a dynamic of their own, reducing the possibility of an existential conflict. But without such movement toward formal peace, we are headed for the iceberg.” He seems to mean something far worse than the current low-level Israeli–Palestinian conflagration.

Barak says that, before July 2000, IDF intelligence gave the Camp David talks less than a 50 percent chance of success. The intelligence chiefs were doubtful that Arafat “would take the decisions necessary to reach a peace agreement.” His own feeling at the time was that he “hoped Arafat would rise to the occasion and display something of greatness, like Sadat and Hussein, at the moment of truth. They did not wait for a consensus [among their people], they decided to lead. I told Clinton on the first day [of the summit] that I didn’t know whether Arafat had come to make a deal or just to extract as many political concessions as possible before he, Clinton, left office.”

Barak dismisses the charges leveled by the Camp David “revisionists” as Palestinian propaganda. The visit to the Temple Mount by then Likud leader Ariel Sharon in September 2000 was not what caused the intifada, he says.

Sharon’s visit, which was coordinated with [Palestinian Authority West Bank security chief] Jibril Rajoub, was directed against me, not the Palestinians, to show that the Likud cared more about Jerusalem than I did. We know, from hard intelligence, that Arafat [after Camp David] intended to unleash a violent confrontation, terrorism. [Sharon’s visit and the riots that followed] fell into his hands like an excellent excuse, a pretext.

As agreed, Sharon had made no statement and had refrained from entering the Islamic shrines in the compound in the course of the visit. But rioting broke out nonetheless. The intifada, says Barak, “was preplanned, pre-prepared. I don’t mean that Arafat knew that on a certain day in September [it would be unleashed].... It wasn’t accurate, like computer engineering. But it was definitely on the level of planning, of a grand plan.”

Nor does Barak believe that the IDF’s precipitate withdrawal from the Security Zone in Southern Lebanon, in May 2000, set off the intifada. “When I took office [in July 1999] I promised to pull out within a year. And that is what I did.” Without doubt, the Palestinians drew inspiration and heart from the Hezbollah’s successful guerrilla campaign during 1985–2000, which in the end drove out the IDF, as well as from the spectacle of the sometime slapdash, chaotic pullout at the end of May; they said as much during the first months of the intifada. “But had we not withdrawn when we did, the situation would have been much worse,” Barak argues:

We would have faced a simultaneous struggle on two fronts, in Palestine and in southern Lebanon, and the Hezbollah would have enjoyed international legitimacy in their struggle against a foreign occupier.

The lack of international legitimacy, Barak stresses, following the Israeli pullback to the international frontier, is what has curtailed the Hezbollah's attacks against Israel during the past weeks. "Had we still been in Leb-anon we would have had to mobilize 100,000, not 30,000, reserve soldiers [in April, during 'Operation Defensive Wall']," he adds. But he is aware that the sporadic Hezbollah attacks might yet escalate into a full-scale Israeli–Lebanese–Syrian confrontation, something the pullback had been designed—and so touted—to avoid.

As to the charge raised by the Palestinians, and, in their wake, by Deborah Sontag, and Malley and Agha, that the Palestinians had been dragooned into coming to Camp David "unprepared" and prematurely, Barak is dismissive to the point of contempt. He observes that the Palestinians had had eight years, since 1993, to prepare their positions and fall-back positions, demands and red lines, and a full year since he had been elected to office and made clear his intention to go for a final settlement. By 2002, he said, they were eager to establish a state,

which is what I and Clinton proposed and offered. And before the summit, there were months of discussions and contacts, in Stockholm, Israel, the Gaza Strip. Would they really have been more "prepared" had the summit been deferred to August, as Arafat later said he had wanted?

One senses that Barak feels on less firm ground when he responds to the "revisionist" charge that it was the continued Israeli settlement in the Occupied Territories, during the year before Camp David and under his premiership, that had so stirred Palestinian passions as to make the intifada inevitable:

Look, during my premiership we established no new settlements and, in fact, dismantled many illegal, unauthorized ones. Immediately after I took office I promised Arafat: No new settlements—but I also told him that we would continue to honor the previous government's commitments, and contracts in the pipeline, concerning the expansion of existing settlements. The courts would force us to honor existing contracts, I said. But I also offered a substantive argument. I want to reach peace during the next sixteen months. What was now being built would either remain within territory that you, the Palestinians, agree should remain ours—and therefore it shouldn't matter to you—or would be in territory that would soon come under Palestinian sovereignty, and therefore would add to the housing available for returning refugees. So you can't lose.

But Barak concedes that while this sounded logical, there was a psychological dimension here that could not be neutralized by argument: the Palestinians simply saw, on a daily basis, that more and more of "their" land was being plundered and becoming "Israeli." And he agrees that he allowed the expansion of existing settlements in part to mollify the Israeli right, which he needed quiescent as he pushed forward toward peace and, ultimately, a withdrawal from the territories.

Regarding the core of the Israeli-American proposals, the “revisionists” have charged that Israel offered the Palestinians not a continuous state but a collection of “bantustans” or “cantons.” “This is one of the most embarrassing lies to have emerged from Camp David,” says Barak.

I ask myself why is he [Arafat] lying. To put it simply, any proposal that offers 92 percent of the West Bank cannot, almost by definition, break up the territory into noncontiguous cantons. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are separate, but that cannot be helped [in a peace agreement, they would be joined by a bridge].

But in the West Bank, Barak says, the Palestinians were promised a continuous piece of sovereign territory except for a razor-thin Israeli wedge running from Jerusalem through from Maale Adumim to the Jordan River. Here, Palestinian territorial continuity would have been assured by a tunnel or bridge:

The Palestinians said that I [and Clinton] presented our proposals as a diktat, take it or leave it. This is a lie. Everything proposed was open to continued negotiations. They could have raised counter-proposals. But they never did.

Barak explains Arafat’s “lie” about “bantustans” as stemming from his fear that “when reasonable Palestinian citizens would come to know the real content of Clinton’s proposal and map, showing what 92 percent of the West Bank means, they would have said: ‘Mr. Chairman, why didn’t you take it?’”

In one other important way the “revisionist” articles are misleading: they focused on Camp David (July 2000) while almost completely ignoring the follow-up (and more generous) Clinton proposals (endorsed by Israel) of December 2000 and the Palestinian– Israeli talks at Taba in January 2001. The “revisionists,” Barak implies, completely ignored the shift—under the prodding of the intifada—in the Israeli (and American) positions between July and the end of 2000. By December and January, Israel had agreed to Washington’s proposal that it withdraw from about 95 percent of the West Bank with substantial territorial compensation for the Palestinians from Israel proper, and that the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem would become sovereign Palestinian territory. The Israelis also agreed to an international force at least temporarily controlling the Jordan River line between the West Bank and the Kingdom of Jordan instead of the IDF. (But on the refugee issue, which Barak sees as “existential,” Israel had continued to stand firm: “We cannot allow even one refugee back on the basis of the ‘right of return,’” says Barak. “And we cannot accept historical responsibility for the creation of the problem.”)

Had the Palestinians, even at that late date, agreed, there would have been a peace settlement. But Arafat dragged his feet for a fortnight and then responded to the Clinton proposals with a “Yes, but...” that, with its hundreds of objections, reservations, and qualifications, was tantamount to a resounding “No.” Palestinian officials maintain to this day that Arafat said “Yes” to the Clinton proposals of December 23. But Dennis Ross, Clinton’s special envoy to the Middle East, in a recent interview (on Fox News, April 21, 2002), who was present at the Arafat–Clinton White House meeting on January 2, says that Arafat rejected “every single one of the ideas” presented by Clinton, even Israeli sovereignty over the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem’s

Old City. And the “Palestinians would have [had] in the West Bank an area that was contiguous. Those who say there were cantons, [that is] completely untrue.” At Taba, the Palestinians seemed to soften a little—for the first time they even produced a map seemingly conceding 2 percent of the West Bank. But on the refugees they, too, stuck to their guns, insisting on Israeli acceptance of “the right of return” and on Jerusalem, that they have sole sovereignty over the Temple Mount.

Several “revisionists” also took Barak to task for his “Syria first” strategy: soon after assuming office, he tried to make peace with Syria and only later, after Damascus turned him down, did he turn to the Palestinians. This had severely taxed the Palestinians’ goodwill and patience; they felt they were being sidelined. Barak concedes the point, but explains:

I always supported Syria first. Because they have a [large] conventional army and nonconventional weaponry, chemical and biological, and missiles to deliver them. This represents, under certain conditions, an existential threat. And after Syria comes Lebanon [meaning that peace with Syria would immediately engender a peace treaty with Lebanon]. Moreover, the Syrian problem, with all its difficulties, is simpler to solve than the Palestinian problem. And reaching peace with Syria would greatly limit the Palestinians’ ability to widen the conflict. On the other hand, solving the Palestinian problem will not diminish Syria’s ability to existentially threaten Israel.

Barak says that this was also Rabin’s thinking. But he points out that when he took office, he immediately informed Arafat that he intended to pursue an agreement with Syria and that this would in no way be at the Palestinians’ expense. “I arrived on the scene immediately after [Netanyahu’s emissary Ronald] Lauder’s intensive [secret] talks, which looked very interesting. It was a Syrian initiative that looked very close to a breakthrough. It would have been very irresponsible not to investigate this because of some traditional, ritual order.”

The Netanyahu-Lauder initiative, which posited an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights to a line a few kilometers east of the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee, came to naught because two of Netanyahu’s senior ministers, Sharon and Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, objected to the proposed concessions. Barak offered then President Hafiz Assad more, in effect a return to the de facto border of “4 June 1967” along the Jordan River and almost to the shoreline at the northeastern end of the Sea of Galilee. Assad, by then feeble and close to death, rejected the terms, conveying his rejection to President Clinton at the famous meeting in Geneva on March 26, 2000. Barak explains,

Assad wanted Israel to capitulate in advance to all his demands. Only then would he agree to enter into substantive negotiations. I couldn’t agree to this. We must continue to live [in the Middle East] afterward [and, had we made the required concessions, would have been seen as weak, inviting depredation].

But Barak believes that Assad’s effort, involving a major policy switch, to reach a peace settlement with Israel was genuine and sincere.

Barak appears uncomfortable with the “revisionist” charge that his body language toward Arafat had been unfriendly and that he had, almost consistently during Camp David, avoided meeting the Palestinian leader, and that these had contributed to the summit’s failure. Barak:

I am the Israeli leader who met most with Arafat. He visited Rabin’s home only after [the assassinated leader] was buried on Mount Herzl [in Jerusalem]. He [Arafat] visited me in my home in Kochav Yair where my wife made food for him. [Arafat’s aide] Abu Mazen and [my wife] Nava swapped memories about Safad, her mother was from Safad, and both their parents were traders. I also met Arafat in friends’ homes, in Gaza, in Ramallah.

Barak says that they met “almost every day” in Camp David at mealtimes and had one “two-hour meeting” in Arafat’s cottage. He admits that the time had been wasted on small talk—but, in the end, he argues, this is all part of the “gossip,” not the real reason for the failure. “Did Nixon meet Ho Chi Minh or Giap [before reaching the Vietnam peace deal]? Or did De Gaulle ever speak to [Algerian leader] Ben Bella? The right time for a meeting between us was when things were ready for a decision by the leaders....” Barak implies that the negotiations had never matured or even come close to the point where the final decision-making meeting by the leaders was apt and necessary.

Barak believes that since the start of the intifada Israel has had no choice—“and it doesn’t matter who is prime minister” (perhaps a jab at his former rival and colleague in the Labor Party, the dovish-sounding Shimon Peres, currently Israel’s foreign minister)—but to combat terrorism with military force. The policy of “targeted killings” of terrorist organizers, bomb-makers, and potential attackers began during his premiership and he still believes it is necessary and effective, “though great care must be taken to limit collateral damage. Say you live in Chevy Chase and you know of someone who is preparing a bomb in Georgetown and intends to launch a suicide bomber against a coffee shop outside your front door. Wouldn’t you do something? Wouldn’t it be justified to arrest this man and, if you can’t, to kill him?” he asks.

Barak supported Sharon’s massive incursion in April—“Operation Defensive Wall”—into the Palestinian cities—Nablus, Jenin, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Qalqilya, and Tulkarm—but suggests that he would have done it differently:

More forcefully and with greater speed, and simultaneously against all the cities, not, as was done, in staggered fashion. And I would argue with the confinement of Arafat to his Ramallah offices. The present situation, with Arafat eyeball to eyeball with [Israeli] tank gun muzzles but with an in-surance policy [i.e., Israel’s promise to President Bush not to harm him], is every guerrilla leader’s wet dream. But, in general, no responsible government, following the wave of suicide bombings culminating in the Passover massacre [in which twenty-eight Israelis were murdered and about 100 injured in a Netanya hotel while sitting at the seder] could have acted otherwise.

But he believes that the counter-terrorist military effort must be accompanied by a constant reiteration of readiness to renew peace negotiations on the basis of the Camp David formula. He seems to be hinting here that Sharon, while also interested in political dialogue, rejects the Camp David proposals as a basis. Indeed, Sharon said in April that his government will not dismantle

any settlements, and will not discuss such a dismantling of settlements, before the scheduled November 2003 general elections. Barak fears that in the absence of political dialogue based on the Camp David–Clinton proposals, the vacuum created will be filled by proposals, from Europe or Saudi Arabia, that are less agreeable to Israel.

Barak seems to hold out no chance of success for Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, should they somehow resume, so long as Arafat and like-minded leaders are at the helm on the Arab side. He seems to think in terms of generations and hesitantly predicts that only “eighty years” after 1948 will the Palestinians be historically ready for a compromise. By then, most of the generation that experienced the catastrophe of 1948 at first hand will have died; there will be “very few ‘salmons’ around who still want to return to their birthplaces to die.” (Barak speaks of a “salmon syndrome” among the Palestinians—and says that Israel, to a degree, was willing to accommodate it, through the family reunion scheme, allowing elderly refugees to return to be with their families before they die.) He points to the model of the Soviet Union, which collapsed roughly after eighty years, after the generation that had lived through the revolution had died. He seems to be saying that revolutionary movements’ zealotry and dogmatism die down after the passage of three generations and, in the case of the Palestinians, the disappearance of the generation of the *nakba*, or catastrophe, of 1948 will facilitate compromise.

I asked, “If this is true, then your peace effort vis-à-vis the Palestinians was historically premature and foredoomed?”

Barak: “No, as a responsible leader I had to give it a try.”

In the absence of real negotiations, Barak believes that Israel should begin to unilaterally prepare for a pullout from “some 75 percent” of the West Bank and, he implies, all or almost all of the Gaza Strip, back to defensible borders, while allowing a Palestinian state to emerge there. Meanwhile Israel should begin constructing a solid, impermeable fence around the evacuated parts of the West Bank and new housing and settlements inside Israel proper and in the areas of the West Bank that Israel intends to permanently annex (such as the Etzion Block area, south of Bethlehem) to absorb the settlers who will be moving out of the territories. He says that when the Palestinians will be ready for peace, the fate of the remaining 25 percent of the West Bank can be negotiated.

Barak is extremely troubled by the problem posed by Israel’s Arab minority, representing some 20 percent of Israel’s total population of some 6.5 million. Their leadership over the past few years has come to identify with Arafat and the PA, and an increasing number of Israeli Arabs, who now commonly refer to themselves as “Palestinian Arabs,” oppose Israel’s existence and support the Palestinian armed struggle. A growing though still very small number have engaged in terrorism, including one of the past months’ suicide bombers. Barak agrees that, in the absence of a peace settlement with the Palestinians, Israel’s Arabs constitute an irredentist “time bomb,” though he declines to use the phrase. At the start of the intifada Israel’s Arabs rioted around the country, blocking major highways with stones and Molotov cocktails. In response, thirteen were killed by Israeli policemen, deepening the chasm between the country’s Jewish majority and Arab minority.

The relations between the two have not recovered and the rhetoric of the Israeli Arab leadership has grown steadily more militant. One Israeli Arab Knesset member, Azmi Bishara, is currently on trial for sedition. If the conflict with the Palestinians continues, says Barak, “Israel’s Arabs will serve as [the Palestinians’] spearpoint” in the struggle:

This may necessitate changes in the rules of the democratic game ... in order to assure Israel’s Jewish character.

He raises the possibility that in a future deal, some areas with large Arab concentrations, such as the “Little Triangle” and Umm al-Fahm, bordering on the West Bank, could be transferred to the emergent Palestinian Arab state, along with their inhabitants:

But this could only be done by agreement—and I don’t recommend that government spokesmen speak of it [openly]. But such an exchange makes demographic sense and is not inconceivable.

Barak is employed as a senior adviser to an American company, Electronic Data Systems, and is considering a partnership in a private equity company, where he will be responsible for “security-related” ventures. I asked him, “Do you see yourself returning to politics?” Barak answered,

Look, the public [decisively] voted against me a year ago. I feel like a reserve soldier who knows he might be called upon to come back but expects that he won’t be unless it is absolutely necessary. But it’s not inconceivable. After all, Rabin returned to the premiership fifteen years after the end of his first term in office.

At one point in the interview, Barak pointed to the settlement campaign in heavily populated Palestinian areas, inaugurated by Menachem Begin’s Likud-led government in 1977, as the point at which Israel took a major historical wrong turn. But at other times Barak pointed to 1967 as the crucial mistake, when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza (and Sinai and the Golan Heights) and, instead of agreeing to immediate withdrawal from all the territories, save East Jerusalem, in exchange for peace, began to settle them. Barak recalled seeing David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s founder and first prime minister (1948–1953 and 1955–1963), on television in June 1967 arguing for the immediate withdrawal from all the territories occupied in the Six- Day War in exchange for peace, save for East Jerusalem.

Many of us—me included—thought that he was suffering from [mental] weakness or perhaps a subconscious jealousy of his successor [Levi Eshkol, who had presided over the unprecedented victory and conquests]. Today one understands that he simply saw more clearly and farther than the leadership at that time.

How does Barak see the Middle East in a hundred years’ time? Would it contain a Jewish state? Unlike Arafat, Barak believes it will, “and it will be strong and prosperous. I really think this. Our connection to the Land of Israel is not like the Crusaders’.... Israel fits into the zeitgeist of our era. It is true that there are demographic threats to its existence. That is why a separation from the Palestinians is a compelling imperative. Without such a separation [into two states] there is no future for the Zionist dream.”

Lesson 3

Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace

| BARAK SAYS YES; ARAFAT EQUIVOCATES |

Arafat was never good at facing moments of truth. They tended by definition to close doors, to foreclose options. Now, especially with the end of conflict as part of the President's ideas, he was on the spot.

Almost immediately he looked for ways to avoid an early decision. He wanted

clarifications. When we communicated back that he must accept the President's ideas first before we would engage in any discussions, he sent Saeb to seek clarifications from Gilad. Not surprisingly, Saeb was not happy with what he heard from Gilad—who told him that the Israelis would like to lease an additional 1 percent of the territory from the Palestinians, and the lease would be for “999 years.” Saeb then called me to explain that the Chairman was very concerned about what Gilad had said.

I was blunt in response: “Gilad does not speak for us, and these are the President's ideas, not Gilad's or Barak's. Like you, they will have to accept them by the twenty-seventh.” Saeb pleaded with me to come and sit with him and Gilad. I said no, seeing this as an obvious ploy to turn the President's ideas into a new basis for negotiation, not the basis of conclusion. Meanwhile, Arafat persuaded President Mubarak to call President Clinton and ask for me to come and sit with Saeb and Gilad; this, despite Mubarak having told the President in their conversation on the twenty-third, that the Clinton ideas were historic and he would encourage Arafat to accept them. Now he would only say that “Arafat has questions.” Mubarak was not about to assume a responsibility for the Palestinians. But we were not about to relieve Arafat of his need to make a decision.

However, he probed every possible out. Yossi Ginossar was at Sloan-Kettering in New York recuperating from cancer surgery. Amnon Shahak was also in New York at this time. Now Arafat sent Abu Ala and Mohammad Rashid to see them. Yossi called to tell me this, reporting that they were clearly trying to see if the Israelis would join them in redefining the Clinton ideas—or at least accepting a need for more time. I sensed that Yossi was also probing me to see if we were going to stand firm now. “Yossi,” I said, “these are the President's ideas and he will not let me talk to anyone now. Both sides must first accept the ideas.”

“That's what I told them,” he answered. But he also added that, based on what we are hearing from Abu Ala, “I do not believe the old man is ready to make a decision.”

Shortly after my conversation with Yossi, Abu Ala called me. He told me that “the Chairman has asked me to come see you.” “Abu Ala,” I said, “you are my friend and I will always want to see you, but when you come, I will not talk about the ideas. The President won't let me. We must have an acceptance first before I can talk about them.”

He was clearly disappointed, saying there was little point in his coming under those circumstances. But Arafat was not giving up, especially knowing our relationship. Within a half hour Abu Ala called back, telling me that “Abu Ammar wants me to come even though you said you won't talk about the ideas.” Fine, I said, you know I am always happy to see you.

Abu Ala would visit Washington on December 29, two days after answers were due. On the twenty-seventh, Barak convened his security cabinet in Jerusalem and

they voted to accept the Clinton ideas with reservations. But the reservations were within the parameters, not outside them. Barak's government had now formally accepted ideas that would effectively divide East Jerusalem, end the IDF's presence in the Jordan Valley, and produce a Palestinian state in roughly 97 percent of the West Bank, and 100 percent of Gaza.

There were only mixed messages from the Palestinians on the twenty-seventh—some suggesting the ideas would be rejected, others suggesting that more talks were needed. Mubarak pleaded with us to give Arafat more time and not to treat his non-response as a no. President Clinton agreed to that, even as he called Arab leaders on a daily basis to have them pressure Arafat to say yes lest he miss a historic opportunity.

On December 29, Abu Ala arrived and Gamal joined me in meeting with him and Mohammad Rashid. They understood I would not talk about the ideas and limited themselves to explaining that Arafat was under a great deal of pressure to say no. Did they understand the consequences of that? I asked. They did. Was no one on their side arguing for the best deal they would ever get? There was, but they did not sound confident about the outcome. I asked to be alone with Abu Ala.

When we were alone, I told him, You are my friend and I don't want you coming back in three months and saying, "You never told me really what would happen if the Chairman says no." So let me tell you: "First, I will be gone. I may be the guy your colleagues love to hate, but I am also the one they all wake up at 3 a.m. when they have a problem. You know that I understand your problems, your needs, and your aspirations very well. You know that I often explain them better than any of you do. You won't have me anymore. Unfortunately, my absence will be the least of your worries. Far more important, Clinton is going to be gone. And he is going to be replaced by a new President who lost the popular vote. George W. Bush becomes President with almost no political capital. He has no interest in this issue. The people around him don't like the issue and think it is hopeless. Having watched Clinton invest the resources of the presidency in it and get stiffed by Arafat, they will want nothing to do with Arafat. They believe we indulged Arafat too much.

"Mark my words, they will disengage from the issue and they will do so at a time when you won't have Barak, or Amnon or Shlomo, but at a time when you will have Sharon as Prime Minister. He will be elected for sure if there is no deal, and your 97 percent will become 40 to 45 percent; your capital in East Jerusalem will be gone; the IDF out of the Jordan Valley will be gone; unlimited right of return for refugees to your state will be gone. Abu Ala, you know I am telling you the truth."

He looked at me sadly and with a note of complete resignation replied, "I am afraid it may take another fifty years to settle this now." As the meeting ended, I didn't know which of us was more depressed.

Following Arafat's meeting with President Ben Ali of Tunisia and Foreign Minister bin Yahya's call requesting that the President see Arafat, President Clinton invited Arafat to Washington for a meeting on January 2. Before seeing the President at the White House, Bandar and Egyptian ambassador Nabil Fahmy went to see Arafat at his Washington hotel. According to Mohammad Rashid, who was at the meeting, they pushed Arafat hard to accept the President's ideas, telling him it was his decision but he should understand this was the best deal he was going to get and the new Bush administration would in all likelihood disengage from the issue. At a minimum, it was in his interest to have the new administration see he had said yes. Bandar had lived up to his promise to me and brought the Egyptians into this as well.

Alas, Arafat was not up to peacemaking. After the meeting with President Clinton, it was clear: he was not up to ending the conflict, and already he had effectively rejected the President's ideas. His reservations were deal-killers, involving his actual rejection of the Western Wall part of the formula on the Haram, his rejection of the most basic elements of the Israeli security needs, and his dismissal of our refugee formula. All were deal-killers.

For me, there was no mistaking that this was the end of the road. However, because of the Israeli election, we tried one final gambit. With Barak pressing for the President to travel to the area, President Clinton was ready for one last roll of the dice. I thought this was crazy, but the President was unwilling to say no to Barak, and was willing even in the last two weeks of his presidency to fly to Israel and meet with Barak and Arafat. President Clinton found it difficult to give up, especially believing that Barak's certain defeat would spell the end of peacemaking in the Middle East for a long time to come. The President did not believe there would be a benign status quo in the absence of any hope for peace; instead he feared a deteriorating environment that imposed increasingly high costs on Palestinians and Israelis alike.

I shared his analysis, but felt our administration was past the point where it could make a difference. Still, I could not dissuade the President from going to the area by simply arguing against it, so I suggested one last test: the President should call Arafat and tell him he would come to the area to conclude an agreement, but only if Arafat first worked out a set of understandings with the Israelis on the core issues of Jerusalem, refugees, security, and borders. The President would ask Arafat to meet for twenty-four hours straight with Amnon Shahak and Shimon Peres, the two Israelis he trusted the most, in order to resolve everything or at least resolve how everything would be dealt with. If at the end of the twenty-four-hour period the two sides called

the President jointly and reported that they had overcome their differences, the President would fly to the area and preside over the finalization of their agreement.

President Clinton liked this idea, ran it by Barak—who also liked it—and then called Arafat. Arafat acted like someone facing a visit to the dentist. He would like to do it, but he would not be available. He had to go see President Ben Ali of Tunisia. Standing by, I scribbled a note to the President saying you are offering him a historic opportunity, you are prepared to take this enormous leap, and he is too busy. What does that tell us?

The President pushed him, but the most that Arafat was willing to do was to have the negotiators get together again. “Saeb could meet Peres.” He would join them after they met. This was another no. If Arafat was truly looking for a way to conclude an agreement—partial or complete—here was his opportunity, even timed to coincide dramatically with the end of the Clinton presidency.

How many times did Arafat have to tell us no before we heard “no”? How many times could excuses be made for him? Those who argue that we just ran out of time ignore the many opportunities Arafat had refused. They ignore that with the Clinton ideas practically on the table at the end of September, Arafat either let the Intifada begin or, as some argue, actually gave orders for it. They ignore his actual rejection of the specifics of the Clinton ideas. They ignore his extraordinary rebuff of the President’s extraordinary offer to come to the area in his final days as President.

They even ignore a last-gasp effort on the part of the Israelis to produce a joint letter from Barak and Arafat that would summarize the areas of agreement and the baselines for the negotiations that could be sent to President Clinton as he left office. In early January, Gilad Sher came to Washington to work on this letter with us. He and his colleagues now understood that the election was a lost cause. Barak was going to lose. The letter was an effort to concretize points of agreements in a way that would tie Sharon’s hands as Prime Minister. Even this Arafat was not prepared to do because it required him to acknowledge concessions on his side. Even creating new advantageous baselines for the Palestinians on all the core issues was not sufficient for Arafat, who was in the end unwilling to even appear to be conceding anything.

Yasir Arafat had definitively demonstrated that he could not end the conflict. We had made every conceivable effort to do what we now had to accept was impossible with Yasir Arafat.

During the first week of the Bush presidency, the negotiators on both sides went to Taba, Egypt. The real purpose was not to reach agreement, but on the Israeli side to try to constrain what Sharon could do and on the Palestinian side to try to get the Bush administration to buy into the Clinton ideas.

Neither was going to happen. Did we come close? Yes. Were the Palestinian negotiators ready to do the deal that was available? Yes. Did we ultimately fail because of the mistakes that Barak made and the mistakes that Clinton made? No, each, regardless of his tactical mistakes, was ready to confront history and mythology. Only one leader was unable or unwilling to confront history and mythology: Yasir Arafat.

Anwar Nusseibeh decried the Mufti of Jerusalem as someone who succeeded as a symbol and failed as a leader. Tragically, for Palestinians and Israelis alike, these words captured the essence of Arafat fifty-three years later.

Lesson 3

Ariel Sharon, "Disengagement Plan (The Withdrawal from Gaza)"

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon: Disengagement Plan • 591

I know that, as you state in your letter, you are aware that certain responsibilities face the state of Israel. Among these, your government has stated that the barrier being erected by Israel should be a security rather than political barrier, should be temporary rather than permanent, and therefore not prejudice any final status issues including final borders, and its route should take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.

As you know, the United States supports the establishment of a Palestinian state that is viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent, so that the Palestinian people can build their own future in accordance with my vision set forth in June 2002 and with the path set forth in the road map. The United States will join with others in the international community to foster the development of democratic political institutions and new leadership committed to those institutions, the reconstruction of civic institutions, the growth of a free and prosperous economy, and the building of capable security institutions dedicated to maintaining law and order and dismantling terrorist organizations.

A peace settlement negotiated between Israelis and Palestinians would be a great boon not only to those peoples but to the peoples of the entire region. Accordingly, the United States believes that all states in the region have special responsibilities: to support the building of the institutions of a Palestinian state; to fight terrorism, and cut off all forms of assistance to individuals and groups engaged in terrorism; and to begin now to move toward more normal relations with the state of Israel. These actions would be true contributions to building peace in the region. . . .

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon: Disengagement Plan (May 28, 2004)

. . . The State of Israel believes it must take action to improve the current situation. The State of Israel has reached the conclusion that there is currently no partner on the Palestinian side with whom progress can be made on a bilateral process. Given this, a four-stage disengagement plan has been drawn up, based on the following considerations:

A. The stalemate embodied in the current situation is damaging; in order to break the stalemate, the State of Israel must initiate a process that is not dependent on cooperation with the Palestinians.

B. The aim of the plan is to bring about a better security, diplomatic economic and demographic reality.

C. In any future permanent arrangement, there will be no Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, it is clear that some parts of Judea and Samaria (including key concentrations of Jewish settlements, civilian

communities, security zones and areas in which Israel has a vested interest) will remain part of the State of Israel.

D. The State of Israel supports the efforts of the United States, which is working along with the international community, to promote the process of reform, the establishment of institutions and improving the economic and welfare conditions of the Palestinian people, so that a new Palestinian leadership can arise, capable of proving it can fulfill its obligations under the road map.

E. The withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from the northern part of Samaria will reduce interaction with the Palestinian population.

F. Completion of the four-stage disengagement plan will negate any claims on Israel regarding its responsibility for the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip.

G. The process of graduated disengagement does not detract from existing agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. The relevant security arrangements will remain in force.

H. International support for the four-stage disengagement plan is widespread and important. This support is vital in ensuring that the Palestinians fulfill their obligations in terms of fighting terror and implementing reforms, in accordance with the road map. Only then will the sides be able to resume negotiations.

II. Key points of the plan

A. The Gaza Strip

1. The State of Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip, including all Israeli settlements, and will redeploy outside the area of the Strip. The method of the withdrawal, with the exception of a military presence in the area adjacent to the border between Gaza and Egypt (the Philadelphia route), will be detailed below.
2. Once the move has been completed, there will be no permanent Israeli military presence in the evacuated territorial area of the Gaza Strip.
3. As a result of this, there will be no basis to the claim that the Strip is occupied land.

B. Judea and Samaria

1. The State of Israel will withdraw from northern Samaria (four settlements: Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh) as well as all permanent military installations in the area, and will redeploy outside the evacuated area.
2. Once the move has been completed, there will be no permanent Israeli military presence in the area.
3. The move will provide Palestinian territorial contiguity in the northern parts of Samaria.
4. The State of Israel, along with the international community, will help improve the transportation infrastructure in Judea and

Samaria, with the goal of providing continuous transport for Palestinians in Judea and Samaria.

5. The move will make it easier for Palestinians to live a normal life in Judea and Samaria, and will facilitate economic and commercial activity. . . .

D. The security fence

The State of Israel will continue to construct the security fence, in accordance with the relevant cabinet decisions. In deciding on the route of the fence, humanitarian considerations will be taken into account.

III. The security reality after the evacuation

A. The Gaza Strip

1. The State of Israel will monitor and supervise the outer envelope on land, will have exclusive control of the Gaza airspace, and will continue its military activity along the Gaza Strip's coastline.

2. The Gaza Strip will be completely demilitarized of arms banned by current agreements between the sides.

3. The State of Israel reserves the basic right to self-defense, which includes taking preventive measures as well as the use of force against threats originating in the Gaza Strip.

B. The West Bank

1. After the evacuation of the northern Samaria settlements, there will be no permanent military presence in that area.

2. The State of Israel reserves the basic right to self-defense, which includes taking preventive measures as well as the use of force against threats originating in the area.

3. Military activity will remain in its current framework in the rest of the West Bank. The State of Israel will, if circumstances allow, consider reducing its activity in Palestinian cities.

4. The State of Israel will work to reduce the number of checkpoints throughout the West Bank.

IV. Military infrastructure and installations in the Gaza Strip and the northern Samaria region

All will be dismantled and evacuated, except for those that the State of Israel decides to transfer to an authorized body.

V. The nature of the security assistance to the Palestinians

The State of Israel agrees that in coordination with it[self], consulting, assistance and training will be provided to Palestinian security forces for the purpose of fighting terror and maintaining the public order. The assistance will be provided by American, British, Egyptian, Jordanian or other experts, as will be agreed upon with Israel.

The State of Israel stresses that it will not agree to any foreign security presence in Gaza or the West Bank without its consent. . . .

Lesson 4
Grading Rubric, Video Advertisement

	<u>Advanced</u>	<u>Intermediate</u>	<u>Emerging</u>
Technical Proficiency and Clarity	Designer demonstrates careful editing skills and attention to detail. Message remains consistently clear to an external audience, with clear video and sound fidelity.	Designer delivers a moderately cogent message with minimal video or grammatical errors.	Advertisement and/or supporting paper contains obvious grammatical errors, misspelled words, typographic errors, and/or video snafus.
Alignment	The director delivers a compelling advertisement that engages external audiences. Each piece of media appears specifically chosen to advance the designer's ideas, and the designer makes a case for each in supporting paper.	Media supports the director's arguments but fails to deliver a compelling message. Director makes a good case for most of the media in his/her supporting paper.	Media appears haphazardly or arbitrarily chosen. Designer makes little or no case for the use of different media in his/her supporting paper.
Perspective and Empathy	The director inhabits the target group's viewpoint as if it was his/her own, and delivers persuasive and compelling visuals that evoke sympathy from the viewer.	Director demonstrates empathy for the viewpoint, but fails to articulate the viewpoint in a fashion compelling to the viewer.	Director appears distant from the subject matter and/or expresses none of the viewpoints desires.
Depth of Understanding	Weaves a compelling narrative that clearly demonstrates to the viewer why the director and target group view the world in the way that they do.	Demonstrates knowledge of the factors contributing to the target group's viewpoint, but fails to make a compelling case for their relevance.	Significant omission of the factors that contribute to the ways in which the target group views the world.
Tone	The author maintains professionalism while demonstrating vigorous passion for his/her arguments.	The advertisement, for the most part, simultaneously demonstrates both passion and professionalism.	The advertisement lacks any sense of professionalism or appears bored with the arguments at hand.

APPENDIX FOUR
Learning Materials for Unit Four

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THE MEANING OF HOMELAND

Amos Oz

And rightly so. But our justification *vis-à-vis* the Arab inhabitants of the country cannot be based on our age-old longings. What are our longings to them? The Zionist enterprise has no other objective justification than the right of a drowning man to grasp the only plank that can save him. And that is justification enough. (Here I must anticipate something I shall return to later: There is a vast moral difference between the drowning man who grasps a plank and makes room for himself by pushing the others who are sitting on it to one side, even by force, and the drowning man who grabs the whole plank for himself and pushes the others into the sea. This is the moral argument that lies behind our repeated agreement in principle to the partition of the land. This is the difference between making Jaffa and Nazareth Jewish, and making Ramallah and Nablus Jewish.)

(the area which Chamberlain offered is today in Kenya). Herzl favored acceptance of the offer, as he wanted to provide immediate relief for fleeing Eastern European Jews and as he sought to establish a large Jewish settlement relatively close to Palestine. Ultimately he foresaw an African Jewish settlement leading to Jewish settlement in the land of Israel. When Herzl presented the Uganda scheme to the Sixth Zionist Congress, though, opposition was intense, and a deep rupture occurred between those in favor (the territorialists) and those opposed. In 1904 the British withdrew their offer of land in Africa, and at the Zionist Congress of 1905, the delegates agreed that all future Zionist settlement activity would be limited to the land of Israel.

Ararat—In 1825 Murdecai Noah (1785–1851), probably the most influential American Jew of the early nineteenth century, purchased a large tract of land on Grand Island in the Niagara River, near Buffalo. Naming this land Ararat, he envisioned it as a Jewish agricultural colony. Leo Hershkowitz writes: "Though the proposal elicited much discussion, the attempt was not a success and Noah's pretensions as ruler were ridiculed. After the failure of the Ararat experience, Noah turned more strongly to the idea of Palestine as a national home for Jews" (*Encyclopaedia Judaica* 12:1199).

Birobidzhan—An area within the former Russian Republic of the Soviet Union, in the far east. It was established as a Jewish agricultural settlement by the central executive committee of the Soviet Union in the twenties, and in 1934 it was declared a "Jewish Autonomous Region." Many Soviet Jews settled in Birobidzhan, and at its height the Jewish population reached about twenty or thirty thousand. However, the Stalinist purges of 1936–1937 and 1948–1949 put a brutal end to developing Jewish life and culture there.

TO BE A JEW

The land of the Jews could not have come into being and could not have existed anywhere but here. Not in Uganda, not in Ararat, and not in Birobidzhan.¹ Because this is the place the Jews have always looked to throughout their history. Because there is no other territory to which the Jews would have come in their masses to establish a Jewish homeland. On this point I commit myself to a severe, remorseless distinction between the *inner motives* of the return to Zion and *its justification to others*. The age-old longings are a motive, but not a justification. Political Zionism has made political, national use of religious, messianic yearnings.

1. All three refer to proposed Jewish territorial settlements.

Uganda—Often called the Uganda scheme. Joseph Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, in 1903 suggested to Theodor Herzl that the Zionist organization establish an autonomous Jewish settlement in a part of British East Africa

I cannot use such words as "the promised land" or "the promised borders." Happy are those who believe, for theirs is the Land. Why should they trouble themselves with questions of morality or the rights of others? (Although perhaps those who believe in the promise ought to wait humbly for the Author of the promises to decide when the right moment has come for Him to keep it.) Happy are those who believe. Their Zionism is simple and carefree. Mine is hard and complicated. I also have no use for the hypocrites who suddenly remember the divine promise whenever their Zionism runs into an obstacle or an inner contradiction (and go charging off in their cars with their wives and children every Sabbath to cherish the dust of the holy places). In a nutshell, I am a Zionist in all that concerns the redemption of the Jews, but not when it comes to the "redemption of the holy land."² We have come here to live as a free nation, not "to liberate the land that groans under the desecration of a foreign yoke," Samaria, Gilead, Aram, and Hauran up to the great Euphrates River. The word "liberation" applies to people, not to dust and stone. I was not born to blow rams' horns or "purge a heritage that has been defiled by strangers."³

Why here of all places? Because here and only here is where the Jews were capable of coming and establishing their independence. Because the establishment of the political independence of the Jews could not have come about in any other territory. Because here was the focus of their prayers and their longings.

To tell the truth, those longings were organically linked with the belief in the promise and the Promiser, the Redeemer, and the Messiah. Is there a contradiction here? As I have already

said, religious feelings helped a secular, political movement to achieve an aim that was historical, not miraculous or messianic. The ancient yearning for the land of Israel was part of a total faith in the coming of the Redeemer. Faith, side by side with a common destiny, maintained the continuing unity of the Jewish people. But let us not forget, or allow others to forget, that it was not God or the Messiah or a miracle or an angel that achieved the independence of the Jews in their own land, but a secular, political movement with a modern ideology and modern tactics. Therefore, the Zionism of a secularist may contain a structural fault. I do not intend to gloss over this fault with phrases and slogans. I accept this contradiction, if such it be, and I say: here I stand. In our social life, in love, in our attitude to others and to death, we the non-religious are condemned to live with inconsistencies and faults. And that goes for Zionism too.

Consequently, my Zionism may not be "whole." For instance, I see nothing wrong with mixed marriage or with conversion, if it is successful. Only those Jews who *choose* to be Jews or who are *compelled* to be Jews belong, in my view, to this tribe. For them, and only for them, the State of Israel is a present possibility. I would like to make it an attractive and fascinating possibility.

I do not regard myself as a Jew by virtue of "race" or as a "Hebrew" because I was born in the land of Canaan. I *choose* to be a Jew, that is, to participate in the collective experience of my ancestors and fellow Jews down the ages. Albeit a selective participation: I do not approve of everything they approved of, nor am I prepared to continue obediently living the kind of life that they lived. As a Jew, I do not want to live among strangers who see in me some kind of symbol or stereotype, but in a State of Jews. Such a State could only have come into being in the land of Israel. That is as far as my Zionism goes....

RIGHT AGAINST RIGHT

As I see it, the confrontation between the Jews returning to Zion and the Arab inhabitants of the country is not like a western or

2. "Redemption of the land" is discussed in Leviticus 25:24 in connection with the jubilee year. Since the early years of the Zionist movement, redemption of the land has also referred to the purchase of land in Israel for Jewish settlement and agricultural development.

3. The quoted phrases are typical of Right-wing rhetoric from the period immediately following the Six-Day War of 1967.

an epic, but more like a Greek tragedy. It is a clash between right and left (although one must not seek a simplistic symmetry in it). And, as in all tragedies, there is no hope of a happy reconciliation based on a clever magical formula. The choice is between a blood bath and a disappointing compromise, more like enforced acceptance than a sudden breakthrough of mutual understanding.

True, the dispute is not "symmetrical." There is no symmetry between the constant, eager attempts of Zionism to establish a dialogue with the local Arabs and those of the neighboring states, and the bitter and consistent hostility the Arabs, with all their different political regimes, have for decades shown us in return.

But it is a gross mistake, a common oversimplification, to believe that the dispute is based on a misunderstanding. It is based on full and complete understanding: We have repeatedly offered the Arabs goodwill, good neighborliness, and cooperation, but that was not what they wanted from us. They wanted us, according to the most moderate Arab formulation, to abandon the idea of establishing a free Jewish State in the land of Israel, and that is a concession we can never make.

It is the height of naiveté to believe that but for the intrigues of outsiders and the backwardness of fanatical regimes, the Arabs would realize the positive side of the Zionist enterprise and straightaway fall on our necks in brotherly love.

The Arabs did not oppose Zionism because they failed to understand it, but because they understood it only too well. And that is the tragedy: The mutual understanding *does* exist. We want to exist as a nation, as a State of Jews. They do not want that State. This cannot be glossed over with high-sounding phrases, neither the noble aspirations to brotherliness of well-meaning Jews, nor the clever Arab tactics of "We will be content, at this stage, with the return of all refugees to their previous place of residence." Any search for a way out must start from a fundamental change of position preceded by the open-eyed realization

of the full extent of the struggle: a tragic conflict, tragic anguish.

We are here because this is the only place where we can exist as a free nation. The Arabs are here because Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinians, just as Iraq is the homeland of the Iraqis and Holland the homeland of the Dutch. The question of what cultural assets the Palestinians have created here or what care they have taken of the landscape or the agriculture is of no relevance to the need to discuss their right to their homeland. Needless to say, the Palestinian owes no deference to God's promises to Abraham, to the longings of Yehudah HaLevi and Bialik, or to the achievements of the early Zionist pioneers.

Current talk about pushing Palestinian masses back to oil-rich Kuwait or fertile Iraq makes no more sense than would talking about our own mass emigration to "Jewish" Brooklyn. Knaves and fools in both camps might add: "After all, they'll be among their brothers there." But just as I am entitled to see myself as an Israeli Jew, not a Brooklynite or a Golders Greener, so a Palestinian Arab is entitled to regard himself as a Palestinian, not an Iraqi or Kuwaiti. The fact that only an enlightened minority of Palestinians seem to see it that way at the moment cannot prejudice the national right to self-determination when the time comes. Let us remember—with all the reservations the comparison requires—that it was only a Zionist-minded minority of Jews that—justly!—claimed the right to establish a Hebrew State here in the name of the entire Jewish people for the benefit of the Jews who would one day come to a national consciousness.

This land is our land. It is also their land. Right conflicts with right. "To be a free people in our own land" is a right that is valid either universally or not at all.

As for the war between Israel and the neighboring Arab states, it is an indirect outcome of the confrontation between us and the Palestinians. Of course I am not going to explain everything away in terms of "devotion" or "brotherliness" on the part of the neighboring states. I only want to emphasize that the strife that has developed in the land of Israel must be resolved here,

between us and the Palestinian people. There is nothing tragic in our relations with Cairo, Baghdad, or Damascus. The war they are waging against us is basically a war of aggressors against victims of aggression, even though our neighbors are armed, as usual, with self-righteous rhetoric. The Arab-Jewish tragedy does not extend, therefore, to the whole Middle East, as the Arab states claim, but is confined to this land, between the sea and the desert....

BETWEEN TWO POSSIBILITIES OF ZIONISM

I believe in a Zionism that faces facts, that exercises power with restraint, that sees the Jewish past as a lesson, but neither as a mystical imperative nor as an insidious nightmare; that sees the Palestinian Arabs as Palestinian Arabs, and neither as the camouflaged reincarnation of the ancient tribes of Canaan nor as a shapeless mass of humanity waiting for us to form it as we see fit: a Zionism *also* capable of seeing itself as others may see it; and finally, a Zionism that recognizes both the spiritual implications and the political consequences of the fact that this small tract of land is the homeland of two peoples fated to live facing each other, willy-nilly, because no God and no angel will come to judge between right and right. The lives of both, the lives of all of us, depend on the hard, tortuous, and essential process of learning to know each other in the curious landscape of the beloved country.

Lesson 2

Yeshayahu Leibowitz and Eliezer Goldman, Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State

Yeshayahu Leibowitz,
Orthodox

CHAPTER 21

The Territories

(1968)

These comments were written and published several years before the Yom Kippur war of 1973.

Should Israeli sovereignty be extended over the territories of Palestine (and Sinai) Israel conquered during the Six Day war? Should they be under Israeli rule or control in any other form? Should they be restored to Arab sovereignty?

These political options are the subject of a widespread public discussion, which suffers from confusion of pragmatic and ideological issues. On the one hand, political and economic interests and security requirements are invoked ("peace," "recognized and secure boundaries"); on the other, an appeal is made to feelings and values (the vision of messianic redemption, "the Undivided Land of Israel," "the sacredness of the land," "the inheritance of our forefathers," "the tradition of generations," "our dead who fell for the liberation of our land"). Each one of these arguments must be dealt with separately and on its own merits.

The crux of the political debate is "peace and security." If the term "peace" is used here in its true sense, as a condition of coexistence between the state of Israel and each of its neighbors on the basis of a peace treaty adhered to by both sides—then there is no prospect of such a peace today or in the foreseeable future. This is not the place for a probing examination of the historical question whether at any stage the Jewish-Arab conflict over the land might have been resolved by an agreement acceptable to both parties. It can, however, safely be

said that if the twenty years since the establishment of the state included occasions in which a compromise might possibly have been reached, we neglected all of them.¹ In the present situation it is inconceivable that either side could freely propose terms of peace that would be freely accepted by the other. Only the pressure of the great powers prevents war in our region today and tomorrow. It may be that their power and pressure—if they agree among themselves—will bring about a counterfeit “peace” in the form of an imposed settlement which will be maintained as long as there is agreement between the powers. The clear-sighted—and there are clear-sighted people even in the government, though they seem to prefer to be silent—perceive that, without an agreement imposed from the outside, our situation will deteriorate to that of a second Vietnam, to a war in constant escalation without prospect of ultimate resolution. Tomorrow, perhaps, we will have to invade Amman or Damascus and nothing will be gained thereby.

“Security” is a reality only where there is true peace between neighbors, as in the case of Holland/Belgium, Sweden/Norway, the United States/Canada. In the absence of peace there is no security, and no geographic-strategic settlement on the land can change this. There is no direct link between security and the territories. There are no “secure boundaries.” Positioning defense on fortified lines—the Maginot Line mentality—always failed, from the time of the Chinese Wall and the Roman Lines through the Atlantic Wall of Hitler.² Our security problem is not a problem of specific boundaries nor solely a military problem, but rather one in which military, political and social factors are intertwined. So long as social organization and technology give us a qualitative advantage over the Arabs, and the American backing neutralizes the Russian involvement, we can repel the Arabs at any boundary. This was demonstrated by the outcome of the Six Day war, which we began with borders that touched Kalkilya and the wall of the Old City of Jerusalem. In the absence of any one of these factors, no border would avail us, not even if they were on the Suez Canal and the Jordan. This is the situation, realistically perceived. Now that we have gained borders that, according to the “experts,” are “ideal from a security perspective,” we are forced to dedicate a much greater portion of our national income and state budget to defense than in the years that preceded the Six Day war, before we got these “ideal borders.” Our

security has been diminished rather than enhanced as a result of the conquests in this war.

We are condemned to live in our country without peace and security, just as the Jewish people have existed for thousands of years. To safeguard this existence we will have to exert constant efforts and make great sacrifices. Hence it is incumbent upon us to understand the nature of the state for the sake of which we accept such an existence for ourselves and our children. Only in the light of such clarification may we adopt a position with regard to the problem of “the territories.”

Our real problem is not the territory but rather the population of about a million and a half Arabs who live in it and over whom we must rule. Inclusion of these Arabs (in addition to the half a million who are citizens of the state) in the area under our rule will effect the liquidation of the state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and bring about a catastrophe for the Jewish people as a whole; it will undermine the social structure that we have created in the state and cause the corruption of individuals, both Jew and Arab. All this will happen even if the Arabs did not become a majority in the state (as a result of their high natural increase) but remained a third or 40 percent of the population. The state would no longer be a Jewish state but a “Canaanite” state.³ Its problems and needs would no longer be those of the Jewish people in Israel and the Diaspora. Its functions would no longer be geared to these needs. It would be concerned only with the specific problems of rule and administration of this state—the problems of ruling over both Jews and Arabs. Its situation would be much like that of the state of Lebanon, perplexed as it is with the relations between Maronite Christians, Moslems and Druzes. The state would be harassed by such problems. In a short time the spiritual and emotional links between it and world Jewry would be severed, as well as the cultural and sentimental ties to the historical tradition of the Jewish people and to Judaism. The only concern of the monstrosity called “the Undivided Land of Israel” would be the maintenance of its system of rule and administration.

Rule over the occupied territories would have social repercussions. After a few years there would be no Jewish workers or Jewish farmers. The Arabs would be the working people and the Jews the administrators, inspectors, officials, and police—mainly secret police. A state rul-

ing a hostile population of 1.5 to 2 million foreigners would necessarily become a secret-police state, with all that this implies for education, free speech, and democratic institutions. The corruption characteristic of every colonial regime would also prevail in the state of Israel. The administration would have to suppress Arab insurgency on the one hand and acquire Arab Quislings on the other. There is also good reason to fear that the Israel Defense Force, which has been until now a people's army, would, as a result of being transformed into an army of occupation, degenerate, and its commanders, who will have become military governors, resemble their colleagues in other nations.

Out of concern for the Jewish people and its state we have no choice but to withdraw from the territories and their population of one and a half million Arabs; this action to be done without any connection with the problem of peace. I speak of *withdrawal* from the territories and not of "returning them," because we have no right to decide to whom to return them: to Jordan's King Hussein? to the PLO? to the Egyptians? to the local inhabitants? It is neither our concern nor our obligation nor our right to decide what the Arabs will do with the territories after we withdraw from them. We could continue to fortify ourselves in our Jewish state and to defend it. If we do not withdraw with honor—that is, of our free will and from an understanding of the true needs of the Jewish people and its state—the Americans and Russians will force us to withdraw shamefacedly.

As for the "religious" arguments for the annexation of the territories—these are only an expression, subconsciously or perhaps even overtly hypocritical, of the transformation of the Jewish religion into a camouflage for Israeli nationalism. Counterfeit religion identifies national interests with the service of God and imputes to the state—which is only an instrument serving human needs—supreme value from a religious standpoint. The "halakhic" reasons for remaining in control of the territories are ridiculous, since the state of Israel does not acknowledge the authority of the Torah and the majority of its Jewish inhabitants reject the imperative demands of its Mitzvoth. The conquest of the land by the army of the state of Israel is a great and impressive national achievement for every nationally conscious Jew, whether religious or secular. However, the conquest itself has no religious significance. Not every "return to Zion" is a religiously significant achievement: one sort of return which may be described in the

words of the prophet: "When you entered you defiled my land and made my heritage an abomination" (Jer. 2:7). The mere fact of the restoration of Israeli rule over the Temple Mount has no religious significance: Jewish sovereignty over the territories of the land of Israel, as a purely political fact, is not the "tradition of generations" which the advocates of "the Undivided Land of Israel" constantly evoke. This is not the true meaning of the "historic tie" of the nation to the land. For its "religious" or pseudo-religious advocates today, "the Undivided Land of Israel" is only the ideal of a dominant sector in this generation; whereas "the generations" to which they refer aspired to the renewal of Jewish sovereignty on the land of Israel only in conjunction with the restoration of the sovereignty of Torah. Only in this context was there a historic tie between the people and its land.

The land of Israel is the Holy Land and the Temple Mount is a holy place only by virtue of the Mitzvoth linked to these locations.⁴ These Mitzvoth were not associated with the land and the mountain because these are "holy." On the contrary, their "holiness" derives from the Mitzvoth associated with them. The idea that a specific country or location have an intrinsic "holiness" is an indubitably idolatrous idea. Consider what the prophet Jeremiah said about the "holiness" of the Temple when those who violated the Torah and Mitzvoth called it "the Temple of God" (Jer. 7). Nationalism and patriotism as such are not religious values. The prophets of Israel in the period of the first commonwealth and the Jewish sages in the period of the second commonwealth were, for the most part, "traitors" from the perspective of secular nationalism and patriotism. The rabbis who argue today that we should keep the territories for "religious reasons" are not carrying on the tradition of Elijah and the prophets of God but rather of the 850 prophets of the Baal and Asherah, "who ate of the table of Jezebel."

We all understand the lament of many of our citizens: "Did our dear sons then fall in vain in the Six Day war? Will the land saturated with their blood be desecrated by returning it to the Gentiles?" To those who utter this cry we can only say: in all the wars of past and present, those who fell died a meaningful death—and at the same time, they fell in vain. There is meaning to their death, if they fell defending their nation and land. Yet they fell in vain because their death (even if they died in a victorious war) does not necessarily resolve the issues over which they fought and fell. Moreover, our brothers and sons who fell

in the Six Day war saved the country from the imminent danger of the moment; but their victory and death did not end and did not even diminish the constant danger to the existence of the state of Israel. This danger continues and will continue irrespective of what will or will not be done with the territories. There is reason to fear that after all those who fell in the Six Day war, many more will yet fall for the defense of the homeland.

Lesson 2

Moshe Dayan on Settlement in Hebron – ‘A Real Disaster’

MOSHE DAYAN ON SETTLEMENT IN HEBRON—“A REAL DISASTER”

On April 27, 1997, the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharanot published interviews conducted by correspondent Rami Tal with former minister of defense Moshe Dayan in 1976. The following are excerpts from these interviews, which Dayan had requested not be published without his permission.

Dayan: I can say that at the beginning of the Six-Day War, when it became clear that we were heading to an absolute victory, much bigger than we had considered, to me it was clear that most of the territories that we conquered would have to be returned the moment that there was a peace agreement. . . .

In the West Bank and Gaza Strip the situation is not clear from an international standpoint, because they belong neither to Jordan nor to Egypt. Here the solution has to be more with the Palestinians who live there, not with Jordan or Egypt. . . . Therefore Gaza and its environs will be possible to keep when peace comes—but Sinai, no.

It's the same thing on the Golan Heights, but more complicated. The area is smaller and closer to Israel's population, and it was used always for warlike acts against our population. In addition, we established many settlements there—which caused us only tremendous problems in October 1973. We almost lost the entire war because of them—and it will be difficult to go down [from the Heights]. I saw this directly, even during the Six-Day War.

Question: How did you see something like that?

Dayan: Because I looked with the eyes of the kibbutz residents. And I knew that the moment we got to the Heights, they would begin to take the land. And when there are communities [settlements] you don't leave. That was our strength in the War of Liberation. This was always power, but it interferes with making peace. . . .

Question: The last time we spoke you said that in two instances you failed to fulfill your duty as minister of defense. One was that you didn't prevent the conquest of the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War. What was the second?

Dayan: The second, and to my mind the worse instance, with more dangerous implications for the future, is the case of the illegal settlement in Hebron. . . . I think that in this case I should have threatened to resign, and I believe, had I done that, the government would have adopted my opinion. But I didn't do it, and about that I am very sorry.

Question: Why didn't you do it?

Dayan: Listen, one has to look at this issue with the perspective of Yigal Allon . . . because it is he who was responsible for the fact that [Rabbi Moshe] Levinger [“father” of Jewish settlement in Hebron after 1967] sits there to this day—very bad—a real disaster. Yigal believed, and he still does, that he is the natural heir of Ben Gurion . . . and he did many things that he believed would advance his prospects of achieving this goal.

It's not difficult to see that Levinger is a disaster, but Yigal was not interested in Levinger, but in Moshe Dayan. Because I was opposed to such wild settling was enough for him to do his

best in order that he and his friends would remain there.

Question: Why is this such a disaster?

Dayan: I hope and believe that we will solve our problems with the Arab countries, and here I speak of all but Jordan, which presents a different problem because it is actually Palestinian, but ruled by a king who is actually Saudi.

But our problem with the Palestinians is entirely different. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be solved if we divide the country. In the end we will have to divide the country in some fashion, but that is only part of the solution. Yitzhak Rabin once said . . . that he is prepared to visit the Etzion Bloc with a visa. . . . This is a simplistic way of approaching a complex problem. Because the question is not one of visas.

Question: Then of what?

Dayan: The question is one of living together with the Palestinians, and this is very complicated. . . . What needs to concern us is that the Palestinians have a very large population—about one-half of our own. . . . Returning to Levinger. Levinger understands this and his solution is very simple—to do what we did during the War of Liberation but on a much larger scale, with planning, and expel them to Jordan.

By the way, I'm told that Arik [Ariel] Sharon shares this belief. I very much hope that he doesn't. I asked him about this. He explained to me that he supports the creation of a Palestinian state in Jordan, and he doesn't care if Yasser Arafat or anyone else is prime minister or king. But this doesn't mean that he supports expulsion of the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan. But I don't know if he says this to me because he knows what I think, or because he truly believes it.

In any case, with Levinger it's clear. He wants to expel. . . . Now he knows that if he says this openly he won't gain any serious support, even with that segment of the public that identifies with him emotionally and spiritually. Therefore, he yells that he is for coexistence, but I tell you that in Hebron one can't have the kind of coexistence he speaks of, it's impossible. . . . Listen, there is a lot of empty land here [in Israel] which belonged once to Arabs. An Arab comes and claims title to the land. Actually he can even come and buy the land and declare his intention to establish an Arab neighborhood. What is this? Coexistence! So what, this will be allowed to happen? He'll be allowed to do this? Are you crazy?

Question: But Levinger says that it is impossible that Jews will not be able to live anywhere in the Land of Israel?

Dayan: Yes. But that's only a slogan. Certainly legally it is forbidden to prevent Jews or Arabs for that matter from living anywhere. . . . Practically speaking, it won't work. Perhaps after 100, 150 years of sweet peace it will be possible, but not today. Levinger understands this perfectly. I stress to you that he doesn't want coexistence, he wants expulsion. He wants to make provocations that will engage the State of Israel, with the

DAYAN, *continued on page 5*

ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS TO SETTLEMENT EXPANSION

The headline in the Israeli mass market daily *Yediot Aharonot* on May 1 exclaimed: "In the Territories: Lots of Building—The Construction Craze in Judea and Samaria Once Again Begins a Stepped-Up Pace."

After almost one year in power, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be embarking on a quickened pace of settlement expansion. According to statistics compiled by the U.S. government and reported in *Ha'aretz* on May 20, there are no less than 9,000 housing units—able to accommodate 40,000 new settlers—on the planning maps of Israeli authorities. This figure does not include new housing in East Jerusalem, prominent among which are the 6,500 units now under way at Jebel Abu Ghneim (Har Homa).

Examples of this policy include the following developments:

- Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai approved the "E-1 Plan" for settlement expansion. The plan includes expropriation orders for thousands of dunams (4 dunams = one acre) to enable the construction of 1,500 units and 3,000 hotel rooms in 10 new hotels to be built on 3,000 dunams between the East Jerusalem settlement of Pisgat Ze'ev and the West Bank settlement of Ma'ale Adumim. Execution of the plan is not expected to begin for three years.

- Mordechai approved the submission of a plan to construct 1,550 units at the settlement of Givat Ze'ev, north of Jerusalem.

- Israeli television reported that Mordechai has endorsed "dozens of plans for construction in various settlements throughout the territories. Approval was given for thousands of new housing units, some of which will be built in the near future."

- Mordechai is reconsidering his opposition to the expansion

of the largest Golan Heights settlement by 1,000 units, which will enable the settlement of Katzrin to almost double its current population of 6,700.

Settlement leaders, however, observe that the government of Yitzhak Rabin "quietly approved" more construction in the settlements than has Netanyahu.

The extent of settlement expansion is constrained by factors over which Netanyahu has little control. First and foremost is the national slowdown in Israel's economy, including the housing sector. During 1995, for example, land was allocated for the construction of 51,500 dwelling units. This figure declined by 27 percent in 1996 to 37,640. Estimates for 1997 fall farther still, to fewer than 35,000 units nationwide. Settlement construction in the occupied territories is part of this national picture. The U.S. State Department information on Israel's settlement activity notes that of the 9,000 units being considered by the Netanyahu government, final approval has been awarded for 2,218—enough housing for 9,000 new settlers—in occupied territories outside Jerusalem. Second is the absence of the kind of "demand push" that dominated Israel's housing market—and contributed to the addition of 50,000 settlers in West Bank settlements in the period 1992–1996—during the years when almost one-half million emigrants from the former Soviet Union entered Israel. Third, the government of Shimon Peres bequeathed to Netanyahu fewer than 5,000 units of settlement housing in various stages of construction—one-half the number inherited by Rabin in 1992.

Netanyahu is operating under these constraints, which will make it difficult in the next four years for Israel to match the settlement achievements of 1992–1996. ♦

DAYAN, *continued from page 4*

power of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], to assist him in this effort. It is the strategy of the weak—to create through provocations a situation necessitating a stronger force to act on your behalf.

I didn't fulfill my responsibility as minister of defense in that I did not prevent the establishment of his piratical settlement in Hebron. I understood its significance, and knew that it would be a disaster, and I believe I should have threatened to resign. I believe there was an 80 percent chance that I wouldn't have had to resign and I could have received permission to get them out by force.

Question: So why didn't you do it?

Dayan: As far as I remember, I believed that perhaps in the end they would leave [on their own]. Not Levinger, he's a fanatic, but others who were with him. But it didn't happen.

I tried to speak with Yigal Allon directly about this matter. I said to him, "Yigal, this settlement is against everything you've

ever said. It's a provocation, it's against the law. How can you support it?" But with Yigal it was not rational, because the moment I took a position against it, he convinced himself that he was in favor, and he didn't think beyond this. Today there is a similar situation between Rabin and Peres, and this causes their dispute [the "illegal" settlement activities of Gush Emmunim that were supported by then defense minister Shimon Peres and opposed by then prime minister Yitzhak Rabin].

Question: Are you opposed to Gush Emmunim?

Dayan: I am opposed to hijacking. . . . I always agreed with Ben Gurion that 1948 marked the end of [the era of] "another goat, another dunam."

Hebron was a hijacking operation, a blackmailing operation against the State of Israel. Now if I, the government, am prepared to endanger children at Ma'alot [where 16 children were killed when Palestinian guerrillas took Israeli students hostage in 1974] in order not to surrender to blackmail, why do I surrender to Levinger's blackmail? ♦